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Abstract 
This thesis introduces four essays dedicated to the topics of responsible investment 
and reputation management. The first essay studies reputation management. This 
intangible asset is a strategic cornerstone for the company’s success, however 
academics yet to provide firm evidence if the management practices bring desirable 
outcome. Another unresolved question is a power of reputation over time. This paper 
addresses these questions through exploring the connection between firms’ concerns 
over reputation and performance, estimated according to Fortune’s “America’s Most 
Admired Companies” (AMAC) rating. The findings of the study demonstrate a 
relationship between firms’ concern over reputation management and performance in 
the rating system. Which provides evidence of reputation management to generate 
positive outcome for the company.  The results also suggest that the power of positive 
reputation has a “lasting weekend”, measured over period of time, proving its 
enduring effect. The second essay focuses survival on ethical and conventional funds. 
It implements a survival analysis to explore if ethical funds represent stronger 
survival capabilities. . The study implements ex ante method to generate dataset, 
which allows to study the survival, based on the dataset developed in the analysis of 
Kreander et al. (2005). The attained results indicate stronger survival capabilities of 
ethical funds. The third essay evaluated value generation capabilities of sell-side 
brokers through the introduction of the ESG ranking.  Implementation of new MiFID 
II regulations interferes with the financial landscape and directly impact on brokers’ 
business models and severely increase competition as brokerage firms are forced to 
disclose the fee information. The current study focuses on ESG ranking development 
as an alternative product a sell-side broker could offer to the client alongside the other 
research services. A portfolio of stocks was created on the basis of the ESG 
recommendations to evaluate value generation capability and its efficiency. Further, 
ESG rating based portfolio was created using the ASSET4 data. The portfolios were 
compared to the portfolios of SRI funds and European sustainable index. This 
approach allows comparing the competitiveness of developed ranking.  Empirical 
analysis embedded CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) and Fama–French (1993) 
models. The analysis revealed statistically strong results. Then recommendation and 
SRI-based portfolios demonstrated negative alpha. Ranking-based portfolio 
demonstrated positive and negative significant alpha. This evidence suggest the ESG 
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recommendations introduced by sell-side broker could withhold competition with 
similar products, however do not allow to generate consistent abnormal returns. The 
last essay explores the ESG framework in the context of the private equity sector. 
This topic has been significantly overlooked by the academic community due to the 
limited information available for in-depth empirical studies, as well as the only 
relatively recent interest from the perspective of investors, in comparison to the equity 
markets. This essay extends the existent research scale and explores the motivation, 
the issues and the barriers related to ESG framework in the private equity field. It 
provides evidence of a growing demand from institutional investors for the ESG 
however the existent scepticism and opaqueness of the industry hinders the growth of 
framework. This essay introduced an exploratory study of the relationship between 
negative ESG events and private equity multiples. The results proved the impact the 
events have, as companies involved in negative ESG events demonstrated weaker 
growth on the basis of multiple evaluations. This study introduces a firm base to 
further grow empirical insight to the potential benefits private equity sector could 
extract in association with ESG implementation to their investment.   
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Introduction 
I.1 Research Background 
Responsible and sustainable investment has introduced significant change to the 
financial and investment industries in an unsuspected way, and encouraged a shift in 
the existing traditions and norms. The concept has brought a new vision, which 
encompasses classic perspectives on investment practices, and broadened investment 
horizons on a global scale. The responsible investment discipline has facilitated a new 
order, where economic development has become an important aspect of investors’ 
activities, facilitated on a micro-level through the adaptation of environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) norms in the investment process, and through the 
encouragement of new norms and policies on a global scale. A new generation of 
professionals has brought investment opportunities, which provide a competitive edge 
and strong financial performance, as well as allowing such investment to create a 
positive impact and address complex environmental and social challenges. The range 
of investment strategies and financial products across asset classes is growing at a 
significant speed and is providing an extensive range of opportunities for both private 
and institutional investors.  
The reinforcement of the responsible investment concept goes beyond 
financial markets, as it has gained strong support from governments, which encourage 
its further development through the implementation of new policies and regulations, 
as well as through non-governmental bodies that facilitate creation of a positive 
environment for the development of responsible investment practices.  
Not only the financial industry, but also companies and society at large have 
benefitted from the implementation of ethical practices and are eager to collaborate 
with sustainable investors. Addressing human rights violations, climate change issues, 
the elimination of labour exploitation, the improvement of health and safety practices, 
the promotion of gender and racial equality, and the improvement of reporting 
practices are only a few of the positive changes accomplished through the 
introduction of ESG practice. An innovative and active approach of investors, and 
2 
 
their desire to engage, positively reflects on companies and communities, providing 
support for both environmental and social needs.  
Responsible investment has a strong resonance within the academic 
community, as well as in industry: a relatively understudied subject is now inspiring a 
broad pool of academic literature. Existing studies are spread across multiple 
disciplines in an attempt to understand better the responsible investment framework, 
to explore its implications and to discover further opportunities for its evolution. This 
research eagerly joins with the efforts of the academic community through revisiting 
existing methodologies and practices, as well as introducing completely new angles 
on existing topics. 
Religion played a central role in establishing and regulating norms and laws, 
which academics nowadays associate with responsible investment practices. The 
modern responsible investment framework places the individual investor and his or 
her beliefs as key to the decision-making process (Renneboog et al., 2008). The 
period of the 1960s was characterized by the significant rise of social movements 
against conflict activities and racial inequality, which drew the significant attention of 
politicians and investors, triggering the process of a re-establishment of ethical 
frameworks (Hutton et al., 1998). The countdown to the modern history of SRI 
investment began in 1971, when the Pax World Fund was founded in the USA. The 
fund focused on the elimination of any war-related stocks from its investment 
strategy, developed in response to the Vietnam War (Hutton et al., 1998). Since then, 
responsible investors have taken an active role in promoting their values. In the 
1980s, SRI fund managers actively confronted the racist apartheid system of South 
Africa, advocating for the avoidance of investment in businesses associated with the 
regime. The environmental disasters and political turmoil that occurred throughout the 
1980s made investors more aware of the risks related to ignoring ESG-related 
activities, and resulted in a significant rise in interest in them in the 1990s. The shift 
in consumption patterns, the rise of ethical and social awareness, the development of 
corporate governance in response to a succession of corporate scandals across the 
markets, and rising threats related to climate change are also considered to be factors 
that influenced the establishment of the modern responsible investment framework.  
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The establishment of United Nations-supported Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI)1 in 2006 marked the initiation of a new era for ethical investment. 
The initiative was established as a network of investors dedicated to promoting ethical 
behaviour and sustainable practices across the global investment community. It 
introduced six key principles, encouraging investors to implement ESG practices in 
their investment and decision-making process, engage in active ownership practices, 
disclose information regarding ESG-related activity, promote PRI principles within 
the industry, collaborate with each other and follow organized reporting practices 
(PRI, 2016). The initiative became widely respected within the investment 
community: the number of signatories increased from 100 to over 1500 in 2016, 
accounting for investment managers, service providers and asset owners across the 
globe. 
The initiation of PRI brought a structure to responsible investment, not only 
through setting clear goals for investors, but also in providing a range of reporting 
methodologies and definitions. In the definition provided by the initiative, responsible 
investment is presented as “an approach to investing that aims to incorporate 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors into investment decisions, to 
better manage risk and generate sustainable, long-term returns”.2 As the interpretation 
of the ESG framework significantly varies among investors due to differences in 
investment approach and asset class characteristics, PRI defines the vector of each 
dimension. The environmental aspect of the concept includes climate change, 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, resource depletion – including water, waste and 
pollution – and deforestation. The social factor of ESG includes issues related to 
working conditions, including slavery and child labour, local communities – including 
indigenous communities – health and safety, employee relations, and diversity and 
conflict. Executive pay, bribery and corruption, political lobbying and donations, 
board diversity and structure, and tax strategy are topics related to the governance 
aspect of ESG.3 These definitions anchor the ESG framework and provide a strong 
starting point for investors to shape their own understanding of the concept.  
                                                          
 
1 See www.unpri.org/, accessed 23 June 2016. 
2 See www.unpri.org/about/what-is-responsible-investment , accessed 23 June 2016. 
3
 See ibid. 
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In literature and industry reports responsible investment is perceived as 
encompassing a multidimensional framework, which provides an opportunity to 
create a positive impact, gain competitive financial advantage and mitigate risks. 
Therefore its traces can be found in a majority of investment strategies, including 
those not purposely tailored to pursue it. It includes multiple angles, which reflect 
certain approaches and investment views. SRI, sustainable investment, ethical 
investment, impact investment and green investment are all angles under the umbrella 
of responsible investment, which identify with certain approaches and investors’ 
views. Due to the lack of clear definition, some of these terms are applied 
interchangeably in both industry and academic papers. 
 Responsible investment as a framework has evolved across industries with a 
growing number of institutional and private investors. Value creation, investment 
strategy diversification, cost reduction, active engagement and opportunities to 
improve companies’ business standards in the ethical way, creating a positive impact 
for people and communities, involvement in improvement and standardization of 
policies and regulations are among the most prominent features which attract 
investors who are willing to “do well by doing good”.  
Sustainable approach prove to positively impact the company’s reputation as 
well. This intangible asset has grown to become of prime strategic importance. In the 
highly competitive environment and highest speed of information transfer, reputation 
could provide a wide range of benefits for a company, such as access to better quality 
of infrastructure as well as attract clients, as well as bed reputation could completely 
damage the company.   As companies make a tremendous effort to improve reputation 
management, sustainability become an increasing popular framework companies rely 
on. As growing academic body links sustainability to reputation improvement, it 
could be suggested, that these to field of research go together hand by hand. 
The multifaceted nature of the responsible investment approach has introduced 
a vast research field for academics to explore. Expansion of the framework and its 
application across various asset classes raises questions between both the academic 
and business communities. The existing pool of literature covers numerous domains 
related to responsible investment, such as the implementation of the ESG framework 
across various asset classes, ESG evaluation techniques, engagement and active 
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ownership, corporate governance, improvement in reporting practices, measuring the 
contribution from ESG implementation, and many others. Nevertheless, one of the 
most significant areas of academic attention is dedicated to the financial aspect of the 
framework, and its potential for value creation. Four decades of research have been 
dedicated to the performance evaluation of ethical portfolios, through the 
implementation of various methodologies and techniques. Despite the efforts of the 
academic and business community, many question related to responsible investment 
remain unresolved, and the research pool exposes a substantial number of gaps. This 
provides further challenges for researchers and creates an opportunity for a valuable 
contribution to the subject, which this study is dedicated to undertake.  
I.2 Literature Overview 
I.2.1 Development of Responsible Investing and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Frameworks 
The significant shift in business dynamics in the direction of sustainability 
since the early 1990s (DB Climate Change Advisory, 2012) has encouraged changes 
across various sectors of the economy. Sustainability evolved as a complex concept, 
promoting changes in government regulations, fostering business ethics and increased 
business responsibility, and encouraging positive social trends. The framework found 
a profound reflection in the academic field, with a substantial amount of research 
dedicated to the topic. 
 Sustainability is rooted in the corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
framework, which was initiated in the nineteenth century (Katsoulakos et al., 2004). 
In the twentieth century, the growing prominence of consumers’ rights and the 
stakeholders’ role in a company’s performance, alongside an increasing awareness of 
environmental issues, provided a further impulse, all of which shaped the CSR 
framework (Visser, 2010).  
The ideas of Bowen (1953), McGuire (1963), Carroll (1979), Wartick and 
Cochran (1985) and Wood (1991) became the pillars of the modern CSR concept. The 
extensive work performed by these scholars defined the fundamentals of the 
framework – economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities – and 
established practices for the framework’s implementation within policies, principles 
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and practices. The CSR concept was gradually accepted in the business sphere; the 
adoption of stakeholder theory significantly encouraged the process, promoting the 
popularization of ethical approaches in management (Lee and Carroll, 2011). 
Strategic engagement with CSR received a significant boost in the 1990s. 
Increasing media exposure facilitated companies becoming more open and paying 
more attention to their public reputation and reporting practices (Visser, 2010). 
Scholars acknowledge that the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002 anticipated a new era for sustainability, putting 
CSR in the spotlight (Visser, 2010; Lee and Carroll, 2011; Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2014). Since the summit CSR has turned into a largely accepted and applied 
framework, and issuing non-financial reporting became a crucial part of reporting 
practices for many firms. With growing attention from governments and NGOs to 
sustainability and CSR, scholars suggest it has become an inseparable part of the 
strategy for a successful business (Galbreath, 2006; Lamberti and Lettieri, 2009). 
 
I.2.2 Defining Responsible Investment 
The definition of responsible investment is similar among both professionals 
and academics. Mercer (2007) and DB Climate Change Advisory (2013) define it as 
the process of the “integration of ESG criteria into [the] investment management 
process and ownership practices in the belief that these factors can have an impact on 
financial performance, in particular over the medium or longer term” (DB Climate 
Change Advisory, 2013, p. 19). They suggest that responsible investment could be 
“practiced across all asset classes” (ibid.). In the PWC report (2012) the accent is 
placed on the desire of investors to create value by implementing ESG-related factors 
in their investment portfolio. And MSCI (2014) highlights the potential for integrating 
ESG factors into the whole range of investment practice, including “investment 
analysis, allocation, risk measurement, security selection, and performance attribution 
process” (MSCI, 2013, p. 2). It should be noted that the existing definitions mostly 
depict the financial potential of an ESG framework implementation, which suggests 
that it has become a cornerstone of the existing sustainable investment strategies.  
For a successful implementation of the ESG framework, it is important for 
both investors and companies to understand what defines each of the three ESG 
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factors. However, the definition of environmental, social and responsible issues is 
broad and, as suggested by the PRI guidance (2015), depends on the individual 
features of the asset class and business. Environmental issues address safety concerns 
and mechanisms of the ecosystem and natural world protection. PRI (2015) 
highlighted: biodiversity loss; greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; climate change; 
renewable energy; energy efficiency; air, water or resource depletion or pollution; 
waste management; stratospheric ozone depletion; changes in land use; ocean 
acidification and changes to the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles. Issues related to 
human rights abuse and support of the well-being of society are incorporated in the 
social aspect, and cover such topics as: human rights; labour standards in the supply 
chain; child, slave and bonded labour; workplace health and safety; freedom of 
association and freedom of expression; human capital management and employee 
relations; diversity; relations with local communities; activities in conflict zones; 
health and access to medicine; consumer protection; and controversial weapons (PRI, 
2013). Corporate governance-related issues may include “board structure, size, 
diversity, skills and independence; executive pay; shareholder rights; stakeholder 
interaction; disclosure of information; business ethics; bribery and corruption; internal 
controls and risk management; and, in general, issues dealing with the relationship 
between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and its other 
stakeholders”.4  
 
I.2.3 Responsible Investment and the Financial Sector 
Sustainability found its reflection in the financial sector through the introduction of 
responsible investing practices, which were originally recognized as a “niche” 
alternative dominated by the socially responsible investment (SRI) funds which based 
their strategy on a negative screening approach (Commonfund, 2013; Crifo and 
Forget, 2013). For several decades after the appearance of the first SRI funds in the 
1960s (Commonfund Institute, 2013), the industry grew at a slow pace. Its growth 
only accelerated in the 2000s, driven by the diversification of investment practices 
(BVCA, 2011; PRI, 2011).  
                                                          
 
4 See www.unpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2013-14_PRI_RF_maindefinitions.pdf, accessed 21 April 2015. 
8 
 
Rather than focusing solely on negative screening, the new investment 
techniques allowed professionals to diversify investment strategies by addressing 
ESG-related issues from various angles (Eurosif, 2014). Incorporating ESG factors 
into the investment process permitted not only the enhancement of risk management, 
but also created an opportunity for future capital growth and improved investment 
performance, as suggested by many reports (PRI, 2011; Commonfund Institute, 2013; 
Eurosif, 2014). 
One of the most significant steps that facilitated the establishment of the ESG 
framework across industries, including the financial markets, was the introduction of 
the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), supported by the United Nations in 
2006. This framework was dedicated to promoting the integration of ESG factors into 
an investment process, which could be voluntarily adopted by investors. The creation 
of UN PRI encouraged the collaboration of like-minded institutions, companies and 
individuals who were committed to promoting a responsible approach in business 
through the introduction of ESG-related features into their financial reporting as well 
as implementing ESG-related activities in their investment targets (Malk, 2013). The 
number of signatories rose dramatically, from 20 institutional investors and $4 trillion 
worth of assets under management in 2006 (Commonfund Institute, 2013) up to 1376 
signatories and $45 trillion of assets under management in 2015, including asset 
owners, investment managers and professional service partners (UN PRI, 2015). 
According to one of the latest reports by the Global Sustainable Investment Alliance 
(GSIA) (2014), where the geographical distribution of the ESG investment strategy 
implementation was presented, 64% of portfolio investments were allocated to 
European markets and, combined with the USA and Canada, accounted for 99% of 
the sustainable investment universe.  
Despite the overall rising scope of ESG framework implementation across the 
financial markets, expansion has occurred unevenly. Public equity investors were the 
pioneers in the field (Commonfund Institute, 2013; Khan et al., 2015). The fixed 
income market was another to embrace the ESG framework. In comparison with the 
equity market, it provided a larger potential for the development of the ESG concept 
(MSCI, 2013). A recent development of fixed-income indices focused on ESG factors 
is a good illustration of the trend. In 2013, MSCI launched its first ESG fixed-income 
indices, together with Barclays (MSCI, 2013), followed by the announcement by S&P 
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Dow Jones Indices jointly with RobecoSAM of the launch of the S&P ESG Pan-
Europe Developed Sovereign Bond Index (S&P Dow Jones Indices and RobecoSAM 
Press Release, 2015). 
The most challenging asset classes in terms of the establishment of ESG 
practices remain alternative investments, which include hedge funds, venture capital, 
commodities, real estate, natural resources and private equity. More complex 
investment strategies, which lack transparency and detailed reporting and have 
relatively short-term investment horizons, could be seen as the key barriers to 
framework adoption (PWC, 2012; Commonfund Institute, 2013). Nevertheless, 
private equity industry has become involved in the recent growth of interest in the 
topics of sustainability and ESG.  
A growing pool of studies dedicated to the sustainability and responsible 
investment topics suggests that there is evidence of potential for value creation and a 
positive financial impact generated by the implementation of the ESG framework. 
While some sectors have demonstrated a high interest and implemented the existing 
technique relatively quickly others, like alternative investments, appeared to be more 
sceptical, so the process of ESG concept implementation has made slower progress. 
The private equity sector appears to be one of the last to incorporate the ESG grid 
within an investment strategy, and progress in the field lacks any deep analysis from 
academics or industry professionals. This study is dedicated to bridging this gap, and 
providing an in-depth overview of the current theoretical and practical developments 
on the topic; it also aims to provide evidence of a significant financial potential of the 
ESG framework for the private equity sector.  
  
I.2.4 Reputation and Responsibility 
A broad pool or research praise sustainability, which found broad popularity across 
various industries. As this thesis majorly focuses on the financial implications, it also 
overlooks a sustainability in the context of corporate reputation. Reputation and 
reputation management attracts a strong academic attention, as it has vital strategic 
implications for the company and stakeholders (Rumelt et al., 1994; Hitt et al. 2004; 
Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy, 2005; Tischer and Hildebrandt, 2014).Reputation 
provides a range of financial benefits, as strong financial performance is associated 
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with reputation improvements Brown and Perry, 1994; Deephouse, 2000; Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002, Garzert, 2015; Weng and Chen, 2017). As well as a range of non-
financial benefits, such as positive relationship with stakeholders (Weigelt and 
Camerer, 1988; Barney, 1991) and access to better infrastructure (; Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002; Gatzer, 2015). 
 Academics has undergone a big effort to define mechanism of reputation 
management. Mahon (2002) established two reputational pillars: substantive and 
symbolic actions. Substantive actions are the actual economic and social actions on 
which stakeholders base their valuation of a firm; whereas symbolic actions are the 
actions the firm takes to manage stakeholders’ perception of the firm (Mahon, 2002). 
Firms actively engage in symbolic actions to manage their reputations, as 
demonstrated in papers by Fombrun and Shanley (1990) and Deephouse (2000).  
 Numerous studies highlighted companies to address sustainable business 
approach as method do improve its reputation. Researches revealed companies, to 
have a positive reputation in social responsibility protect themselves from shareholder 
losses (Epstein and Schneitz, 2002), it allows to improve stakeholders’ perception 
(Robinson et al, 2011) and improve a protection from downside risk (Fombrun et al, 
2000). Companies engage in sustainability and apply various methods to 
communicate its engagement in CSR and various sustainable practices in order to 
receive a positive feet back from stakeholder and competitors (Robinson et al, 2011). 
A growing evidence associates improved reputational benefits through these practices 
(Sarbutts, 2003; Adams, 2008, Robinson et al, 2011).  
 It could be seen in academic literature reputation and sustainability to often 
come hand in hand. And as one subject complements another, this thesis addressed 
both fields.  
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I.3 Summary and Contribution of Essays 
Essay 1 
The first essay studies if reputation management works and endurance of reputation 
management power. A company’s reputation is a key communication point, which 
demonstrates the firm’s strength and competitive advantages. It is a predominant 
intangible asset of the firm, as well as one of its key strategic priorities. Due to this 
reason firms actively engage in reputation management practices. Numerous studies 
dedicated to explore mechanisms to manage reputation, as well as to measure it. 
 In comparison, very few academics address the timeframe of reputation 
power. Shultz et al (2001) revealed ability of reputation to “stick” on the basis of 
Danish ranking evaluation, however the timeframe was not measured. Further Roberts 
and Dowling (2002) indicted, that firms are more likely to sustain superior 
performance if they sustain positive reputation. Ang and Wight (2009) indicated 
cumulative effort that reputation has and further supported the findings of Shultz et al. 
(2001), linking longevity of reputation to stronger financial performance over time  
The task of measuring positive outcome and endurance proves challenging. It 
could be due to the intangible nature of the asset, therefore academic community is 
yet to develop robust approach.  
This essay examines outcome of reputation management based on company’s 
concern over reputation and its performance in the reputation ranking.  Reputation 
ratings are one of the most widely respected mechanisms relied on by both academics 
and industry (Brown and Perry, 1994; Fombrun, 1998; Ali et al., 2015; Weng and 
Chen, 2017). Therefore, it could be perceived among the most reliable means to 
estimate reputation.   
 The analysis of this paper is focused on Fortune’s “America’s Most Admired 
Companies” (AMAC) rating, which is highly respected in the industry. Due to the 
power of this rating, as well as its long history, it can be applied as a well-fitted 
sample to explore the connection between a company’s interest in reputation and its 
performance. The model presented in this study depicts concerns expressed by firms 
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over reputation management and examines its impact on its performance in the 
ratings. The second aspect focuses on measuring the power of reputation over time, 
through analysing a company’s performance over the time span of five years. 
 The results of the analysis establish a connection between firms’ concerns 
over reputation and performance in the rating. These results could be interpreted as 
indication, that reputation management work as it positive outcome was reflected on 
in the ranking. This study also demonstrates a “lasting effect” of reputation 
management. The results of the investigation suggest that there are lasting effects of 
reputation management, as firms’ concerns over reputation demonstrate an effect on 
their performance that could be detected over a t least two –year period.   
 These results contribute to the theoretical field of reputation management 
studies and suggest an alternative way to measure if reputation management works. It 
further expands the studies of Shultz et al (2001) and Ang and Wight (2009), 
indicated that reputation power lasts over two years, if accounting for firm fixed 
effects. 
 The practical contribution of the study could be useful for strategic planning 
and to promote the place of reputation management in it. Understanding of the power 
of reputation could facilitate the time-frame of reputation management activities more 
accurately.  
 
Essay 2  
The second essay is dedicated to the topics of fund survival and its 
implications for asset managers in the context of SRI and the performance of 
conventional funds. The existing pool of research can be divided into three categories: 
the studies which do not identify a difference between ethical and conventional fund 
performance, including Hamilton et al. (1993), Sauer (1997), Statman (2000), Bauer 
et al. (2005) and numerous others; the studies which found indications of ethical 
funds’ underperformance, including Gregory et al. (1997), Tippet (2001) and Geczy 
et al. (2005); and the studies which indicated positive ethical portfolio performance, 
including Luther et al. (1992), Mallin et al. (1995) and Shank et al. (2005). Few 
Notably, as highlighted by Cherub (2010), despite some datasets to suffer from 
survivorship bias, the majority of these studies either ignored survivorship bias during 
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the analyses or did not tackle it in the methodology. On the other hand, the studies, 
which address it, indicated a strikingly higher survival rates of ethical funds (Bauer et 
al. (2005), Renneboog et al. (2008) and Kempf and Osthoff (2008)).  
This study focuses on survival analysis ethical and non-ethical funds. Bauer et 
al. (2005) indicated higher survival rates amongst ethical funds. Renneboog et al. 
(2008) indicated a similar trend. This study takes a closer look at this trend and aims 
to identify whether ethical specification of the fund has an impact on the trend. In 
comparison to previous work, where survival was indicated in descriptive statistics, 
this study implements the survival analysis approach. 
As this trend was majorly overlook in the academic literature dedicated to the 
performance of ethical and conventional funds, this study focuses on the topic and 
explores if the trend is related to a fund specification.  
Apart from expanding the theoretical perspective on SRI and conventional 
funds, this study is insightful for asset management companies. Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) 
addressed the structure of fees, by searching for differences, in comparison to the size 
of fees in conventional funds; however no strong similarities were detected. As fees is 
a sole source for asset management companies to generate income, the funds, which 
demonstrate stronger survival could be preferred higher by asset managers.  
In order to study survival, the crucial component of the analysis is the dataset, 
which would allow us to study survival over time. Therefore ex ante approach was 
taken. It was applied of the dataset of Kreander at al. (2005), which provided data 
matched on the basis of size, age, investment universe at the beginning of the dataset, 
as a prerequisite to ex ante dataset formation. The essay implemented survival 
analysis to study the survival of ethical and conventional funds, and the chi-squared 
test. It also implemented Carhrat model (1997) as part of robustness test to compare 
the performance of SRI and conventional portfolio of funds. 
   Analysis revealed stronger survival capabilities of ethical funds. Chi-squared 
analysis, supported by the survival analysis based on the Cox (1972) proportional 
hazard distribution, revealed ethical specification to have an impact on survival 
longevity. The funds were analysed separately and then allocated to an equally 
weighted portfolio of ethical and non-ethical funds. Despite negative performance, the 
coefficient did not significantly deviate from the market in the case of both ethical 
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and conventional funds. Overall, despite stronger survival abilities, investment 
approaches did not find indications of ethical funds’ underperformance: both ethical 
and conventional funds demonstrated a positive risk mitigation capacity.   
From a theoretical perspective this study further expands the methodological 
toolkit applied for fund performance, through introduction of survival analysis, 
adopted from the IPO (Initial Public Offer) survival studies, such as Carpentier and 
Suret (2011), Espenlaub et al (2012) and Espenlaub et al (2016). It also provides 
justification for the accountability of survivorship bias in the methodologies. 
This study contributes to the literature dedicated to the asset management and 
fees structure, as was previously explored in the study Gil-Bazo et al. (2010). 
However, instead of exploring the size of the fees, it focuses on the timeline of fee 
payments. The results revealed stronger tendencies of SRI funds to survive. It could 
be argued that under the current structure of asset managers’ performance, adaptation 
of ethical investment offers a secure inflow of fees over a longer period of time, 
which positively contributes to asset managers’ earnings.  
 
Essay 3 
The third essay studies sell-side broker capability to generate value through 
adaptation of ESG practices, based on the example of the data provided by a French 
sell-side broker, which developed an ESG ranking. This is a rare attempt for a sell-
side broker to go that length to develop an alternative service, however under the 
condition of changing regulatory landscape due to implementation of MiFID II, this 
approach, it is important for sell-side brokers to find the ways to adopt to the 
changing landscape. 
  Brokerage houses previously did not pay enough interest to the opportunities 
linked to responsible investing. Sell-side brokers have operated by relying on the 
same model for decades. The participants provided recommendations, forecasting, 
earnings predictions and execution services to the buy-side, charging clients fees 
upfront. Academic community drew attention to certain inconveniences related to this 
system, suggesting that it allows brokerage houses to hide information on costs and 
create a certain level of opaqueness in the market (Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 
2001; Marber et al., 2014). 
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 As new regulations take place in 2018, they are expected to challenge 
significantly the existent sell-side, broker-dealer operating model. New Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) regulations are devoted to improving 
market transparency. Under new conditions brokers are forced to separate and reveal 
the price for research and execution, as well as to charge the clients after the service 
has been delivered (Deloitte, 2014; PwC, 2016; Bloomberg, 2017). These changes 
established new standards for broker-dealers and increase the severity of competition, 
potentially jeopardizing the existence of market participants. Under turbulent market 
conditions brokerage houses face an important challenge in finding new ways to 
secure revenue and generate value. As alternatives vary, there is a rising demand for 
robust evidence of the most secure alternatives. 
As sustainable investment theme rises across financial markets and is strongly 
supported by the staggering demand from both the sell and buy side, it could withhold 
prosperous opportunities from brokerage to find an alternative way to generate value.  
 Financial market participants apply ESG ratings and recommendations to 
develop ESG investment strategies. A number of agencies offer their services and 
provide publicly available ratings. However, numerous companies and funds choose 
to develop their own methodologies. The sector could be characterized as strongly 
dispersed, with staggering evidence of a lack of standardization approaches and 
transparency (Fowler and Hope, 2007; Chatterji et al., 2009), as many participants 
prefer not to disclose the rating methodologies. There is significant demand for ESG 
ranking on the market (Fowler and Hope 2007; Richardson and Cragg, 2009; Chatterji 
et al., 2009). There is no established regulations approach or standardized 
requirements for issuing ESG ranking. These factors create positive market 
opportunity for new entrants (Fowler and Hope 2007; Richardson and Cragg, 2009). 
Brokerage houses have extensive access to data and research capabilities, these 
factors provide them with strong prerequisites to implement ESG and develop ESG 
ranking in-house. 
 The current environment poses important questions regarding the future 
development and value generation opportunities for brokerage companies, as well as 
whether implementation of ESG solutions could provide a sustainable alternative. The 
current academic literature is yet to cover this subject, which provides an opportunity 
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for research. This study makes the attempt to fill the existing gap in the subject, and 
take the opportunity to suggest new alternatives for brokers through the prism of the 
ESG framework. 
 In order to estimate the value creation capability, two portfolios were 
generated: the one, which originated in Europe and the one originated specifically in 
France, as a French sell-side broker provided the dataset. CAPM and Fama-French 
models were applied for the analysis. ASSET4 data was applied to create an ESG 
ranking-based portfolio to compare the performance. Further, an alternative SRI fund 
–based portfolios were generated, as well as sustainability index-based portfolio to 
compare the performance of the results indicated the feasibility of the product. The 
results indicated broker capabilities to develop legitimate recommendations for the 
ESG-related investment opportunities, however the portfolios did not demonstrate 
strong positive alpha generation capabilities. 
As this essay analyses the attempt to create an alternative product by a sell-
side broker through development of an ESG ranking and issuing ESG 
recommendations for investors, it generates both practical and theoretical 
contributions. It explores opportunities for sell-side brokers to diversify and retain its 
competitive advantage amid the changing regulatory landscape. This is an important 
subject from a practical perspective, due to increasing pressure and tightening of 
competition (Bloomberg, 2017; KPMG, 2017). As brokers are obliged to develop 
prices in advance (Bloomberg, 2018), the competitive edge significantly narrows. 
This essay evaluates an alternative method of gaining competitive advantage, rather 
than focusing on the pricing.   
From the theoretical perspective, this essay adds diversity to the literature 
dedicated to the ESG ranking. In Chatterji and Levine (2006), Chatterji et al. (2009), 
Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010), Delmas and Blass (2010) and Dorfleitner et al. (2015) 
the authors explore the development and application of various sustainability 
rankings.  
 
Essay 4 
This essay is dedicated ESG framework in the context of private equity. In 
comparison to equity market, private equity implement ESG-related approach to the 
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investment process at a slower paste. The literature landscape appeared to be 
extremely scarce on the subject. Therefore there is no conclusive evidence of the 
reasons of the pace, or the motivating factors for private equity firms to implement 
ESG. The area, additionally, substantially lacks empirical background. This could be 
explained by the opaqueness of the sector.  
 This study represents a broad overview of the existent literature on the subject. 
It is highly characterised by the industry reports. It identifies key motivating factors 
and obstacles for ESG framework to penetrate and evolve in the private equity sector. 
In addition it introduces an exploratory study of ESG-related negative incidence and 
their relationship with private equity multiples. Thus study explores an early evidence 
of the relationship. As it could be used as the fundamental base for the further 
development of empirical framework. 
The essay established, that the main impulses for ESG implementation are 
based on the growing evidence of value creation and portfolio risk minimization 
opportunities (Cronelli et al, 2015), and stimulated by institutional investors and LPs. 
Additionally, the changing environment of the financial markets creates a positive 
environment for framework development (Malk, 2014; PWC, 2015).  
Literature review exposed measurement techniques to be the most problematic 
area, as suggested by reports (Doughty Hanson & Co. and WWF, 2012; Crifo and 
Forget, 2013). As there is no unified methodology available in the industry to guide 
ESG implementation. The lack of empirical evidence creates significant scepticism 
from some general partners (Commonfund Institute, 2013; PWC, 2014), and poor 
reporting standards hinder the transparency improvement (PRI 2013; 2015).  
 The results of the data, provided by the market participants and developed into 
a dataset through merging it with the RepRisk data on ESG-related negative events 
revealed a pattern, which indicates the relationship between negative ESG factor-
related events and the investment multiples.   
 Overall, this study has provided an extensive overview of the relationship 
between the ESG framework and the private equity industry, demonstrating the 
growing potential for the framework to develop. It demonstrated the initial elements 
of the influence that the ESG framework can have on portfolio performance are also 
presented, this is an important theoretical contribution, which could serve a catalyst 
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for further empirical investigations on the subject. From a practical perspective, the 
evidence presented in the paper is an important signal for private equity sector to take 
the framework into serious consideration.  
 Overall, it should be noted, that the paper is significantly dominated by data-
driven research. As responsible investment attract significant attention not only from 
academic, but also from the business community, a significant amount of data 
becomes available. This data reveal not only existent imperfections on the financial, 
market, but brings a strong incentive for academic investigation. Some of the data 
provided inspiration for the work, presented in the current thesis.  
 
Summary Table 
The table presented below summarizes each essay. It introduces the theme, the 
research question, the original contribution and the implication of the findings. 
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Overview of the four essays in this thesis on responsible investment, research output analysis and investment performance evaluation 
Essay number and title Essay 1: How Long Does Reputation Last? A Clinical Study of Fortune’s “America’s 
Most Admired Companies” Rating 
Essay theme(s) Clinical study: reputation management 
Contribution number First contribution Second contribution 
Research task(s)/research question Does reputation management work - examine 
relationship between firm’s concern over 
reputation management and its performance in 
reputation ratings. 
Estimate the capability of reputation to retain 
power over time 
Original contribution(s) Development methodology to measure if 
reputation management work through studying 
firm’s concern/interest in reputation 
management expressed by the firm and its 
performance in the ranking. Strong connection 
between these two factors was found, 
suggesting reputation management works and 
offers better outcome for the firm. 
Analysis of reputation. Reputation appeared to 
have long-lasting effect over a period of 
minimum of two years, in comparison to being 
subjected to yearly fluctuations.  
Implications This essay expands literature dedicated to 
reputation management and suggest a 
methodology to assess the outcome of 
reputation management activity.  
This finding provides important insight for the 
strategic planning of reputation management.  
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Essay number and title Essay 2: Evaluating 
Performance of SRI Funds and 
Conventional Funds: Revisited 
Essay 3: Do Sell-Side Brokers 
Add ESG Alpha? First 
Evidence From a European 
Leader. 
Essay 4: Returns to Corporate 
Social Responsibility in Private 
Equity? A First Explanatory 
Study. 
Essay theme(s) Responsible investments; SRI fund 
performance; fund performance 
analysis; matched pairs analysis. 
Responsible investments; ESG 
rating practice; brokerage. 
Explorative study: responsible 
investment and private equity. 
Contribution number Third contribution Fourth contribution Fifth contribution 
Research task(s)/research 
question 
Study the survival of SRI and 
conventional funds. Do the SRI 
funds have stronger survival 
capabilities in comparison to 
conventional funds? 
Could sell-side broker generate 
value through introduction of ESG 
recommendations amid changing 
regulatory landscape dictated by the 
implementation of MiFID II. 
What motivation and obstacles 
effect the slow process of ESG 
implementation in PE sector? 
Studies a relationship between ESG 
factors and PE multiples 
Original contribution(s) Introduction of survival analysis to 
study the survival of ethical and 
conventional funds.  Introduction of 
evidence of ethical fund to have 
stronger survival capability than 
conventional funds.  
It is the first paper to explore 
opportunities for brokers within 
ESG rating./recommendations 
framework. The study revealed, that 
adaptation of ESG recommendations 
generate a competitive alternative 
service.  
Introduction of in-depth literature 
overview; constructive analysis of 
current motivation and obstacles for 
ESG tilt stages of development with 
private equity sector; exploratory study 
of negative ESG events and PE 
multiples.  
Implications Results expand further ethical 
literature. Positive implication for 
asset management companies. 
Longevity of SRI funds suggests 
increase in the time period of fees 
the manager charges. 
ESG provided an alternative 
framework, sell-side broker could 
explore to generate value, as new 
regulations put standard value 
generating practices under pressure. 
The study provides evidence of the 
relationship between negative ESG 
incidents and PE multiples, suggesting 
PE firms to consider ESG implications 
for portfolios. The study provides firm 
base to unfold empirical analysis of 
ESG implications for portfolio 
performance, which academics and 
practitioners could use.  
 
21 
 
 
I.4 Thesis Structure  
The thesis is organized as follows. In the first essay I study one of the core assets, 
highly valued within the responsible investment framework – company reputation. 
The essay begins with introductory remarks and explores the process of the evolution 
of reputation over time. It examines the ways the company can benefit from 
reputation management and explores the mechanism of reputation management and 
measurement. The introductory sections are followed by the introduction of 
hypothesis formulation, focusing not only on the evolution of reputational effects but 
also on the strength of reputation over time. The data section introduces the AMAC 
rating, which is the key data source in this essay. The approach to the data analysis is 
presented in the methodology section, followed by an analysis of the results and 
completed with a discussion and concluding remarks.  
The second essay explores ethical fund performance. I introduce a new 
approach to dataset construction, based on the ex ante approach. The sample is 
constructed from both ethical and non-ethical European funds, which are matched on 
the bases of the data and performance results available at the starting date of the 
analysis. The analysis is performed by implementation of the Carhart four-factor 
model. The literature review of the chapter considers the existing studies dedicated to 
the topic. The data section and methodology provide a detailed description of the 
analysis, followed by presentation of the results and concluding remarks.  
The third essay explores the new opportunity for sell-side brokers amid the 
changing business environment due to the implementation of the new EU regulations 
MiFID II. It addresses ESG-related potential with a major focus on ESG ranking 
practice. The analysis is based on the unique dataset provided by the industry player. 
The literature overview is dedicated to revealing existing gaps in the academic 
material, and demonstrates a lack of comprehensive research in evaluating the rating 
technique of the market players. It also highlights the previous lack of attention to 
brokers as market intermediaries in the context of responsible investment. The data 
section provides characteristics of the analysed cross-section, followed by a 
methodology section, which explains the process of portfolio construction, which was 
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analysed through implementation of Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Fama–
French model (Fama and French, 1993). The outcome is analysed in the results 
section, followed by concluding remarks.  
The last essay takes a step away from empirical analysis and represents an 
exploratory study dedicated to ESG implementation in an investment strategy of a 
private equity market. Adoption of the ESG framework occurs at a slower pace in 
comparison to the equity and fixed income markets. The opaqueness of the industry 
affects information availability, which hinders the development of a thorough analysis 
and has resulted in a significant lack of academic research. The study explores the 
steps that lead to a development of the framework in the context of financial markets 
as an initial step. It further highlights the path of framework evolution in the context 
of the equity market, in order to understand the process. A further section focuses on 
the processes, which occur in the private equity sector. This begins with a literature 
overview, characterized by the absence of empirical studies and a strong dominance 
of industry reports, followed by an exploration of the ESG framework’s integration 
process in the private equity market, an analysis of the existing measurement and 
methodologies, and completed by an investigation of the hurdles and criticisms that 
have hindered development of the framework. The explorative approach is 
complemented by a clinical study, based on the unique dataset provided by the 
industry participant. This is composed of a short data introduction, comments on 
methodology, and results of the analysis. The study is summarized in the concluding 
remarks. An overall summary of the study and final conclusions are presented in the 
final section of the study. 
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Essay 1: How Long Does Reputation Last? A Clinical 
Study of Fortune’s “America’s Most Admired Companies” 
Rating 
 
 
Abstract 
The rise of the intangible assets’ role in investment decision making process, and 
investors’ interest to implement ethical approaches transformed reputation into a key 
building block in a company’s value chain. It is not only important to create a positive 
reputation, but also to retain it. This study investigates if management reputation 
work. It also evaluates firm’s ranking over time, in order to gain notion about 
reputation strength over time. The analysis studies Fortune’s “America’s Most 
Admired Companies” (AMAC). For decades it was an exemplary rating, respected 
across industries as a reliable source of reputational assessment. The results of the 
analysis suggest, that companies that manage reputation do better outcome, as 
demonstrated a discovered strong connection between a company’s concerns over 
reputation and the scores it received in AMAC ranking. It was also established, that 
reputation management retain its power over two to four years.  
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1.1 Introductory Remarks and Reputation Management 
Reputation management has attracted the attention of both the academic and the 
corporate world over the past three decades. Nevertheless, the subject was really put 
under the spotlight only at the beginning of the 2000s (Barnett et al., 2006), when the 
rules of industry competition started to be reshaped under the pressure of a changing 
economic climate. With the evolution of a new order on the markets, tangible assets 
no longer played a defining role in the competitive environment, as intangible assets 
took a leading position in strategic initiatives.  
 Reputation management in particular became a key asset and an invaluable 
aspect of strategic planning. It provided numerous benefits for the firm, including the 
opportunity for value creation, building and reinforcing relationships with various 
groups of stakeholders, and improving customers’ and employees’ loyalty (Hall, 
1992; Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy, 2005; Tischer and Hildebrandt, 2014).  
 Despite the evident power of reputation management as a concept, and its 
growing popularity, the topic caused significant dispute in the academic community. 
Numerous studies named the complexity and opaqueness of corporate reputation 
among the main reasons behind the lack of comprehensive approaches in the field 
(Fombrun et al., 2000; Ali et al., 2015; Garzert, 2015). The debate on effectiveness of 
reputation remains ongoing. And the question if reputation works and proves 
beneficial is of significant relevance In the meantime, the absence of systemized 
approaches offered a significant potential for further research.  
Among numerous unresolved questions, a significant dispute arose around 
measuring corporate reputation. With various approaches available for academics and 
practitioners, the efficiency of each is still a subject of debate. Some regard brand 
equity measurement as interchangeable with reputation estimation (Caruana and 
Chircop, 2000); another methodology involves comparison of firm position in the 
industry with an estimated “ideal” position (Hatch and Schultz, 1997). However, the 
most sought-after approach is reputation evaluation through a ranking system 
presented by the media (Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Fombrun, 1998). For decades 
influential business media publications have provided their own interpretation of 
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firms’ reputation expressed in their reputation rankings. Each rating is based on a 
unique approach. Fortune’s AMAC rating remains the most prominent and well 
respected in the academic and business community. 
This study further extends reputation management literature. It provides 
alternative methodology, through application of reputation ranking to estimate if 
reputation management proves beneficial. Papers of Shultz et al. (2001) discovered, 
that reputation management efforts appear to “stick” to a company. Another evidence 
of financial performance longevity to be linked to reputation strength was revealed in 
the study of Roberts and Dowling (2002). Further research associated longevity of 
reputation power over time and indicated it influence on company’s financial 
performance (Ang and Wight, 2009). This research further examines the time effect 
of reputation power. The study follows Fortune’s AMAC ranking to study the impact 
of firm’s concern over reputation and its performance in the ranking. The results 
revealed the relationship between firm’s interest tin reputation ranking and its 
performance. This evidence signalises of positive outcome of reputation management 
effort. Empirical investigation revealed mixed evidence, which suggests reputation 
power to last over a period of time, however the period appeared to be significant 
over two years. 
It is important to study reputation management effectiveness and the power 
reputation over time, as it helps to shed light on the horizon of the strategic planning 
when it comes to reputation management. Which, in return could further encourage to 
improve reputation management practices. 
 The rest of the essay organised as follows. The background section presents a 
broad literature review, which reflects the key corresponding topics with reputation 
management. It is followed by the development of hypothesis. Data section reveals 
the process of data preparation for the analysis. Followed by methodology, which 
introduces two empirical strategy of the analysis. The result section is followed by a 
brief discussion and concluding remarks. 
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1.2 Background 
1.2.1 Defining Reputation 
Reputation is a complex multidimensional framework, reflected in numerous domains 
of research, including management, economics, accounting, sociology and marketing 
(Fombrun and Van Riel, 1997). Such a variety of disciplines have facilitated a 
diversity of academic research dedicated to the subject. In the domain of economics, 
reputation is analysed from the game theory and signal theory perspectives. Game 
theory represents reputation as a unique set of traits, which allows differentiation 
between companies through a developed typology (Fombrun and Van Riel, 1997). 
Signal theory considers reputation as a means to communicate information, and to 
create a certain perception of the company to an outside audience (Turban and 
Greening, 1997; Basedo et al., 2006).  
From the strategic point of view, reputation is considered as one of the key 
assets of the firm. It introduces the potential for a company to gain competitive 
advantage (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990 Tischer and Hildebrandt, 2014), as well as 
providing an opportunity for value creation (Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Rindova et 
al., 2005). Studies suggest that reputation could be acquired through a distinctive set 
of company characteristics and reflected in public perception (Freeman, 1984; 
Rindova and Fombrun, 1997).  
Reputation within the marketing framework is often referred to as “image”; 
and there is an extensive range of available studies dedicated to the construction of 
strong positive brand equity and development of branding strategies (Brown et al., 
2006). A strong positive reputation plays an important role in the organizational 
context. It encourages the development of a strong sense of identity among managers, 
as well as positively affecting corporate culture (Cable and Graham, 2000; Highhouse 
and Hoffman, 2001). A substantial amount of work has also been conducted by 
sociologists, who have highlighted the importance of reputation within a social 
context and presented it as a validation mechanism for a firm (Shapiro, 1987; 
Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1992).  
The academic community has engaged in numerous attempts to find an 
omnibus definition of corporate reputation. However, due to its multilayered and 
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multidisciplinary nature, this task has appeared to impose a challenge, and none of the 
definitions have so far been widely accepted (Barnett et al., 2006).  
Various cross-field reviews of the existing research on the subject suggest that 
reputation as a concept has numerous basic characteristics, which provide multiple 
angles for academic research (Chun, 2005; Barnett, et al., 2006; Lange et al., 2011); 
as Ali et al. (2015) highlighted, this factor explains the lack of coordination in the 
efforts to produce a complete definition.  
In a paper published in 2011 Lange et al. provided an extensive overview of 
the work accomplished on the subject of reputation. The authors applied the prism of 
reputation characteristics to define the key dimensions of the research, which were 
perception of reputation as “being known”, “being known for something” (ibid., p. 
157) and “generalized favourability” (ibid., p. 159).  
Studies that regard corporate reputation as a concept of “being known” mostly 
concentrate on the general perception of the firm. Rindova et al. (2005, p. 1035) 
associate reputation with “prominence”. The key aspect of this dimension is 
accurately defined in the paper of Barnett et al. (2006), where the authors suggest 
recognition of a company without judgement from stakeholders to be among the main 
criteria. It is worth presenting several existing definitions that fall within this 
conceptualization. 
 Rindova et al. define reputation as “stakeholder perceptions with regard to an 
organization’s ability to deliver valuable outcome” (2005, p. 610). Bromley provides 
a similar definition in the paper, where reputation is defined as “the way key external 
stakeholder groups or other interested parties actually conceptualize the 
organizations” (2000, p. 241). Whetten and Mackey define reputation as “a particular 
type of feedback received by an organization from its stakeholders, concerning the 
credibility of the organization’s identity claims” (2002, p. 9). These definitions 
highlight the generalized role of other parties’ perception of reputation.  
As opposed to “being known”, authors that associate reputation with “being 
known for something” perceive a certain prominent feature to be central in defining 
reputation or, as depicted by Lange et al. (2006), a notion of quality. This attribute is 
present in the definition presented by Mahon (2002, p. 439): “reputation is an asset in 
relation to a specific context or process, specific issue, specific stakeholders, and 
28 
 
expectations of organizational behaviour based on past action and situations”. This 
definition highlights the importance of communicating and reflecting certain unique 
traits of organization and formalizing a certain judgement in a certain stakeholder 
group. This concept is also well described in the paper by Rindova et al. (2005, p. 54), 
which defines reputation as “beliefs of various stakeholders regarding the likelihood 
that the firm will deliver value along key dimensions of performance” (Lange et al., 
2006).  
A group of studies that perceive reputation from the angle of “generalized 
favourability” depict a general cumulative perception of a firm based on the overall 
quality of its attributes to be at the core of the definition. Lange et al. (2006) 
specifically highlight Fombrun’s definition of reputation, which is often referenced in 
the academic literature: “a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions and 
future prospects that describe the firm’s overall appeal to all its key constituents when 
compared to other leading rival[s]” (Fombrun, 1996, p. 72). This concept provides 
views on a reputation as a cumulative judgement based on multiple attributes (Barnett 
et al., 2006), with a stress on the relativity of its features (Fischer and Reuber, 2007). 
Or, as Boyd et al. present reputation: “an organizational attribute and depicted as a 
broad, multidimensional single construct whose value is determined through the 
interactions interrelationships among multiple attributes, both internal and external to 
the firm” (2010, p. 590). 
As can be seen from the review above, despite a wide range of definitions, 
perception and value remain the major attributes. Reputation is portrayed as a key 
communication tool between the company and its stakeholders, which puts it in the 
prime position in the strategic management practices of the present competitive 
business environment. 
 
1.2.2 Reputational Benefits 
Despite extensive alternative interpretations of corporate reputation, academics have 
agreed on its benefits for the company. Reputation has gained significant 
acknowledgement from academics through the years, and often been approached as 
one of the key elements for a modern company’s successful performance (Rumelt et 
al., 1994; Hitt et al. 2004; Tischer and Hildebrandt, 2014). Re-evaluation of its role in 
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corporate strategy contributed to the shift in the perception of a strong reputation as 
one of the crucial steps towards building strong competitive advantage. Numerous 
studies agree that reputation has become one of the key strategic assets and provides a 
wide range of benefits for the company (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Hall, 1992; 
Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy, 2005). 
 Financial benefits and value creation are some of the most widely discussed 
topics in the academic community. An extensive range of papers recognizes the 
positive relationship between a strong reputation and a firm’s financial performance 
(Brown and Perry, 1994; Deephouse, 2000; Roberts and Dowling, 2002, Gatzert, 
2015; Weng and Chen, 2017). This interdependence can be perceived as one of the 
strongest motivations for the growing attention to corporate reputation from both 
academics and practitioners. Fryxell and Wang (1994) demonstrate the connection 
between a positive corporate reputation and an inflow of financial investments. Later 
studies supported early evidence and highlighted that the reputation of appointed 
CEOs further impacted on financial performance (Tischer and Hildebrandt, 2014; 
Weng and Chen, 2017). 
The non-financially related benefits are also important. Tischer and 
Hildebrandt (2014) highlighted that intangible attributes are hard to mimic, which 
allows a company to gain competitive advantage. Reputation allows the firm to build 
a trustworthy relationship with clients (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). A strong 
reputation equips a firm with advantages over competitors, as well as affecting 
information distribution within the sector (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). To be more 
precise, a positive reputation signals one of the unique features of the company and 
provides information regarding product quality (Shapiro, 1983; Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990). In return, reputation facilitates a strong relationship with suppliers 
and customers, as well as improving pricing policies (Barney, 1991; Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002; Gatzer, 2015). Reputation is also seen to affect the image of the 
company as perceived by its employees, and facilitates it in gaining the strongest 
candidates (Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy, 2005; Walker, 2010).  
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1.2.3 Mechanisms of Reputation Management 
Growing evidence of the undeniable benefits derived from corporate 
reputation has encouraged companies to put more effort into its improvement and 
support. However, this task appears to be challenging due to the complexity of the 
theoretical background for reputation management mechanisms, as well as lack of 
real-world examples. One of the main approaches to conceptualizing reputation 
management mechanisms came from the work of Mahon (2002), where the author 
established two reputational pillars: substantive and symbolic actions. Substantive 
actions are the actual economic and social actions on which stakeholders base their 
valuation of a firm; whereas symbolic actions are the actions the firm takes to manage 
stakeholders’ perception of the firm (Mahon, 2002). Firms actively engage in 
symbolic actions to manage their reputations, as demonstrated in papers by Fombrun 
and Shanley (1990) and Deephouse (2000). For example, firms routinely utilize 
public relations and the mass media to improve how they are perceived (Deephouse, 
2000). Such actions are intended both to maintain and to enhance the firm’s 
reputation among stakeholders and the general public. Nevertheless, due to the 
complexity of the concept, it appears to be challenging for managers to determine the 
correct pathway to reputation management (Barnett and Pollock, 2012). Moreover, 
even where the path forward is clear, the actions necessary to improve reputation may 
be too costly to the firm or too burdensome for management to undertake, as several 
authors have highlighted (Barnett and Pollock, 2012). Management may therefore 
seek another way to influence reputation, one that requires neither a change in 
substantive behaviour nor the need to engage in complex and uncertain symbolic 
management practices. 
 
1.2.4 Reputation Measurements 
In order to be able to detect the influence of reputation and manage it efficiently, it is 
important to have a firm measurement technique. This task has proved to be 
challenging for both academics and practitioners due to the ambiguity of the 
definition of management practices. The variety of measuring approaches has been 
criticized for the lack compatibility, subjectivity and being subjected to a number of 
limitations power and scrutinised under the accuracy of applied methodologies. 
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 The work of Ali et al. (2015) marked measurement amongst three key 
moderators in the process. Other “moderators” identified were country of origin and 
stakeholder group. The authors suggested that these moderators have a crucial impact 
on two major groups of factors related to reputation: the first includes financial 
performance, firm size, firm age, media visibility, corporate social performance and 
long term institutional ownership. The second includes financial performance, 
customer trust, customer loyalty and customer commitment. Ali et al. highlighted the 
fact that ability to measure reputation is the key to understanding and managing these 
two factors.  
 Among the multiple approaches to measuring reputation, evaluation through 
the ranking system presented by the media is significant (Brown and Perry, 1994; 
Fombrun, 1998; Ali et al., 2015; Weng and Chen, 2017). As Fryxell and Wang (1994) 
noted in their paper that since a social component remains one of the dominating 
factors in reputation composition, social and media reputation monitoring systems can 
be a representative source of reputation evaluation. 
A number of rankings presented by the media focus on corporate evaluation. 
One of them is the Financial Times’s annual “World’s Most Respected Companies”, 
which is based on an interview with over 4000 CEOs from 70 countries (Chun, 2005). 
Another ranking is provided by Barron’s magazine.5 The “World’s Most Respected 
Companies” list is based on an evaluation of 100 companies which scored highest on 
the basis of stock market capitalization and were reviewed by institutional investors. 
Given the assessment methodology, this ranking places a higher stress on the financial 
aspect of reputation. The Management Today magazine – “Britain’s Most Admired 
Companies”, presents the British alternative, with the focus on the UK market.6 
Looking at the available data on reputation management, it could be stated 
without doubt that Fortune’s AMAC rating stands out in both the academic and the 
business worlds. As reported in the study by Ali et al. (2015), Fortune’s AMAC 
ranking Management Today are the most featured ratings in the academic community. 
This is one of the oldest and most widely respected rankings in the academic world 
                                                          
 
5 See www.barrons.com, accessed 25 July 2016. 
6 See www.managementtoday.co.uk/bmac, accessed 25 Jul 2016. 
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and business community. It was introduced in 1983 and based on a survey of industry 
representatives. The ranking is based on a score ranging from 1 (the lowest) to 10 (the 
highest). The survey is conducted with the help of the Hay Group management-
consulting agency.7 It is introduced in more detail in Section 1.7. 
This ranking is widely applied across a vast pool of studies dedicated to 
understanding the role and structure of the corporate reputation concept, as well as 
being applied in various comparative studies and investigations of single companies. 
 
1.3 Hypothesis Development 
A vast pool of studies has been dedicated to exploring the topic of reputation 
management. A group of studies focused on positive financial angle when exploring 
corporate reputation (Brown and Perry, 1994; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Rindova et 
al., 2005). For example, Brwon and Perry (1994) focused on financial hailo, which 
was associated with reputation rating. Fryxell and Wang (1994) linked inflow of 
financial investment with positive corporate reputation. Another group of studies 
explores reputation in a media and communication context (Shultz and Ervorder, 
1998; Argenti and Forman, 2000; Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun and Rindova, 2000). 
Deephpuse (2000) demonstrated evidence of media reputation to increase 
performance of commercial banks.  Other group of studies focust on overall strategic 
implications Fombrun and Shanley (1990) in their famous work highlighted how the 
known company brand allows company to be competitive in comparison to the peers. 
Tischer and Hildebarndt (2014) presented further support to the link reputation has to 
competitive advantage.  
It is clear from the literature that the majority of the studies focus on the 
reputation’s implications for a company’s performance using reputation ranking as a 
tool of the analysis. However, the studies do not focus on assessing if reputation 
management works and creates positive implications for firm’s corporate reputation. 
As reputation ranking remain a prominent measure of reputation, addressing the 
                                                          
 
7 See www.haygroup.com/, accessed 25 July 2016. 
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connection between reputation concern and a firm’s performance in the popular 
reputation ranking AMAC is the first step to constructing the hypothesis of this study.  
 Another step in the hypothesis formation is to address the time factor. 
Building reputation requires a substantial amount of resources and proves to be a 
costly activity. Under these circumstances, understanding the time frame of reputation 
power could provide a strong justification for required investments. 
Shultz et al. (2001) addressed this question by introducing the analysis when 
the mechanism behind the Danish reputation ranking was – as the authors’ suggested 
– identical to Fortune’s AMAC ranking. They found that a high reputation evaluation 
has a tendency to “stick” to the company over the years, as well as detecting a 
fragility of the methodology behind reputation evaluation (Shultz et al., 2001). Robert 
and Dowling (2002) studies firm’s superior financial performance linked to 
reputation. The results revealed a connection between the endurance of superior 
performance and positive reputation associated with the firm. Similarly, Ang and 
Wight (2009) noted the cumulative effort that reputation has and further supported the 
findings of Shultz et al. (2001), linking longevity of reputation to stronger financial 
performance over time. The rising evidence form the academic literature indicates 
lasting implications and effects connected to the reputation, however, no attempt to 
measure longevity, or the power of reputation over time.  
 This study is dedicated to further exploring a firm’s interest in encouraging 
reputation growth through establishing itself in media rankings, and exploring the link 
between ranking scores and a company’s involvement in its reputation. It takes the 
prism of a five-year time frame, in order to assess the power of reputation over time. 
On these grounds, the hypothesis of this study could be formulated in the following 
way: 
Hypothesis: Reputation scores are positively related to a firm’s current 
concern for its reputation. And this relationship holds for a period of up to five years.  
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1.4 Data 
1.4.1 Dependant Variable Construction and Fortune’s Ranking 
The analysis represented in this study is based on the information gained from 
multiple sources: Fortune’s AMAC reputation ranking; the COMPUSTAT database, 
which provided accounting-related information; and the ProQuest dataset, which 
supplied information for building a variable to reflect a reputation concern. The rest 
of the data, necessary to grasp any potential geographical effect, was coded manually. 
Since the AMAC rating is highly regarded among both the academic 
community and business practitioners, there is a probability that the scores of the 
ranking would reflect the effort and concern to manage reputation. The survey takes 
place on a yearly basis, which allows for estimating the strength of the reputation on 
the basis of the firm’s yearly performance.  
The survey has been published every February since 1983 and started with 
approximately 1400 companies: the Fortune 1000, the 1000 largest US companies 
ranked by revenue; and non-US companies in Fortune's global 500 database with 
revenues of $10 billion or more. Then the 15 largest were selected for each 
international industry and the ten largest for each US industry, which surveys a total 
of 687 companies from 30 countries. In 2003, the ranking comprised 57 industry lists. 
The survey itself takes place from July until October. The questionnaire is customized 
to the industry. Ten CEOs, seven outside board directors and a group of financial 
analysts rank each company within the industry. For example, in 2013, 3800 
respondents were reported to have participated in the survey (Hay Group, 2013). They 
were asked to select the ten companies they admired most, from a list made up of the 
companies that ranked in the top 25% in the previous year’s survey, plus those that 
finished in the top 20% of their industry. Anyone could vote for any company in any 
industry, which is why some results may seem anomalous. For example, BMW is in 
the top 15 of Most Admired Companies and second in the motor vehicles industry, 
behind Toyota Motor (ranked 29th in the top 50). 
The survey comprises nine dimensions: (1) quality of management; (2) quality 
of products/services offered; (3) innovativeness; (4) value as a long-term investment; 
(5) soundness of financial position; (6) ability to attract, develop and keep talented 
people; (7) responsibility to the community and/or the environment; (8) wise use of 
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corporate assets; (9) effectiveness in conducting its business globally (Hay Group, 
2013). The dimensions themselves were developed in the early 1980s by Fortune 
magazine with the assistance of executives and analysts from the industry. All the 
participants are asked to rank each company from the industry on a scale from 0 (the 
lowest) to 10 (the highest). They are left free to interpret the meaning of the attributes 
on the basis of their own understanding and provide ranking according to their 
personal knowledge about the companies. Then the total score is calculated as a 
simple average of the scores of each dimension separately. Companies can access the 
preliminary information about the employees from the particular company and who 
participate in the survey. The survey is held in collaboration with the Hay Group 
management consulting agency (Hay Group, 2013). 
For example, in 2010 Apple was ranked first in the “Top 10” ranking. It is 
classified under the “computers” industry, and scored 7.95. Western Digital was 
ranked eighth in the list and scored 5.67. The list only contained ten companies. In 
comparison, in 2009 Apple was also ranked first in the “Top 10 list”. However, it was 
ranked second under the “computers” industry, scoring 7.07, whereas Xerxo was 
ranked first with a 7.28 scoring. Dell was in last place with 5.62 points; however, the 
industry only included six companies in 2009. Alternatively, in the same year, in the 
“financial data services” industry, ten companies were included in the ranking: the top 
performing Dun and Bradstreet received 6.98, whereas Fidelity National Info Service 
received 5.25 points and was ranked the last.8 
To detect any visible affects from a firm’s expression of particular interest 
about its reputation, and test its persistence over time, scores presented in the AMAC 
annual ranking were subjected to analysis. The data for the analyses was collected 
over a 25-year period (1985–2010). The period 1985–2005 was available in the 
printed copies of magazines; data for the later years of the annual review were 
available online, which resulted in 11,239 firm-year observations.  
Data availability, partly caused by the industries with too few representatives 
in a given year, enforced a further reduction of the dataset. This affected the statistical 
                                                          
 
8 The example is built on the basis of Fortune’s AMAC ranking published in 2009 and 2010. The data, applied in 
the example, was provided by Fortune’s AMAC webpage: http://fortune.com/worlds-most-admired-companies/, 
accessed 20 November 2017. 
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power of the model. Since reputation management practices could be implemented 
and adjusted in any given year at the industry level, small industries with only a few 
firms in a certain year could distort the analysis.  
 This exclusion criterion forced the exclusion of all firms in 2005, as Fortune 
used an unusual industry classification in this particular year, which they 
subsequently revised. This was due to the overall extensive time frame of the dataset; 
to keep consistency, it was decided against implementing an alternative classification 
for that year. As the AMAC firm selection, their industry sizes and their industry 
definitions were found to vary somewhat over time, it would not be conservative 
research practice to consider the dataset an unbalanced panel. 9  Hence, all the 
observations are pooled, and treated as a pooled dataset. 
 Net Income, Book Value per Share, Total Revenue, Employees and Total 
Liabilities were applied as standard control variables, the latter three variables being 
logged in order to account for their approximately lognormal distribution. The 
COMPUSTAT accounting database was used to retrieve the relevant information. 
This was integrated into the dataset through matching the accounting data from the 
previous year with the pooled sample of firms with an AMAC rating. 
The introduction of accounting variables is a step shared by numerous studies, 
such as in Fryxell and Wang (1994), Brown and Perry (1995), Roberts and Dowling 
(2002) and Schwaiger (2004), which relied on accounting variables during reputation 
analysis. Fombrun and Shanley (1990) incorporated accounting variables in their 
early study, arguing that certain market information impacts on the perception of the 
firm. Roberts and Dowling (2002) supported the evidence that positive contribution 
accounting parameters play in reputation formation and included it in the model. The 
importance of accounting and financial indicators in the formation of reputation was 
further supported by the evidence provided in Schwaiger (2004). This was 
particularly important, as financial performance drivers were previously marked to 
have a strong impact on AMC ranking (Brown and Perry, 1994). 
A similar case is applicable for the Employee variable. Helm (2011) 
emphasized in her study the role employees’ play in reputation management. She 
                                                          
 
9 Unbalanced panel datasets are characterized by missing observations, but these missing observations are usually 
considered to result from data series starting late or ending early. 
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portrayed the positive impact that employee awareness has on reputation. Earlier 
Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy (2005) and Walker (2010) indicated the importance of 
employees as an influential group of stakeholders. Additionally, Flanagan and 
O’Shaughnessy (2005) provided evidence of employee retention linked to positive 
reputation, suggesting that it could be an important factor which would impact on 
reputational performance and subsequently reflect on scores. 
 Additional control variables are the number of companies in a certain industry 
in a given year and year dummies. Year dummies were added as the event is time 
fixed, and the scoring approach could vary over time, as it is conducted on the basis 
of a survey of industry representatives. The variation is predefined by the qualitative 
nature of the survey. 
 
1.4.2 Independent variables 
To create the independent variable, an additional dataset was developed. This 
was sourced from a less conventional reference, which is not usually applied in the 
academic literature. The first batch of data was acquired through the ProQuest 
Historical Annual Reports database. This provides full text access to annual corporate 
reports starting from 1983. This data was applied to construct a variable that reflects 
an interest in reputation. The assumption that firms mentioning the AMAC rating in 
their annual report have a greater interest in reputation management (and so a greater 
motivation to collude) than those not mentioning it, underlined the creation of the 
variable. The focus of the search was made specifically on the AMAC ranking, as it 
was chosen for the analysis, as well as it being by far the most significant one which 
covers all the industries. Therefore, including other rankings, which are more 
industry-focused, would create bias across industries. A search for “America’s most 
admired” in annual reports after 1983 identifies the 238 firms that highlight their 
AMAC ratings to their investors and the wider public.10 Thus, the first independent 
variable, REPINTEREST, measures a firm’s stated interest in its reputation. It is 
coded as 1 if a company mentions its AMAC score in its annual report in the previous 
year, and zero otherwise.  
                                                          
 
10 It is not possible to conceive of any ambiguity of the search term “America’s most admired”, but we did 
manually cross-check a sample of these annual reports and found the search to be fully accurate.  
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The second group of independent variables was constructed to capture the 
strength of a firm’s reputation concerns over time. The REPINTEREST variable 
provided the basis to construct another set of variables, with similar principles 
applied. The set incorporated four new variables to test the strength of reputation 
concerns over two, three, four and five years. The variables were accordingly named 
REPINTEREST (t-2), REPINTEREST (t-3), REPINTEREST (t-4) and 
REPINTEREST (t-5). REPINTEREST (t-2) was coded as 1 if a company mentions its 
AMAC score in its annual report over the two years, and zero otherwise. In the case 
of REPINTEREST (t-3), 1 was coded if the AMAC rating was mentioned in the 
annual reports over the three years. A similar principle applied to capture the four and 
five-year period.  
The ProQuest database did not cover the complete list of the companies 
presented in the AMAC sample. To avoid reducing our sample further, another 
control variable was defined – “ProQuestAvailability” – that is 1 for all firms covered 
in ProQuest, and zero otherwise. This control variable was included in any regression 
specification. 
The second part of data involved in the analysis was gathered manually. The 
AMAC ranking is based on the survey conducted amongst industry representatives. 
The nature of the methodology could suggest that a firm’s opportunity to manage 
reputation is related to its geographic proximity to those it aims to impress. . Barnett 
and Hoffman (2008) indicated in the paper the implications that geographical 
proximity of riving companies could facilitate the spillover effect, when studying 
CSR approach in companies within one industry. Therefore, this study assumes that if 
the geographic distance between firms increases, the opportunity for the firms’ 
managers to interact and impress decreases 
 To reflect that in the variable construction, for each firm in the sample, and 
for each year, the percentage of competitors with the headquarters in the same state 
was coded manually. Each company in the ranking was then allocated a percentage to 
eliminate double counting. The distribution of these percentages is approximately 
lognormal, since companies are more likely to be in a different state instead of the 
same state. Thus, another independent variable was presented in the form of logged 
39 
 
percentages. 11  The variable was given the name GEOPROX to reflect the 
measurement of the geographical element’s potential impact.  
Over the analysed period a crucial event – the introduction of the Internet – 
occurred in the information world. This fact motivated the introduction of the “Pre-
Internet-Age Dummy” variable. The number 1 was related to the years prior to the 
Internet – 1985 to 1991 – 0 was related to the years afterwards. 12  Logic, which 
motivated the introduction of this variable, is based on the assumption that the 
increased transparency encouraged by the Internet might potentially hinder a firm’s 
score manipulation. In addition, the encouragement of information spread caused by 
the Internet might potentially compromise the role of the geographic location of the 
firm.13 
In the final stage of data preparation, final rearrangements were applied. At 
this stage firms that did not indicate interest in an AMAC rating were excluded from 
the dataset, in order to focus the analyses on the firms with an interest in corporate 
reputation. Due to this change, the amount of observations reduced to 2,859 firms; 
however this facilitated the strength of the results. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
1.5.1 Empirical strategies 
The methodology contains two empirical strategies. The first empirical strategy based 
on the treatment of data as pooled cross-section. Therefore the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method was implemented. This is one of the most extensively applied methods 
in regression analysis, which helps to diminish the sum of distance squares (Balestar, 
1970). The application of such a method assumes the presence of homoscedasticity in 
the errors, which is one of the key conditions to “keep false rejections at the nominal 
                                                          
 
11 In the analysis, the natural logarithm of the percentage point plus 1 and divide the result by 100, for three 
reasons. First, logging the percentage points plus 1 (e.g. 24 instead of 0.24) ensures that all values stay positive, 
which allows us to use the variable in an interaction term (e.g. variables with changing signs need a very clear 
meaning of 0 to be employed in an interaction term). Second, adding 1 ensures that the value or 0 can be processed 
and remains at 0, which does not distort the scale in any meaningful way. The result was divided by 100 to obtain 
this variable on the same 0 to 1 scale as the first independent variable. 
12 Tim Berners-Lee invented the Internet in 1989 with the world’s first website being launched in 1991. Hence, we 
consider the Internet age to start in 1992, as we lack a more decisive measure of the start of this era. 
13 Since the “Pre-Internet-Age” control variable essentially is a sum of year dummies, separate year dummies for 
1985–1991 were not used. 
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level, or confidence intervals that are either too narrow or too wide” (Hayes, 2003, p. 
3). The violation of such a condition yields the appearance of heteroscedasticity in the 
errors, which leads to the inaccurate and biased results of the variance of the 
coefficients in least squared measurements (Hayes, 2003). To avoid violation of the 
results, a White estimator (White, 1980), implemented for the cross-sectional dataset, 
was used. OLS method was applied as it priorities the power of independent variables 
and allows more freedom to explore their power. Year dummy variables were 
introduced to account for the time effects.   
OLS estimator often get scrutinized in the panel data regressions, as it bears a 
high risk of the coefficients to be correlated with the error term, leading to the 
biasness of the estimates. In addition, under OLS estimations the risk of omitted 
variables arises. To resolve this problem, the second empirical strategy was 
introduced. 
The second empirical strategy treated the dataset as unbalanced panel data. 
Firstly, the Housman test was perform to define fixed or random effects firm effects. 
Hausman test (1978) was performed over data indicating fixed effects.  
Fixed effect analysis revealed further results. Hausman test (1978) indicated 
Chi-Sq (8) = 222.5, with Probability > Chi-Sq = 0. These results revealed systematic 
difference in coefficients, indicating Fixed effects.  
On the basis of Hausman test (1978) results, second empirical strategy, which 
evaluated panel data, accounted for firm fixed effects in the model. The model 
similarly included five specifications to study the power of reputation over time. The 
specifications were added one by one step, as demonstrated in the next paragraph.  
 
15.2 Empirical Model 
In order to evaluate the connection between a firm’s interest in its reputation, the 
potential influence it has on the AMAC scores, and its power over time, the model 
evolved through five stages; independent variables were added gradually to the base 
model and extended through control variables. Ten types of model specification were 
developed for this purpose. Five model specifications explored the link between a 
firm’s interest in reputation and the AMAC rating scores. Another five equations 
explore the strength of this link through time. The adjustment of the model took place 
during the robustness tests. 
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The baseline model with a first key independent variable can be written as in 
equation (1): 
 
 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑇−1 + 𝜀𝐶,𝑇 (1) 
 
where AMACc,t represents the AMAC score of company (c) in year (t); 
REPINTERESTc,t-1 represents the reputation interest of the company in the previous 
year, with β1 being its coefficient; CONTROLSc,t-1 is a column vector of standard 
controls (Net Income, Book Value per Share, ln (Total Revenue), ln(Employees), 
ln(Total Liabilities) and ProQuestAvailability), with 𝛾1  being the respective row 
vector of coefficients; α represents the intercept; and εc,t the random disturbance term. 
 Stepwise we now add the key independent variable GEOPROXc,t to assess the 
potential impact from the geographic proximity of certain ranking participants: 
 
 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑐,𝑡
+ +𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
(2) 
 
The PREINTERNETc,t dummy is set to reflect shift in information 
distribution, which, allegedly, might create complications for companies seeking to 
protect their reputation. This effect is grasped by the positive coefficient of this 
variable, which does not account for variations that occurred on a daily basis. The 
relationship between independent variables and the AMAC scores are analysed by 
stepwise adding them to the advanced model, as shown in equation (3): 
 
 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
(3) 
 
 
The year dummies are added in the further extension of the model, represented 
by the column vector YEARSc,t. This model can be written as in equation (4): 
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 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
(4) 
 
Where 𝛾2 is the row vectors of year dummy coefficients, while the remaining symbols 
can be interpreted as in equation (2). In the final step of the model the 
FIRMPERINDc,t variable was introduced to capture any industry-specific effects, 
related to the number of firms associated with each industry.14 The model is displayed 
in equation (5), with γ3 being the coefficient of the newly introduced variable and the 
remaining symbols interpreted as in equation (4), 
 
 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛾3𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
(5) 
 
This advanced model was applied to estimation specifications that include up to five 
further lags of reputation interest. 
Another range of regressions was created to track the power of reputation over 
a five-year period. The same variables and regression model were applied, with a few 
alterations. The baseline model in the second set of regressions was constructed to 
reflect the link between scores and reputation concerns in the two-year period, 
therefore a REPINTERESTc,t-2 variable was added to REPINTERESTc,t-1 and 
GEOPROXc,t in the formula, where all the coefficients could be interpreted similarly 
to the formulas in the first set of regressions, as in equation (6): 
 
 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
(6) 
 
                                                          
 
14 Since FIRMPERINDc,t correlates strongly with industry dummies but, in contrast to those dummies, also 
controls for the possible effects resulting from the number of firms that Fortune assessed in each industry, we 
consider this variable superior to industry dummies. 
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In the second specification the PREINTERNETc,t, dummy variable was added 
to see if changes in information distribution had an impact on the behaviour of 
REPINTERESTc,t-2. Industry-specific effects presented by the FIRMPERINDc,t 
variable and the vector of year dummy coefficients YEARSc,t were added as well, as 
in equation (7): 
 
 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
(7) 
 
In the third specification the firm’s interest in reputation over the period of 
three years, presented by the variable REPINTERESTc,t-3, was introduced to the 
equation, on the side of REPINTERESTc,t-2, which was added before, as in equation 
(8): 
 
 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−3
+ 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛾3𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
(8) 
 
 
The fourth specification was tailored to capture changes in the relationship 
between scores and reputation interest, with the addition of the REPINTERESTc,t-4 
variable, which represents interest in the reputation captured four years ago, as in 
equation (9): 
 
 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−3
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−4 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
(9) 
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In a similar style, the last specification represents similar coefficients, as 
before, with the addition of the variable REPINTERESTc,t-5, which captures interest 
in reputation, registered five years ago, as in equation (10): 
 
 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−3
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−4 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−5
+ 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑐,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
(10) 
 
 
The equations above were estimated through the OLS method with a White 
(1980) heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. This simplistic well-
known method allows evaluating precisely the regression results for the dependent 
variable, which is defined by the scores’ range between 1 and 10.  
The AMAC survey scores can be understood as being equivalent to the 
percentages in any kind of approval survey (e.g. a presidential approval rating), whose 
default mean is one-half. Statistically, three issues should be considered when dealing 
with such a dependent variable. First, such percentage scores tend to experience 
substantially more variability in the middle of the distribution than at its extremes. In 
other words, it is much harder to increase an approval rating from 97 to 99% than 
from 52 to 54%. Second, changes in potential determinants of a percentage-based 
dependent variable (i.e. independent of control variables) will more likely have an 
effect on values in the middle of the distribution than on extreme values. Third, these 
percentage distributions are limited in their variability, which can have a distorting 
effect on confidence intervals.  
 These problems were addressed in the first empirical strategy. To address 
these three issues and analyse the percentage-based dependent variable as accurately 
as possible, the second method is to follow the approach suggested by Wrigley 
(1973). To increase the variability of the dependent variable and effectively stretch 
the scores at the extremes, Wrigley (1973) suggests a logit transformation that can be 
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written as shown in equation (11) for our case with a dependent variable ranging from 
1 to 10: 
 
 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐶,𝑇 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐶,𝑇
(10 − 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐶,𝑇)
) 
(11) 
 
 
Where TAMACc,t represents the logit transformed AMAC score. The bracketed term 
in this transformation can be understood as the odds of the appearance of the best 
possible event (i.e. an AMAC score of 10) in relation to the odds of the worst possible 
event (i.e. an AMAC score of 1), whereas the natural logarithm is applied to increase 
the symmetry of the distribution15.  
 To analyse the transformed dependent variable in a way that focuses more on 
the variability in the centre of the percentage distribution than at its extremes, Wrigley 
(1973) suggests a weighted least squares (WLS) approach, whereby the weights are a 
positive function of the relevance of an observation and the distance of its value from 
the extreme. As all observations are of equivalent value, Wrigley’s weighting function 
is used in the analysis, as shown in equation (12): 
 
 𝑊𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑐,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡(10 − 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡) (12) 
 
Where WEIGHTc,t represents the weighting function used in our analysis. We also 
extend Wrigley’s (1973) method by applying White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity 
consistent covariance matrix estimator. 
 
                                                          
 
15  Wrigley (1973) presented alternative interpretation of the equation, expressed in raw numbers  
𝑇𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐶,𝑇 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒 (
𝑅𝑗
(𝑛𝑗−𝑅𝑗)
) , w here TAMACc,t represents the logit transformed AMAC score. 𝑅𝑗 
represents the absolute best score for company j. 𝑛𝑗 is the overall number of scores. Wrigley (1973) 
additionally applied Cox (1970) approach to overcome the fact, that logit score is undefined at 𝑅𝑗 = 0 
or 𝑛𝑗, as presented in the following equation. 𝑇𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐶,𝑇 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒 (
𝑅𝑗−
1
2
 
(𝑛𝑗−𝑅𝑗−
1
2
)
),where logit is placed in a 
regression equation L=𝑋𝛽  + 𝜀, where L is a column vector, defines what is termed the linear logit 
model (Wrigley, 1973). 
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1.6 Results  
The results of the analysis are summarized and developed in three tables. Prior to a 
detailed examination of the results, a correlation matrix (Appendix 1) and descriptive 
statistics (Appendix 2) are introduced to indicate that all the important correlations are 
significant and positive. 
 
1.6.1 First Empirical Strategy. Immediate Effects of Reputation Management16 
 Table 1.2 represents the results of a relationship between current reputation concerns 
and scores from the AMAC ranking evaluation. The first OLS model specification 
demonstrates a strong positive casual relation between firms’ interest in reputation 
and the AMAC score (p < 0.001). According to the results, the AMAC scores of the 
companies, which indicated interest in corporate reputation, had coefficient by 0.69 
higher, compared to those for companies that did not express any particular concern 
about reputation. These results could be considered strong, as they indicate a 
significant boost (approximately two-thirds) of the standard deviation. Positive results 
for this model specification also hold when the WLS method is applied.  
 The geographic factor, included at the next step of the analysis, adds further 
strength to the model. The factor itself is defined by statistically strong positive 
significance. The indicator of firms’ interest in reputation also strengthened by 0.02 
points. This evidence suggests that another link might potentially facilitate the 
connection between a firm’s interest and its performance in the ranking. In other 
words, it could be assumed that geographic factors empower communication between 
firms and allow them to coordinate their efforts.  
                                                          
 
16  Due to the specification of the REPINTEREST independent variable (dummy variable), it is 
important to tackle the potentially rising endogeneity issue. In order to study the direction of causation 
between AMAC raking performance scores and firms’ reputation concerns, a Granger causality test 
was implemented. The analysis was performed with the standard controls, similar to the model applied 
in the study. REPINTEREST (t-1) variable was used as the dependent variable. 𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡  variable 
replaced the independent one. The basic model was presented as 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 . The 
variable was lagged accordingly. The result revealed a positive coefficient at 0.044; however, the P 
value appeared insignificant, with R squared at 16%, similar to the previous results. These results 
suggest the acceptance of the null hypothesis. No reverse causality was found, proving the interest in 
reputation to have an effect on the performance of a firm in Fortune’s AMAC ranking. 
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 In the next step of the model, the Pre-Internet-Age variable was introduced. 
This carries strong statistical significance, which proves that firms had more 
opportunity to manipulate scores in the AMAC ranking and affect their reputation 
before the introduction of the Internet, which significantly increased information 
accessibility. The introduction of this variable did not affect the strength of the model. 
This evidence suggests that firms that prioritize reputation are still influenced by it, 
despite any complications imposed by the Internet. 
 In order to capture potential yearly effects, the year dummies were introduced 
as the next step. As a result, the power of the Pre-Internet-Age dummy significantly 
grew from 0.32 to 0.43. This proves the significant role the Internet played in 
complicating firms’ influence on the reputation scores. Nevertheless, the casual 
relation between firms’ concern about reputation and score indicators remains strong. 
It gradually increased through the extension of the model and gained 0.09 points, 
which signals the effort that companies can contribute to the impact of reputation 
scores. The geographic factor appeared to lose its relevance. With the introduction of 
the Pre-Internet-Age variable, its power dropped from 0.67 to 0.45, despite having a 
high statistical significance.
 Table 1.1 Immediate Effects of Reputation Management 
 
  
 
Regression 
specification 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Regression 
algorithm 
OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS 
Dependent variable Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit Fortune 
Score 
Constant 5.89**** 
(32.49) 
0.14**** 
(4.64) 
5.71**** 
(30.83) 
0.11**** 
(3.52) 
5.34**** 
(28.49) 
0.07** 
(2.16) 
5.18**** 
(26.45) 
0.02 
(0.61) 
5.37**** 
(23.18) 
0.04 
(1.01) 
Control variables           
Net Income 0.01**** 
(7.91) 
1.95E-
05**** 
(6.82) 
0.01**** 
(7.83) 
1.90E-
05**** 
(6.76) 
0.01**** 
(7.79) 
1.86E-
05**** 
(6.734518) 
0.01**** 
(8.02) 
1.91E-
05**** 
(6.999757) 
0.01**** 
(7.93) 
1.90E-
05**** 
(6.961100) 
Ln (Total Revenue) 0.19**** 
(5.70) 
0.03**** 
(5.14) 
0.21**** 
(6.21) 
0.03**** 
(5.67) 
0.24**** 
(7.03) 
0.04**** 
(6.40) 
0.26**** 
(7.49) 
0.04**** 
(7.01) 
0.26**** 
(7.63) 
0.04**** 
(7.05) 
Ln (Employees) 0.02 
(1.19) 
0.01 
(0.93) 
0.02 
(1.09) 
0.01 
(0.84) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
-0.01 
(-0.34) 
-0.01 
(-0.63) 
-0.01 
(-0.48) 
-0.01 
(-0.71) 
Book Value per 
Share 
8.27E-05 
(0.86) 
1.02E-05 
(0.63) 
9.09E-05 
(0.92) 
1.15E-05 
(0.70) 
9.23E-05 
(0.93) 
1.15E-05 
(0.70) 
8.19E-05 
(0.89) 
1.01E-05 
(0.66) 
8.39E-05 
(0.92) 
1.03E-05 
(0.68) 
Ln (Total Liabilities) -0.21**** 
(-9.24) 
-0.03**** 
(-8.29) 
-0.21**** 
(-9.52) 
-0.03**** 
(-8.57) 
-0.21**** 
(-9.34) 
-0.03**** 
(-8.44) 
-0.20**** 
(-8.77) 
-0.03**** 
(-7.87) 
-0.19**** 
(-8.66) 
-0.03**** 
(-7.82) 
Number of 
Companies per 
Industry 
No No No No No No No No -0.02 
(-1.59) 
-0.01 
(-0.95) 
Year Dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ProQuest 
Availability Dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Regression 
algorithm 
OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS 
Dependent 
variable 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Key independent 
variables 
          
REPINTEREST 
(t-1) 
0.69**** 
(7.42) 
0.12**** 
(6.35) 
0.71**** 
(7.29) 
0.12**** 
(6.56) 
0.72**** 
(7.89) 
0.12**** 
(6.76) 
0.78**** 
(8.72) 
0.14**** 
(6.73) 
0.78**** 
(8.63) 
0.14**** 
(7.58) 
GEOPROX   0.67**** 
(5.82) 
0.12**** 
(6.11) 
0.62**** 
(5.33) 
0.12**** 
(5.71) 
0.45**** 
(3.85) 
0.09**** 
(4.21) 
0.45**** 
(3.86) 
0.09**** 
(4.21) 
Pre-Internet-Age 
Dummy 
    0.32**** 
(5.16) 
0.05**** 
(4.59) 
0.43**** 
(6.06) 
0.07**** 
(5.68) 
0.41**** 
(5.40) 
0.07**** 
(5.22) 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.12 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 
No. of 
Observations 
2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 
Notes: This table represents the results of regression analysis, which was performed to identify the connection between a firm’s interest in reputation and the 
scores presented in Fortune’s AMAC rating. The score was used as a dependent variable in the model. Net Income, Total Revenue, Number of Employees, 
Book Value per Share and Total Liabilities were used as control variables. A number of dummy variables were also added in the model. The ProQuest 
Availability Dummy variable was presented in every specification, the Pre-Internet-Age variable was introduced in the third specification to depict potential 
changes introduced by the shift in information. Year Dummies were added in the fourth specification. In the final specification the Number of Companies per 
Industry variable was introduced to capture the potential effect from industry-specific differences, potentially caused by the variation in the number of firms. 
REPINTEREST (t-1) was an independent variable, which introduced the firm’s interest in corporate reputation. GEOPROX was an independent variable, which 
addressed the potential effect caused by geographic location of the firms interested in corporate reputation. This table represents a combination of regressions 
run by using two methods: the OLS method was applied in all uneven-numbered specifications; the WLS method was applied in all even-numbered 
specifications. Significance levels estimated: p****<0.001, p***<0.01, p** < 0.05, p* < 0.1.  
  
 The model demonstrates significant strong statistical power throughout every 
step. The overall regressions demonstrate a reasonably strong adjusted R-squared in 
the range of 12 to 15%. In the last step, the model tests the role of industry size. The 
results appear insignificant. This demonstrates that a firm’s interest is the main 
predisposition to affect the score and it is possible to accomplish this despite industry 
size.  
 
1.6.2 First Empirical Strategy. Reputation Management over Time 
The next set of regressions is dedicated to evaluating whether concerns about 
reputation transfer over time.  
 The first specification of the model is similar to the second specification in 
Table 1.2. It comprises the Reputation Interest and Geographic Proximity variables. 
However, adding Reputation Interest over a two-year time span expands the set of 
dependent variables. The model appears to be statistically significant. The Reputation 
Interest coefficients are slightly smaller compared to the case of a single year, 0.54 
against 0.69. Nevertheless, it appears that even in the case of a firm expressing strong 
concerns about reputation over two years, it still has a significant connection to the 
performance of the scores appearing in the AMAC rating.  
 The second stage of model development is indicated by the introduction of a 
Pre-Internet-Age variable alongside the year effects. The results demonstrate a 
significant contribution of the appearance of the Internet. It indicates that the increase 
of transparency, facilitated by growing information accessibility, has an impact on 
potential opportunity score manipulation. In the same specification of the model, 
potential industry size effects were tested. However, as in the case considered above, 
this feature appears to have no impact on score variability, as it appeared statistically 
insignificant. The geographic proximity coefficients are statistically significant in 
both the first and the second specification. This leads to the assumption that firms 
with a similar location could potentially negotiate with or motivate each other to 
engage in certain activities targeted to supporting performance in the ranking 
(managing reputation in a certain manner).  
 The third specification of the model grasps the prolonged effects of a 
company’s interest in reputation. This variable, which represents reputation interest 
 expressed over three years, was added at this stage. A strong statistical significance 
holds in the specification of this model (p < 0.001). It appears that Interest expressed 
in its reputation by a firm has a strong impact on the AMAC scores even throughout a 
three-year period. It raises the suggestion that firms with high concerns about their 
reputation also make a better effort to invest in its support. Stronger involvement in 
reputation management has a tendency to have longer-term effects, which in the 
current case found a reflection in performance on the AMAC ratings. 
The final two specifications of the model were designed to examine the 
strength of reputation interest expressed over four and five years, respectively. The 
introduction of a fourth year does not affect overall strength of the model; however, it 
can be seen that the strength of the reputation interest impact tends to weakens over 
this period of time. The coefficient of the fourth-year variable is less, compared to the 
third year, by 10%. The relationship between reputation concerns expressed over a 
four-year period statistically loses its strength (p < 0.01). The reputation interest 
expressed over five years appeared statistically insignificant. This brings us to the 
conclusion that even though a high interest in reputation has a tendency to last, the 
effect is more of a mid-term nature. This raises the suggestion that for a strong and 
long-term performance, the firm is required constantly to take relevant actions.  
 The WLS method supports the results presented above, and demonstrates a 
strong statistical significance throughout all the specifications. The pool of 
regressions also was supported by a strong adjusted R-squared between 13 and 17%.  
 Table 1.2 Reputation Management over Time 
 
Regression 
specification 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Regression 
algorithm 
OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS 
Dependent 
variable 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Constant 5.71**** 
(30.97) 
0.11**** 
(3.59) 
5.37**** 
(23.22) 
0.04 
(1.00) 
5.39**** 
(23.23) 
0.04 
(1.05) 
5.39 
(23.24) 
0.04 
(1.09) 
5.40**** 
(23.24) 
0.04 
(1.11) 
Control variables           
Net Income 0.01**** 
(7.79) 
1.88E-
05**** 
(6.73) 
0.01**** 
(7.88) 
1.88E-
05**** 
(6.94) 
0.01**** 
(7.75) 
1.85E-
05**** 
(6.87) 
0.01**** 
(7.66) 
1.84E-
05**** 
(6.79) 
0.01**** 
(7.59) 
1.82E-
05**** 
(6.76) 
Ln (Total 
Revenue) 
0.21**** 
(6.17) 
0.03**** 
(5.62) 
0.262932**** 
(7.56) 
0.04**** 
(7.01) 
0.26**** 
(7.50) 
0.04**** 
(6.97) 
0.26**** 
(7.52) 
0.04**** 
(7.00) 
0.26**** 
(7.51) 
0.04**** 
(7.00) 
Ln (Employees) 0.02 
(0.97) 
0.01 
(0.76) 
-0.01 
(-0.60) 
-0.01 
(-0.82) 
-0.01 
(-0.55) 
-0.01**** 
(-0.78) 
-0.01 
(-0.55) 
-0.01 
(-0.79) 
-0.01 
(-0.58) 
-0.01 
(-0.81) 
Book Value per 
Share 
9.89E-05 
(1.03) 
1.29E-05 
(0.80) 
9.17E-05 
(1.03) 
1.17E-05 
(0.79) 
9.45E-05 
(1.07) 
1.22E-05 
(0.82) 
9.59E-05 
(1.09) 
1.24E-05 
(0.84) 
9.63E-05 
(1.09) 
1.25E-05 
(0.84) 
Ln (Total 
Liabilities) 
-0.21**** 
(-9.50) 
-0.03**** 
(-8.56) 
-0.19**** 
(-8.63) 
-0.03**** 
(-7.80) 
-0.19**** 
(-8.62) 
-0.03**** 
(-7.81) 
-0.19**** 
(-8.67) 
-0.03**** 
(-7.87) 
-0.19**** 
(-8.67) 
-0.03**** 
(-7.89) 
Number of 
Companies per 
Industry 
  -0.02 
(-1.49) 
-0.01 
(-0.84) 
-0.02 
(-1.51) 
-0.03**** 
(-0.85) 
-0.02 
(-1.56) 
-0.01 
(-0.89) 
-0.02 
(-1.57) 
-0.01 
(-0.91) 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ProQuest 
Availability 
Dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
 
Regression 
specification 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Regression 
algorithm 
OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS 
Dependent variable Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Fortune 
Score 
Logit 
Fortune 
Score 
Key independent 
variables 
          
REPINTEREST (t-
1) 
0.54**** 
(5.68) 
0.10**** 
(4.96) 
0.61**** 
(6.59) 
0.11**** 
(5.87) 
0.57**** 
(4.28) 
0.10**** 
(5.55) 
0.55**** 
(6.05) 
0.11**** 
(5.39) 
0.55**** 
(6.05) 
0.11**** 
(5.39) 
GEOPROX 0.68**** 
(5.96) 
0.13**** 
(6.19) 
0.47**** 
(3.99) 
0.09**** 
(4.29) 
0.47**** 
(4.03) 
0.09**** 
(4.29) 
0.47**** 
(4.01) 
0.09**** 
(4.26) 
0.47**** 
(4.03) 
0.09**** 
(4.26) 
Pre-Internet-Age 
Dummy 
  0.41**** 
(5.51) 
0.07**** 
(5.33) 
0.41**** 
(5.54) 
0.07**** 
(5.40) 
0.41**** 
(5.57) 
0.07**** 
(5.41) 
0.41**** 
(5.60) 
0.07**** 
(5.42) 
REPINTEREST (t-
2) 
0.54**** 
(4.93) 
0.09**** 
(4.15) 
0.57**** 
(3.99) 
0.10**** 
(4.78) 
0.45**** 
(3.73) 
0.08**** 
(3.81) 
0.44**** 
(4.28) 
0.08**** 
(3.68) 
0.43**** 
(4.21) 
0.08**** 
(3.64) 
REPINTEREST (t-
3) 
    0.53**** 
(2.51) 
0.09**** 
(4.46) 
0.42**** 
(3.73) 
0.08**** 
(3.47) 
0.42**** 
(3.70) 
0.08**** 
(3.44) 
REPINTEREST (t-
4) 
      0.32** 
(2.51) 
0.05*** 
(2.04) 
0.6** 
(1.97) 
0.04* 
(1.71) 
REPINTEREST (t-
5) 
        0.22 
(1.58) 
0.03 
(0.95) 
Adjusted r-squared 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.15 
No. of observations 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 
Notes: This table represents the results of a regression analysis which was performed to explore the correlation between the reputation scores presented in Fortune’s AMAC ranking and a firm’s interest in its corporate reputation over a two, three, -
four and five-year time frame. The score was used as a dependent variable in the model. Net income, Total Revenue, Number of Employees, Book Value per Share and Total Liabilities were used as control variables. A number of dummy variables 
were also added in the model. The ProQuest Availability Dummy variable was present in every specification, the Pre-Internet-Age variable was introduced in the third specification to depict the potential changes introduced by the shift in 
information. Year Dummies were added in the fourth specification. In the final specification the Number of Companies per Industry variable was introduced to capture the potential effect from industry-specific differences, potentially caused by the 
variation in the number of firms. REPINTEREST (t-1) was an independent variable, which introduced the firm’s interest in its corporate reputation; REPINTEREST (t-2) was the same but for a two-year period; REPINTEREST (t-3) for a three-year 
period; REPINTEREST (t-4) for a four-year period; and REPINTEREST(t-5) for a five-year period. GEOPROX was an independent variable, which addressed the potential effect caused by the geographic location of the firms interested in their 
corporate reputation. This table represents a combination of regressions run by using two methods: the OLS method was applied in all uneven-numbered specifications; the WLS method was applied in all even-numbered specifications. Significance 
levels estimated: p****<0.001, p***<0.01, p** < 0.05, p* < 0.1. 
54 
 
1.6.3. Second Empirical Strategy. Fixed Effect Model 
The data was further analyzed with the implementation of Fixed effects model 
to study firm fixed effects. This approach helped to eliminate omitted variables and 
further withdraw potential endogenity issue. Results reported in Table 1.3. The 
control variables’ coefficients remained highly significant. However, the behaviors of 
independent variables have shifted. Geographic proximity of industry player, involved 
in AMAC ranking appeared not to have an impact on company’s performance in the 
ranking. The introduction of the Internet additionally does not appear to affect 
company’s performance. However the relationship between company’s interests in 
reputation remain statistically strong and positive. The analysis indicated reputation to 
lose the power faster over time, in comparison to the first empirical assessment. 
However, it still indicated it ability to hold over a two-year period. Therefore, it could 
be suggested, that company should priorities the role of reputation. As practical 
implication, this evidence suggests, that reputation management effort pay off. And 
since the reputation power last over few years, it justifies the investment in the 
management process.  
  
55 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3: Reputation Management Over Time, Fixed Effects 
Regression Specification (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) 
Regression Algorithm Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model 
Dependent Variable Fortune Score Fortune Score Fortune Score Fortune Score Fortune Score 
Constant 7.7501*** 
(24.18) 
7.2304*** 
(18.78) 
7.2303*** 
(18.78) 
7.2105*** 
(18.72) 
7.2337*** 
(18.74) 
 
Control Variables      
Net Income 0.0000375 
(5.34)*** 
0.000036*** 
(5.17) 
3.60E-05*** 
(5.17) 
3.65E-05*** 
(5.23) 
0.000037*** 
(5.28) 
Ln(Total Revenue) 0.282092*** 
(3.74) 
0.37621*** 
(4.81) 
0.376278*** 
(4.78) 
0.382597*** 
(4.86) 
0.377922*** 
(4.78) 
Ln(Employees) 0.2266393*** 
(3.97) 
0.206301*** 
(3.34) 
2.06E-01*** 
(3.34) 
0.206469*** 
(3.35) 
0.20865*** 
(3.38) 
Book Value per Share -0.000154** 
(-2.09) 
-0.00014** 
(-1.96) 
-0.00014** 
(-1.96) 
-0.00014* 
(-1.96) 
-0.00014** 
(-1.96) 
Ln(Total Liabilities) -0.55247*** 
(-11.62) 
-0.53345*** 
(-10.88) 
-0.53351*** 
(-10.87) 
-0.5369*** 
(-10.94) 
-0.53677*** 
(-10.94) 
Number of Companies per Industry 
 
-0.04882*** 
(-3.7) 
-0.04881*** 
(-3.7) 
-0.04892*** 
(-3.7) 
-0.04844*** 
(-3.67) 
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ProQuest AvailabilityDummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Regression Specification (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) 
Regression Algorithm Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model 
Dependent Variable Fortune Score Fortune Score Fortune Score Fortune Score Fortune Score 
Key Independent Variables      
REPINTEREST (t-1) 0.2094077*** 
(2.61) 
0.244952*** 
(3.1) 
0.244751*** 
(3.1) 
0.234452*** 
(2.69) 
0.238821*** 
(3.01) 
GEOPROX -0.125793*** 
(-1.24) 
-0.15581 
(-1.56) 
-0.15575 
(-1.56) 
-0.15871 
(-1.59) 
-0.15853 
(-1.59) 
Pre-Internet-Age Dummy 
 
0.1401* 
(1.89) 
0.1402* 
(1.89) 
0.1289* 
(1.86) 
0.1291* 
(1.86) 
REPINTEREST (t-2) 0.2261*** 
(2.64) 
0.216321*** 
(2.56) 
0.218062** 
(2.52) 
0.20768** 
(2.39) 
0.20696** 
(2.38) 
REPINTEREST (t-3)   -0.0078 
(-0.09) 
0.020004 
(0.23) 
0.023108 
(0.26) 
REPINTEREST (t-4)    -0.15042* 
(-1.37) 
-0.16593** 
(-1.87) 
REPINTEREST (t-5)     0.0792 
(0.85) 
Adjusted r-Squared 10.56% 14.89% 14.89% 15% 15.03% 
N of Observations 2859 2859 2859 2859 2859 
Notes: This table represents the results of a regression analysis which was performed to explore the correlation between the reputation scores presented in Fortune’s AMAC ranking and a firm’s 
interest in its corporate reputation over a two-, three-, -four-, and five-year timeframe. The score was used as a dependent variable in the model. Net income, Total Revenue, Number of 
Employees, Book Value per Share, and Total Liabilities were used as control variables. A number of dummy variables were also added in the model. The ProQuest Availability Dummy variable 
was present in every specification, the Pre-Internet-Age variable was introduced in the third specification to depict the potential changes introduced by the shift in information. Year Dummies 
were added in the fourth specification. In the final specification the Number of Companies per Industry variable was introduced to capture the potential effect from industry-specific differences, 
potentially caused by the variation in the number of firms. REPINTEREST (t-1) was an independent variable, which introduced the firm’s interest in its corporate reputation. REPINTEREST(t-
2) was an independent variable, which introduced the firm’s interest in its corporate reputation over a two-year  period, REPINTEREST(t-3) was an independent variable, which introduced the 
firm’s interest in its corporate reputation over three years’ time, REPINTEREST(t-4) was an independent variable, which introduces firm’s interest in corporate reputation  over four years’ time, 
REPINTEREST(t-5) is an independent variable, which introduced the firm’s interest in its corporate reputation over a five-year time span. GEOPROX was an independent variable, which 
addressed the potential effect caused by the geographic location of the firms interested in their corporate reputation. This table represented a combination of regressions run by using two 
methods: the OLS method was applied in all uneven-numbered specifications; the WLS method was applied in all even-numbered specifications. Significance levels estimated:  p****<0.001, 
p***<0.01, p** < 0.05, p* < 0.1. 
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1.7 Discussion 
The results presented in this essay demonstrate the connection and relationship 
between firm concern over reputation and its performance ranking. This finding fills 
the missing gap by providing supporting evidence of reputation ranking to be a valid 
methodology of reputation measurement, as pointed out by Ali et al. (2015). 
However, due to the nature of the survey it was not possible to identify the financial 
contribution, as was previously addressed by Fryxell and Wang (1994), Fombrun et 
al. (2000) and so on. 
 Further, the evidence presented in this essay provides strong support to the 
studies of Shultz et al. (2001) and Ang and Wight (2009) on the stickiness of 
reputation. The analysis of reputation over time not only shows that effort to manage 
reputation efficiently pays off, but suggests that the effect tends to last over a time 
frame of at least three years. This evidence is a strong encouraging factor for taking 
reputation management strategy into serious consideration, as well as justifying the 
investment.  
 
1. 8 Conclusion 
Corporate reputation has gained recognition as a cornerstone of a firm’s strategy to 
gain competitive advantage by both academics and practitioners in recent years. This 
intangible asset provides a prime opportunity for a company to communicate its value 
to the outside world (Tischer and Hildebrandt, 2014). The benefits of corporate 
reputation spread beyond the company’s positive image in stakeholders’ eyes. It is 
linked to higher investment attractiveness, easier access to capital resources, an 
increase in returns, partnership with the best suppliers and industry representatives, 
and much more, as has been argued by academics over the years (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990; Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy, 2005; Ali et al., 2015).  
 As numerous studies provide evidence of the benefits related to corporate 
reputation, it became an important intangible asset, which, if managed properly, could 
bring strong strategic benefits. A significant research studied mechanism of reputation 
management and measurement, this study diversifies the research focusing on 
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outcome of reputation management, which signalize it works, and examines 
reputation endurance over time. 
Without an explicit framework, evaluating reputation becomes problematic. 
Reputation ranking plays a definitive role in reputation evaluation, remaining one of 
the most respectable information sources (Tischer and Hildebrandt, 2014; Gatzer, 
2015). Its reliability is confirmed by much evidence from academic and industry 
sources. Fortune’s AMAC rating appears to be one of the most powerful reputation 
estimators (Ali et al., 2015), as it remains the most popular amongst academics and 
practitioners. 
The results of the analysis revealed evidence of the interrelation between a 
firm’s concerns about reputation management and its performance in the AMAC 
ranking. These results seem logical. To put it in perspective, the AMAC ranking is the 
strongest outside estimator of corporate reputation. Therefore firms, who invest in 
reputation management, would be extremely concerned over performance captured by 
such a powerful reputation measurement as AMAC ranking. The results revealed such 
connection, which suggests evidence that reputation management works. 
 Another significant question tackled in this study is how strongly the power of 
reputation management hold over a time perspective. As reputation is an intangible 
asset, it becomes complicated to determine its “expiry date”. Nevertheless, Schultz et 
al. (2000) and Ang and Wight (2009) have argued that reputation sticks to the 
company. Two strategies were used to measure the power of reputation. The results 
both revealed the power of reputation to demonstrate lasting effect. However the 
“expire date” results indicated endurance of reputation. Two empirical strategies 
reviled the power of reputation to hold over at least two years. These findings 
contribute to the literature dedicated to corporate reputation, through providing new 
evidence of reputation management to work. It further develops the discussion over 
reputation “stickiness” or its power over time in the theoretical investigations.  
 The results bring positive practical implication, encouraging reputation 
management practices. This paper provides new evidence, which suggests, investment 
in strategic reputation management pays off. The evidence of reputation endurance 
supports the strategically important role of the asset. As reputation power 
demonstrated a lasting effect, the management mechanism could have lasting strategic 
implications. 
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 It is important to develop further alternative methodology to measure the 
impact of reputation management, which could provide a toolkit for companies to 
improve the strategic approach to reputation management. Additionally, it is 
important to further improve suggested model through finding more empirically 
strong independent variable.   
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Appendix 1. Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Fortune Score 
 
1 1.00                
Fortune Score 
(Log) 
2 1.00*** 1.00               
Net Income 3 0.25*** 0.25*** 1.00              
Total Revenue 4 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.49*** 1.00             
Ln (Employees) 5 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.34*** 0.87*** 1.00            
Book Value Per Share 6 0.03** 0.03** 0.00 -0.01* -0.01* 1.00           
Ln (Total Liabilities) 7 0.00 0.00 0.30*** 0.40*** 0.17*** 0.00 1.00          
FIRMPERIND 8 
-
0.08*** 
-
0.08*** 
0.09** 0.20** 0.06 0.01 0.21* 1.00         
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
ProQuest Availability 9 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.04*** 
-
0.02*** 
-
0.03*** 
0.02*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 1.00        
REPINTEREST 10 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 
-
0.02*** 
0.11*** 1.00       
GEOPROX 11 0.08* 0.07*** 0.01** -0.04** -0.04** -0.03** -0.01* 
-
0.08*** 
-
0.09*** 
-
0.04*** 
1.00      
PREINTERNET 12 0.09*** 0.10*** -0.04** -0.08 
-
0.02*** 
0.00*** -0.05** -0.19** 0.00*** 
-
0.04*** 
0.10*** 1.00     
REPINTEREST t-2 13 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.09** 0.06* 0.06*** 
-
0.01*** 
0.05*** 0.02*** 0.08*** 0.18*** 
-
0.03*** 
-0.03 1.00    
REPINTEREST t-3 14 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.10** 0.05* 0.03*** 
-
0.01*** 
0.08*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 
-
0.02*** 
-
0.03*** 
0.36*** 1.00   
REPINTEREST t-4 15 0.10** 0.11** 0.14** 0.10* 0.08** -0.01** 0.09** 0.05** 0.07** 0.08** -0.03** -0.05** 0.15** 0.33** 1.00  
REPINTEREST t-5 16 0.08** 0.09** 0.07* 0.12* 0.11* -0.01** 0.09* 0.05** 0.07* 0.05** -0.02** -0.05** 0.14** 0.16** 0.34** 1.00 
Notes: This table represents the results of correlation analysis conducted between the key variables, which are included in the subsequent model of regression analysis. Score and Logit Score are dependent variables. 
Net Income (Loss), Total Revenue, Number of Employees, Book Value per Share and Total Liabilities are control variables in the model. FIRMPERIND, ProQuest Availability and PREINTERNET are dummy 
variables. Key independent variables are REPINTEREST, GEOPROX and REPINTEREST with time effects t-2, t-3, t-4, t-5. Logarithmic interpretation of the Peers in State variable was also presented. Significance 
levels estimated: p***<0.001, p**<0.01, p* < 0.05. 
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Appendix 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean St. Dev. Median Max Min Average-
Min 
Average-
Max 
Score 6.258381 1.040039 6.37 9.02 1.64 4.618381 -2.76162 
Logitscore 0.233586 0.200684 0.244233 0.96398 -0.70736 0.940949 -0.73039 
Net 
Income 
757.4145 2331.115 266.623 24589 -27684 28441.41 -23831.6 
Total 
Revenue 
14517.71 26501.15 7094.619 406103 7.252 14510.46 -391585 
Employees 69.08595 133.4002 34 2100 0.015 69.07095 -2030.91 
Book  
Value per 
Share 
29.04473 349.8825 13.492 14419.68 -1164.23 1193.272 -14390.6 
Total 
Liabilities 
24818.89 140539.5 3321.5 2074033 1.797 24817.1 -204921.4 
Geoprox 0.106479 0.147187 0 0.625 0 0.106479 -0.51852 
Notes: This table represents descriptive statistics for the key variables implemented in 
the analysis of firm’s interest in reputation management and relationship with it 
performance in the AMAC ranking. 
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Essay 2: Revisiting the Evaluation of the Performance of 
SRI Funds and Conventional Funds 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This essay explores the survival capabilities of ethical and conventional funds. 
Numerous studies, which addressed survivorship bias, indicated that SRI funds 
display stronger survival capabilities; however, academics did not address the 
evidence in sufficient depth. This essay provides new evidence of SRI funds to have 
stronger survival capabilities. Understanding the effects that ethical specifications 
have on the length of a fund’s life would allow the further extending of the notion of 
ethical investment capabilities. It would also bring positive practical implications for 
asset management companies, since strong survival capabilities of funds would 
positively affect the income, which is fully fee-based in the case of asset managers.  
64 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Over the decades sophistication and diversity arose amongst sustainable approaches 
across financial disciplines. The introduction of socially responsible investing (SRI) 
funds became an important step for asset owners and investors to embrace sustainable 
practices. It offered a range of new opportunities for investors to diversify their 
strategies, and granted asset managers with the means to attract new clients, 
introducing new ways to generate profits in a responsible manner. 
Academics have conducted intense work dedicated to the exploration of 
various ethical investing related practices. Interest in asset owners and fund 
performance notably dominated the research pool, leaving the implications of SRI 
practices for asset management companies visibly understudied.  
Another subject, which did not receive significant attention, is the survival of 
the funds. Significant academic interest is directed towards performance of ethical 
and non-ethical funds. In the empirical studies, numerous papers indicated a strikingly 
higher survival rate of ethical funds, when addressing survivorship bias (Bauer et al. 
(2005), Renneboog et al. (2008) and Kempf and Osthoff (2008)). However, the 
studies notably did not perform a survival analysis to take a closer look on the trend. 
This study focuses on fund survival and explores if the survival is attributed to 
the ethical specification of the fund. And become the first to introduce a profound 
survival analysis. Methodology is rooted to the medical research and found wide 
application in the work dedicated to the IPO (Carpentier and Suret (2011), Espenlaub 
et al (2012) and Espenlaub et al (2016)). The findings of the paper diversify 
theoretical outlook on the ethical and conventional funds. It extends methodological 
base through adopting an approach, which did not find wide application in the 
sustainability research before. From practical perspective, these finding would 
provide new outlook on SRI-related opportunities for asset management companies, 
as stronger survival would provide a robust fee structure for asset managers.  
The first group of literature, considered in this paper explores the performance 
abilities of ethical funds. Luther et al. (1992) pioneered academic work dedicated to 
the comparative study of SRI fund performance. Matched pair analysis, which was 
introduced in the study of Mallin (1995), spread across papers as an efficient 
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mechanism to gain accurate performance evaluation, implementing various criteria to 
develop compatible datasets, based on size, age and a fund’s country of origin. 
Gregory et al. (1997) and Kreander et al. (2005) questioned applied methods, and 
introduced more sophisticated empirical methodology, through further development 
of Jensen’s (1976) performance measurement and accounting for the small size of 
bias, which was suggested to disrupt the results (Fletcher, 1995). Further 
methodology development undermined implementation of the four-factor model, 
which allows the accurate evaluation of the impact that investment styles have on 
fund performance (Gregory and Whittaker, 1997). Despite the scale of the studies, 
academics could not come to a conclusion over the capabilities of SRI fund 
outperformance. The lack of strong evidence divided fund management companies 
into those which focus on conventional products and those, which offer opportunities 
for ethical and mixed investment. 
Numerous academics reported survivorship bias presence in the research 
(Gregory et al., 1997; Bauer et al. 2005; Kreander et al. 2005; Gregory and Whittaker, 
2007). Chegut et al. (2011) reported in their research overview that there has been no 
unified recognition or methodology to treat the bias. Studies, which acknowledged 
survivorship bias, revealed the common trend of SRI fund capabilities as surviving 
better than conventional funds. Gregory and Whittaker (2007) revealed a 17.43% 
higher survival rate of SRI funds; Kempf and Osthoff (2008) reported even lower 
survival rates of conventional funds at 19% lower compared to ethical funds. It is 
important to note, that the academic attention was reported in the descriptive statistics 
of survival rates, however, now in-depth analysis was performed. 
Common survival trends depicted by several research papers did not receive 
wide academic attention. However, it could be argued that the trend is not 
coincidental, but rather attributable to the ethical specifications of the funds. As the 
evidence reported in academic paper became the motivation for this study, it is 
important to notify the data-driven nature of it. Nevertheless, the subject matter finds 
a strong reflection not only in academia, but also in the practical subject matter. 
Existent studies indicated the presence of effect that the ethical specification 
of funds make on survival capabilities, as presented in the works dedicated to 
investors’ behaviour. Bollen (2007) carried out a study, which evaluated investors’ 
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behaviour, as it has a strong impact on a fund’s viability and the variability of its 
operating costs. The author applied fund–flow volatility as a measure of investors’ 
behaviour; his finding demonstrated lower cash flow volatility in sustainable funds, 
suggesting higher investor loyalty to ethical funds. Renneboog (2008) showed 
evidence that social investors are less likely to move investments from one fund to 
another and more inclined to stay with an SRI fund. If ethical attributes encourage 
investors’ loyalty, it could be suggested it also has an impact on the survival of the 
fund itself.   
This increasing evidence encouraged in this study to take a closer look at the 
link between ethical investing and fund survival. Espenlaub et al. (2016) defined 
survival as the “continued trading of newly listed stocks on the stock market” (p. 99), 
when examining the subject in the context of IPOs. Following this definition, this 
study refers to the “survival” of funds as the continued fund operation on the market. 
Studying survival in the context of SRI funds could make a valuable contribution to 
the theoretical literature through further expanding the understanding that the 
sustainability of effects has on fund performance. Additionally, the research would 
contribute to the further exploration of fund management companies’ financial 
benefits associated with SRI funds.  
Another dimension of studies questioned the interrelation of the fee size and 
the ethical specifications of the fund. In 2005 two papers addressed the role that 
management fees play in the assessment of SRI fund performance. Kreander et al. 
(2005) showcased the positive relationship between managers’ performance and the 
size of the fees, demonstrating its effects on alpha. Whereas Bauer et al. (2005) 
suggested the size of the fees SRI fund managers charge could interfere with 
performance evaluation results. Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) argued that these findings 
provided robust evidence of no difference in the size of the fees charged for SRI and 
conventional funds, with the sole exception of when asset managers focused on SRI 
investment.  
 This study addresses the survivorship bias presented and survival capabilities 
of the funds, as well as exploring opportunities arising for asset managers. It suggests, 
that survival capabilities of the funds could bring positive implications for asset 
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management, as it would introduce a longer fee generation opportunity, in case ethical 
specification is linked to the stronger survival rates. 
This study is built on the dataset presented in the study of Kreander et al. 
(2005), which highlights its data-divineness. Researchers provided an optimal dataset 
as the analysis covered the European market, rather than purely focusing on the UK or 
the US, and the time frame would allow analysing the framework on an ex ante basis, 
which is crucial to study funds’ survival capabilities. Additional robustness tests were 
included to evaluate the performance of the funds through the Carhart (1997) four-
factor implementation.    
The results indicated a strong survival capability of ethical funds. Further 
analysis demonstrated the survival capabilities to be attributed to the ethical 
specification of the funds.  
These results contribute to the theoretical approach of SRI and the evaluation 
of conventional funds. They address the question raised by Chegut et al. (2011), and 
provide further evidence of survivorship bias to be a significant part of fund 
performance evaluation and which will be addressed in this study. They further 
indicate that not only survivorship bias exists, but that the survival is attributed to the 
ethical specification of the fund, which further contributes to the study of the ethical 
investment approach. The results confirm the findings of Bollen (200& and 
Renneboog (2008) linking ethical specification to survival. It further expands 
evidence reflected in descriptive statistics and studies of in the studies of Gregory et 
al., 1997; Bauer et al. 2005; Kreander et al. 2005; Gregory and Whittaker, 2007. 
From a practical perspective, the current study further expands the discussion 
on the benefits associated with ethical investment and brings light to the issues related 
to survivorship bias. Additionally, the fact that SRI is positively connected to longer 
fund survival highlights an opportunity for asset managers, who are severely 
dependent on management fees, as the survival of ethical funds offers longevity of 
management fees.  
 In the rest of this essay, an overview of the existing literature dedicated to 
ethical mutual fund performance is first presented, followed by a description of the 
methodological steps and a detailed introduction to the data. The results attained are 
analysed before some concluding remarks. 
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2.2 Literature Overview 
 The growing relevance of the ethical movement sparked a development in 
extensive research dedicated to understanding the implications associated with 
responsible investment for asset owners and fund managers. As a majority of studies 
took the perspective of asset owners, relatively few took an in-depth interest in 
studying the ethical investing implications for asset management companies.  
 The first evidence of ethical unit trust outperformance capabilities against 
general market indices was registered in the study of Luther et al. (1992). As the first 
verification appeared weak, Luther and Matatko (1994) revisited the research 
introducing a small cap benchmark in 1994. The evidence corroborated the small cap 
bias suggested in previous studies. Mallin et al. (1995) addressed this issue through 
the introduction of matched pairs of funds, rather than analysing the performance 
against the benchmark. Fund size criteria were used for pair matching (Mallin et al., 
1995). Gregory et al. (1997) argued that the criteria suggested by Mallin et al. (1995) 
were not sufficient, as the methodology failed to control for the type of the fund. 
Therefore further variables were implemented, on the basis of the extended CAPM 
model, which accounts for the difference between returns on high and low 
capitalization stocks, represented as “size premium” (Gregory et al., 1997). The 
authors did not find SRI funds to demonstrate better performance than other funds. In 
addition, the study indicated that the age of the fund to be an important factor. 
The matched pair analysis was established as the dominant framework for 
fund performance evaluation following Gregory et al. (1997). Statman (2000) was the 
first to implement the method by applying it to US funds. The author used the Jensen 
and Sharpe measure, which indicated the stronger performance of ethical funds. A 
significant research body appeals to the match pair analysis methodology, as was 
highlighted by Rathner (2013), as alternatively it is hard to predict whether a fund’s 
performance results are consequences attributed to ethics, or to other factors such as 
size and age difference. 
Kreander et al. (2005) continued exploring the performance potential of SRI 
funds with a significantly expanded dataset, which incorporated four European 
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countries as well as four benchmarks. The study covered the markets of the UK, 
Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands; 30 SRI funds were depicted in the evaluation. 
Both funds, which invested locally and internationally, were included in the dataset, 
and compared against conventional funds. The funds were matched on the basis of 
four factors: age, size, and country of origin and investment universe.  
The data was analysed for the period from 1995 to 2001. Following earlier 
published papers, Kreander et al. (1995) extended the depth of the analysis through 
the implementation of additional factors, such as management fee and load charge. 
Despite the growing complexity of the analysis, Kreander et al. (2005) did not 
demonstrate the outperformance of either SRI or conventional funds against the 
market benchmarks. However, the results contributed to the evidence that proves SRI 
funds’ capacity to perform equally well as non-ethical funds. In the same year 
Derwall et al. (2005) indicated strong outperformance in ethical versus non-ethical 
stock portfolios, which they evaluated from 1995 to 2003. Bauer et al. (2007) 
implemented the Carhart model for the analysis in 2005, accounting for size, book to 
market and momentum factors. The study suggested the risk of ethical portfolios to be 
lower, and ethical portfolios as facing larger exposure to growth stocks.  
As the research progressed, more studies evolved that criticized the 
responsible investing approach. A popular academic outlook, facilitated by the study 
of Rudd (1981), suggested that the restriction of the investment universe due to 
additional limitations could negatively affect returns. Kurtz (1997) and Michelson et 
al. (2004) suggested a potential increase in the risk burden related to the adoption of 
an ethical framework, whereas, Geczy et al. (2005) linked a weaker performance of 
mutual funds to the increased costs due to the selection process and imposed 
limitations. However, the analysis was conducted at a less-than-five-year time period.   
Over a period of time, several academics drew attention to the survivorship 
bias presented in their studies. Chegut et al. (2011) in the overview of SRI fund 
performance research indicated that only 49% of the studies acknowledged its 
presence. In the study from 1992, Brown et al. suggested survivorship bias could 
impact on the final performance outcomes. Some studies, such as Kreander et al. 
(2005), did not tackle the bias in the dataset, whereas Bauer et al. (2005), Kempf and 
Osthoff (2008) and Renneboog et al. (2008) addressed the issue and adjusted the data 
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accordingly. Interestingly, all the studies, which addressed the survivorship bias, 
indicated significantly higher survival rates amongst SRI funds in comparison to the 
conventional ones. Gregory and Whittaker (2007) reported the death rates of 
conventional funds against sustainable funds to be 29.93 to 12.50%. Similarly, Bauer 
et al. (2005), Renneboog et al. (2008) and Kempf and Osthoff (2008) reported 
significantly higher attrition rates amongst conventional funds.  
The presented evidence suggests the potential positive effect that ethical 
specification could have on the survival strength of the fund. However, the evidence 
remained anecdotal with a lack of profound research to support it. Bollen (2007) 
presented indirect confirmation of the SRI factor impacting on survival strength. The 
author presented strong evidence of investors’ dedication to SRI funds, which was 
signalled by lower volatility and an increase in investors’ utility associated with it.  
Pasewark and Riley (2009) positively indicated that investors see an opportunity to 
make social change through SRI investing. Renneboog et al. (2011) supported the 
evidence presented in Bollen (2007) and indicated in his work, that past returns of 
SRI funds have a weak impact on investors’ behaviour.Papers of Gregory et al., 1997; 
Bauer et al. 2005; Kreander et al. 2005; Gregory and Whittaker, 2007: Chegut et al, 
2011 reviewed above indicate the existence of survivorship biasness and indication of 
strong ethical fund survival. Previous studies addressed the issue by representing the 
descriptive statistics of survival rates, yet not introducing a study of survival. Indirect 
indication of link between survival strength and ethical specification was reported in 
the works by Bollen (2007) and Renneboog (2008).  
The lack of work dedicated to examining fund survival and the growing 
indirect evidence presented in the literature gives a unique research opportunity to 
enlarge the existent pool of theoretical studies dedicated to ethical investment. 
Addressing survivorship bias is crucial to providing accurate empirical results. The 
understanding of funds’ survival capabilities would raise awareness of the survival 
issue and bring positive implications for the quality of the studies. 
The study of the survival of funds brings a strong practical contribution to the 
research dedicated to asset management companies. Asset management companies 
operate according to the fee-based structure. To draw a parallel, the structure of the 
income of hedge funds not only includes management fees, represented as a 
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percentage share of the fund’s net asset value, but also additionally charges an 
incentive fee of 20% on the fund’s profits. Therefore fees remain the sole income 
source for the asset management company. This study is challenged the findings of 
Gil_Bazo et al (2010) and further explores the ethical fund related opportunities for 
asset managers. It suggests, the potential increase in fee size related to SRI funds 
could be a strong incentive for asset managers. 
 Bauer et al. (2005) suggested the size of the fees to be higher for SRI funds in 
the analysis, based on the evidence attained through expense ratio coefficients. Gil-
Bazo et al. (2010) took a closer look at the implications that ethical consideration has 
on fees. The author developed a counter-argument, showing no evidence of higher 
fees charged for SRI funds, with the one exception of fund management companies, 
which solely focus on ethical investments. This evidence suggests the size of the fee 
does not provide an opportunity for fund managers. 
As neither fund performance nor fee size significantly differentiates between 
SRI and conventional funds, fund survival could secure longer fees inflow for asset 
management at longer terms. In other words, if the analysis confirms ethical 
specification improves fund survival capabilities it would mean that the choice of 
portfolio allocation towards SRI would secure a management fee flow at a longer-
term perspective, which is beneficial for fund management companies.  
 
2.3 Methods Applied 
 The methodology developed in this study is explores the survival capabilities 
of ethical and non-ethical funds. It is tailored to answer whether SRI funds 
demonstrate stronger survival rates.  
In order to study the survival of the fund, the dataset requires an ex ante 
approach. This approach was previously overlooked in the current analysis presented 
in the literature. Research in the past applied various criteria to match funds. For 
example Malin et al. (1995) and Gregory et al. (1997) used formation date and size 
criteria. However, the dataset was matched on an ex post basis, which arguably failed 
to capture the criteria variation over time, which hence could distort the results. 
Kreander et al. (2005) improved the framework through matching on the size factor 
72 
 
basis in the middle of the analysis time line; however, the analysis did not address 
survivorship bias presented in the dataset. Despite this fact, the dataset presented in 
the study was used as a starting point of the analysis, as Kreander et al. (2005) 
develop one of the most solid databases of European funds.  
The funds from the dataset were studied throughout the period of 2002 to 
2015. Hence, the dataset that was matched by Kreander et al. (2005) was used. The 
application of the previously used dataset introduces a required starting point of the 
data for ex ante analysis. This allows establishing the number of survived funds in 
both the ethical and non-ethical lists. Each fund was tracked during the period in order 
to explore the reasons why it ceased to exist in order to get a fuller picture. This 
subject is further explored in the “data” section of this essay. Additionally, matched 
pairs of funds presented in Gregory et al. (1997) was compared to the Kreander et al. 
(2005) dataset to establish if certain SRI or non-SRI funds revealed attrition 
tendencies.  
A Pearson’s Chi-squared test (Pearson, 1900) was applied to examine the data. 
This is a widely recognized statistical tool to study the relationship and establish the 
likelihood of chance to determine particular observations between two categorical 
variables:  
 
 
𝑥𝑐
2 = ∑
(𝑂𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖)
2
𝐸𝑖
 
   (13) 
 
Where x is the expected value, c represents the degree of freedom, O 
represents the observed value and E represents the expected value. 
 Further, the data on the fund closure was summarised to identify average 
closure year. This was a preliminary step to further introduce the survival analysis. 
Survival analysis came as the next step. Cox (1972) Proportional Hazard 
distribution was implemented to study survival. The model is non-parametric, and it 
requires no assumption about the failure distribution (Cox, 1972).  
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The application of this approach could be found in IPO survival literature, as 
featured in papers of Carpentier and Suret (2011), Espenlaub et al (2012) and 
Espenlaub et al (2016). It is originated in the medical field; where statistical 
methodology was developed to study the survival and length of patience survival, in 
other words, the factors are likely to lead to the positive outcome. This statistical 
method could be applied across fields of studies when circumstances are similar 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2008). Despite that, the method did not receive significant 
attention in the ethical-related topics. 
The dependant variable in the survival analysis measures risk of failure. In the 
Cox (1972) model the marginal effect of independent variable is measured by the 
hazard ratio (calculated as the exponential coefficient from the Cox (1972) model). A 
positive (negative) coefficient implies a hazard ratio of greater (less) than one and 
indicates that an increase in the covariates increases (decreases) the failure rate 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2008). 
The general equation for the model could be presented, following Cox (1972) 
methodology: 
 𝑟(𝑥, 𝛽) = exp (𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝) (14) 
 
Where, the covariates, 𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝑥𝑝 , include regulative, normative and culture-
cognitive institutional variables and control variables, and 𝛽1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 are the model 
parameters describing the effect of the covariates. 
 In current essay, Cox (1972) distribution tests, which factors contribute to the 
survival of the fund, or, in case of survival analysis setting, which factors are 
associated with the hazardous event, such as fund attrition in this case. Therefore, the 
dependant variable is the hazard rate, in form of probability, that event of fund’s 
closure takes place at a particular time interval (between 2002 and 2015) (Hosmer and 
Lemeshaw, 2008). The variable is treated as unobservable, which allows to control for 
the timing of event as well as the occurrence.  
The fund closure dataset is characterised by missing data. In order to follow 
the assumption of hazard rate to be consistent over time Cox (1972), the funds with 
no reported closure date were deleted from the framework. However, a robustness 
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tests were introduced to challenge the conservative approach, and further explore the 
effects factors have on funds’ survival. The distribution was measure on the basis of 
assumption, that closed funds with missing data were closed in the beginning of the 
timeline, in the middle, or at the end of time line.  
 The next step is to evaluate fund performance, as this is still a driving 
determinant in the asset managers’ fund choice Therefore it could be suggested that 
managers would not take the SRI fund into consideration without the funds 
demonstrating better or similar performance to conventional funds. For this reason 
this paper incorporated classic risk-adjusted Sharpe, Treynor ratios and Jensen 
measure.  
 The Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966), shown in equation (15), is one of the most 
widely applicable estimates for risk-adjusted performance, as supported by the 
extensive evidence from the academic literature, including Bello (2005), Geczy et al. 
(2005) and Sauer (1997). It studies average return’ relation to standard deviation of 
fund returns: 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 =
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓
𝜎𝑖
 
 
(15) 
 
 
Where 𝑟i  is the average monthly return of fund i, 𝑟𝑓 is the average return of the risk-
free asset, with the local one-month T-Bill rate for UK and Swedish funds and the 
euro for the one-month interbank rates for German and Dutch funds. 𝜎𝑖 represents the 
standard deviation.  
 Unlike the Sharpe ratio, which measures the return of the portfolio or a stock 
on one unit of the risk-free rate of return, the Treynor ratio reflects the measurement 
of performance against the equity market as a whole. Therefore it is used as an 
addition to the Sharpe ratio in performance measurement (Mueller, 1991; Mallin et 
al., 1995; Hill et al., 2007) as in equation (16), 
 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟 =
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓
𝛽𝑖
 
(16) 
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Where 𝛽𝑖 is the Beta of fund i.  
Equation (17) showcases the Jensen measure. It reflects a fund’s capability to 
out or underperform the market through the difference between the fund’s return and 
the return on the single-factor benchmark according to an estimated CAPM. This 
indicator is placed amongst the most applicable tools to assess fund performance 
(Gregory et al., 1997; 2007; Kreander et al. 2005; Bauer et al., 2005): 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                         (17) 
 
Where 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the random error in the equation. 
For robustness purposes an extended multi-factor model was additionally 
applied in order to gain a better explanation of fund behaviour, following the recent 
studies of Bauer et al. (2005), Gregory and Whittaker (2007) and Derwall et al. 
(2011).  
Small size bias played an important role in the evaluation of SRI fund 
performance. The first concern over the issue was expressed in the findings of Mallin 
et al. (1995). Small-size stocks are believed to distort performance results, having an 
impact on ethical fund performance. Gregory et al. (1997) suggested the 
implementation of a Fama–French model, as a method to tackle size-related issues, by 
controlling for the size factor. Since then the approach has gained strong appreciation 
in the field of fund performance evaluation. 
The study published by Wallis and Klein (2015) is dedicated to evaluating the 
stages of academic advances in the area of SRI fund performance. Notably, the 
majority of existing papers focus on the Jensen, Traynor and Sharpe estimates when it 
comes to the investigation of fund performance, with controls for the “size” factor. 
The work of Bauer et al. (2005) and Fletcher and Marshall (2005) were amongst the 
first to implement the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. This performance attribution 
model uses the coefficient and premium on the factor-mimicking portfolio to indicate 
the proportion of mean return attributable to four investment strategies (Bauer et al., 
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2005).  Bauer et al. also suggested it could allow the tracking of market cycles and 
style preferences effects on returns of ethical and non-ethical investments.  
The Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimates fund performance through the 
addition of the investment style indicators, as estimated by equation (18). The 
momentum factor was formed by ranking all stocks on their prior 12 month return. 
The momentum factor return is calculated as the difference between the stocks with 
the top 30% market capitalisation and the return of the stocks with the bottom 30% 
The calculation is performed on a monthly basis to obtain rolling momentum:  
 
 (𝑟𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡−1) =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡−1) + 𝛾𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛿𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡
+ 𝜆𝑝𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 
(18) 
 
 
Where 𝛽𝑝  is described in equation (16); (𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡−1)  is the continuously 
compounded return of portfolio p at time t in excess of the continuously compounded 
risk-free rate of return; αp represents portfolio p’s systematic return component not 
captured by the independent variables of the model; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the continuously 
compounded return of small-cap stocks in excess of the continuously compounded 
return large-cap stocks at time t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the continuously compounded return of 
value stocks in excess of the continuously compounded return of growth stocks at 
time t; MOMt  represents the difference in the returns of the winning and losing 
portfolios over a 12-month period; while γp and δp represent portfolio p’s exposure to 
small-cap and value investment styles respectively; εp,t is a random disturbance term.  
The methodology presented above reveals fund survival abilities and allows 
the detailed evaluation of funds’ performance. It explores if fund survival is an 
attribute of the ethical approach and reveals the exposure of funds to market risk and 
various investment styles, in order to comprehend the behaviour of returns. 
 
2.4 Data  
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Interestingly, during the analysis it was established that not all funds were matched 
accurately according to “age” criteria. Kreander et al. (2005) did not indicate 
significant difference in the performance of SRI and non-SRI portfolios. The current 
study requires a solid dataset, which would combine ethical and non-ethical funds 
with similar performance, otherwise asset managers would not consider choosing 
between ethical and non-ethical funds. This cross-section introduces a firm base to 
develop the dataset for this essay’s empirical analysis. 
The Kreander et al. (2005) dataset reviewed in Table 2.2, and summary of the 
funds state at 2015 is presented as well. The dataset included 60 funds: 30 ethical and 
30 conventional. Funds in the dataset predominantly originated from the UK, with a 
few funds from Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. All funds apart from one 
were open-ended equity funds. As might be suggested, the dataset could suffer from 
survivorship bias. However, it was deliberately used to reveal its effects throughout 
the analysis period.  
It is important to draw attention to the fact that Kreander et al. (2005) suggested 
that as the dataset affects both the ethical and the non-ethical funds, it does not distort 
the matched pair analysis. It could overstate the performance of all funds on average, 
but Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Brown and Goetzmann (1995) estimated that the 
survivorship bias was not substantial in their investigations; it was only about 0.5% 
per year.  
After following the performance of each fund back to 2002, the final dataset 
revealed an obvious attrition of the funds: 18 ethical funds survived until 2015, as 
against only 10 in non-ethical ones. SRI funds demonstrated a stronger pattern of 
survival, at 60%. This represents a good background for further investigation of 
whether the results are connected to the ethical settings of the funds. 
 It is important to state that despite the funds being initially matched on the 
basis of age, size, and country of origin and investment universe (Kreander et al., 
2005), only eight pairs of funds survived. For the accuracy of research, the history of 
each fund was examined. A summary of the fund list is presented in Table 2.3, where 
the attempt was made to trace the circumstance under which the funds were closed; 
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however, information availability was limited. Datastream, 17  Bloomberg 18  and 
Morningstar 19  were used as the main sources of information. The final dataset 
subjected to analysis included 169 observations. The analysis was performed on a 
monthly basis.
                                                          
 
17 Thomson Reuters Datastream: <datastream.com>, accessed 16 August 2016. 
18 Bloomberg L.P.: <Bloomberg.com>, accessed 16 August 2016. 
19 Morningstar: <morningtar.com>, accessed 16 August 2016. 
79 
 
 
Table 2.1 Fund overview 
Name of fund Country Size 
(1998), £ 
Size 
(2016), £ 
Fund 
growth (%) 
Survived 
funds 
Name of fund Country Size 
(1998), £ 
Size 
(2016), £ 
Fund 
growth (%) 
Survived 
funds 
Abbey Ethical Trust UK 40.4 20.5179  * Sovereign Income UK 39    
Aberdeen Ethical UK 6.7 140.1986 1992.52 * Cavendish Worldwide UK 5.4 117.1375 2069.21 * 
ABF Andere 
Beleggingsfond 
Netherla
nds 
35 133.77 282.20 * Ing Bank Global Netherla
nds 
128.1 1494.16 1066.40 * 
Allchurches Amity UK 35.3 137.6344  * Credit Suisse Growth 
Portfolio 
UK 59.5    
ASN Aandelensfonds Netherla
nds 
68.2 437.28  * Postbank Aandelenfonds Netherla
nds 
223.2    
Banco Hjalpfond Sweden 11.3    Alfred Berg Sverige Sweden 56.6    
Banco Ideella Miljofond Sweden 24.9    Lansforsakringar Wasa 
Allemansfonden 
Sweden 34.6    
Banco Miljofond Sweden 5.7    HQ Select Sweden 18.5    
CIS Environ Trust UK 146.3 471.5405 222.31 * HSBC European Growth 
Fund 
UK 129.6 242.2249 86.90 * 
City Acom Ethical UK 3.9    City Financial 
International Fund 
UK 3.3    
Clerical Medical 
Evergreen 
UK 18.3 20.3637  * Sunlife of Canada 
Worldwide Growth 
UK 16.6    
Equitable Ethical UK 17.7 1.5803  * Dresdner RCM European 
Small Cos 
UK 21.6    
Family Charities Ethical UK 9.5 131.1  * Abbey National Smaller 
Cos Fund 
UK 10.5    
Focus Umweltechnologie German
y 
2.1 17.07  * Nordinvest Wekanord German
y 
9.3    
Framlington Health Fund UK 71.4 573.6708 703.46 * Old Mutual Worldwide 
Trust 
UK 82.2 395.35 380.96 * 
Friends Provident 
Stewardship Income 
Trust 
UK 73.6    Henderson UK Capital 
Growth Fund 
UK 76.8 463.3567  * 
80 
 
Friends Provident 
Stewardship Unit Trust 
UK 473 193.5921 -59.07 * Equitable High Income 
Trust 
UK 426.7 74.6628 -82.50 * 
Hypobank Ecotech German
y 
18.2    Walser Aktien 
International 
German
y 
49.9    
Jupiter Ecology UK 61.2 506.2003 727.12 * Scottish Life Worldwide UK 60.3 29.29466 -51.42 * 
KD Fonds Okoinvest German
y 
2.8 35.13  * Nordglobal German
y 
17.8    
Luxinter Oekolux German
y 
37.2 26.88  * ADIG Fondiro German
y 
23    
NPI Global Care Income UK 31 88.1  * Scottish Amicable Equity 
Strategy 
UK 25.4    
NPI Global Care Pension UK 45.4    Scottish Mutual Int. 
Growth 
UK 34.4 52.25  * 
Scottish Equitable Ethical UK 44.9 764.2 1602.00 * Rathbone Income & 
Growth Fund 
UK 25.4 77.29112 204.30 * 
SEB Miljofond Sweden 37.5    Lansforsakringar Wasa 
Globalfonden 
Sweden 39.6 201.93  * 
Sovereign Ethical Fund UK 19.8    Hill Samuel Ex. Umbrella 
Fund 
UK 16.3    
TSB Environmental UK 21.8 181.3148  * Martin Currie UK Growth UK 22    
Varldsnaturfonden Sweden 20.9    Banco Smabolagsfond Sweden 27.7    
Wasa Miljofond Sweden 10.4    Banco Global Sweden 12.5    
Wasa U Hja¨lpsfond Sweden 5.5       Handelsbanken 
Seniorbofond Aktie 
Sweden 5       
No of survived funds         18           10 
Active Funds (%)         60           33.32 
Notes: This table summarizes information about the funds analysed in Kreander et al. (2005) as well as in the current study. It presents a full list, which is similar to the list 
provided by Kreander et al. (2005). It provides information on the country of the fund’s origin. Further it shows the initial fund size, and the last reported fund size, followed 
by a column which demonstrates the growth indicator. Finally, this table provides detailed information on the current stages of the fund’s operation, exploring the reasons for 
its closure. 
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Table 2.2 Fund Closure, Explained 
Fund name  Country Reasons 
Ethical 
Banco Hjalpfond Sweden Liquidated, January 2009  
Banco Ideella Miljofond Sweden Merged, 2012 
Banco Miljofond Sweden Notice in a press of a merger in 2010. No further information found. Potentially 
liquidated. 
City Acom Ethical UK No information found 
Friends Provident Stewardship Income 
Trust 
UK No information found, 2003 
Hypobank Ecotech German
y 
Liquidated, date not specified 
NPI Global Care Pension UK Liquidated, 2003 
SEB Miljofond Sweden No information found, 2015 
Sovereign Ethical Fund UK Changed to Standard Life Investments UK Ethical, February 1998. Followed by closure 
in 2015. 
Varldsnaturfonden Sweden No information found 
Wasa Miljofond Sweden No information found 
Wasa U Hja¨lpsfond Sweden  No information found 
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Fund name  Country Reasons 
Non-Ethical 
Sovereign Income UK Merged  
Credit Suisse Growth Portfolio UK Liquidated, 2002 
Postbank Aandelenfonds Netherlands Liquidated, 2008 
Alfred Berg Sverige Sweden Liquidated, 2001 
Lansforsakringar Wasa Allemansfonden Sweden No information found 
HQ Select Sweden No information found 
City Financial International Fund UK No information found 
Sunlife of Canada Worldwide Growth UK No information found 
Dresdner RCM European Small Cos UK No information found. Potentially liquidated 
Abbey National Smaller Cos Fund UK Liquidated, June 2012 
Nordinvest Wekanord Germany Liquidated, December 2008 
Walser Aktien International Germany Liquidated, December 2005 
Nordglobal Germany Liquidated, September 2013 
ADIG Fondiro Germany Liquidated, May 2011 
Scottish Amicable Equity Strategy UK Liquidated, data not specified 
Hill Samuel Ex. Umbrella Fund UK Relaunched by Scottish Widows in 2003. Further details not found 
Martin Currie UK Growth UK Liquidated, 2010 
Banco Smabolagsfond Sweden Liquidated, November 2011 
Banco Global Sweden Liquidated, date not specified 
Handelsbanken Seniorbofond Aktie Sweden Liquidated, date not specified 
Notes: This table represents a summary of the fund list, emphasizing the funds that did not exist by the time of the analysis, and providing information on the potential reasons for the fund’s closure. An in-depth 
research took place in order to identify the history of each fund. The information availability appeared to be limited. This could be linked to the length of the time period passed since closure. In addition, the majority of 
closed funds are European, therefore most related news and reports were available in foreign languages. Funds with available contact information were contacted; however none of them replied to the request.  
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Table 2.2 shows the UK to take a dominating position in the list. In order to 
overcome exchange rate fluctuation effects, the analysis was carried out in British 
currency, with the major focus on the British market.  
To define the portfolios’ excess returns and create benchmark returns, the total 
return indices were transformed through the application of continuously compounded 
rates of return to the return index, as in equation (19): 
 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) (19) 
 
Where 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the total return of firm or index i at time t, 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 is the total return of 
firm or index i at time t-1, and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the continuously compounded rate of return of 
stock or index i at time t. To construct the excess market returns or excess firm 
returns, the weekly risk-free rate of return at time t–1 is subtracted from the 
continuously compounded rate of return of stock or index i at time t.   
 The benchmark was constructed on the basis of information obtained from 
Datastream and the online research and data provider Style Research Ltd.20 In order to 
assess a fund’s exposure to the market, a respective variable was created on the basis 
of the FTSE All Share Total Return Index.21  The index is widely applied in the 
academic literature, and can be found in Bello (2005), Bauer et al (2005).  
 It could be argued that application of social indices, as a benchmark would 
provide more accurate explanatory power to empirical outcomes, when estimating 
SRI funds’ performance. Statman (2000) suggests that due to the difference in 
investment strategies of SRI and conventional funds, application of conventional 
indices could distort the performance outcome. However, further investigation did not 
reveal any evidence to support the assumption. The findings of Bauer et al. (2005) 
indicated ethical fund returns to be stronger and explained by conventional indices. 
These findings were later supported by Cortez et al. (2012). Therefore this study used 
                                                          
 
20 StyleResearch: <www.styleresearch.com./ >, accessed 16 August 2016. 
21 FTSE All Share Index: < www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-
markets/stocks/indices/summary/summary-indices.html?index=ASX. >, accessed 16 August 2016. 
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the conventional index – the FTSE All Share Total Index. The index covers the UK 
market, as all the remaining funds subjected to the analysis were originated in the UK. 
The index chosen was the same as the one applied in the analysis of Kreander et al. 
(2005).  
  Investment style indexes were developed in accordance with Carhart (1997) 
models. They were based on returns’ information retrieved from Style Research Ltd. 
Investment styles captured the exposure of the evaluated portfolio to certain equity 
traits, such as size, book-to-market and momentum. The SMB (small minus big) 
factor reflects the exposure to small-capitalization stocks, and is constructed as the 
difference between the lower half of the market capitalization of stocks returns and 
the upper half of the market capitalization of stock returns. The HML (high minus 
low) factor reflects the exposure to the value stocks, which is calculated as the 
difference between the returns of the top 30% and the lowest 30% stock universe, 
calculated according to the book-to-market value ratio. The ranking performance of 
each stock in the universe over a 12-month period is followed by calculating the 
difference between the winning 30% and the 30% of stocks that demonstrated the 
weakest period, which is the procedure behind constructing a MOM (momentum) 
factor.  
 As a risk-free rate for the UK market, the three-month London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) was implemented. As the performance evaluation is carried 
out on a monthly basis, the three-month LIBOR was calculated as in equation (20): 
 
 𝑟𝑓,𝑡.1𝑤 = 𝑙𝑛 [(1 + 𝑠𝑟𝑓,1𝑦/100)
30.4375 91⁄
]                (20) 
 
Where 𝑠𝑟𝑓,𝑡,1𝑦 is the annualised three-month Euribor rate at time t and 𝑟𝑓,𝑡.1𝑤 is the 
monthly risk-free rate of return at time t. 
As the majority of funds originate from the UK and estimations are performed 
in the British currency, the implementation of the UK risk-free rate should not hinder 
an appropriate evaluation of the performance of all the funds, including those outside 
of the UK, against the benchmark.  
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 A continuously compounded monthly return for each fund was calculated. The 
data collected for fund analysis demonstrated the existence of multiple asset classes in 
the case of several funds. In that case, the overall fund return was presented as a 
return on the equally weighted portfolio, calculated on a monthly basis. The monthly 
logged returns were applied in the model in order to overcome any skewness in the 
returns’ distribution. 
 
2.5 Results  
 First step of analysis was to incorporated Chi-squared. This test was chosen to 
evaluate if the trend could be attributed to ethical specification. Table 2.3 
demonstrates result with significant levels of probability.  
 
Table 2.3 Chi-Squared Test Results 
Chi-Sq DF P-Value 
18.3 1 0.00003 
Notes: This table represents the result of Chi-Squared test, with one degree of freedom and P-value 
 
These results demonstrate strong level of significance with probability below 
1%. These results indicate the results not to be independent from the ethical or non-
ethical factors. In other words, the ethical style of the fund encourages its capacity for 
survival.   
Results presented above support previous indication of stronger survival 
capabilities of ethical funds.  Survival analysis allows further testing empirical 
findings. Prior to the survival analysis, further step compared the closure dates of the 
funds. It not possible to analyse the complete list of closed ethical and non-ethical 
funds, as some information was not available, as was previously indicated. Available 
data was used to estimate the average life expectancy on the basis of information 
about the closure of the funds. The results indicated the average closure date for SRI 
funds to be 2009, against conventional funds with the closing year 2008. The 
evidence supports stronger survival capabilities for SRI funds was presented in Table 
2.4. These results dictated the shape of survival analysis 
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2.4 Average Year of Closure of Ethical and Conventional Funds 
Fund name Open Final year 
Ethical 
Banco Hjalpfond 1995 2009 
Banco Ideella Miljofond 1992 2012 
Banco Miljofond 1996 2010 
City Acom Ethical   
Friends Provident Stewardship Income 
Trust 
1987 2003 
Hypobank Ecotech   
NPI Global Care Pension 1994 2000 
SEB Miljofond 1991 2015 
Sovereign Ethical Fund   
Varldsnaturfonden   
Wasa Miljofond   
Wasa U Hja¨lpsfond     
Average  2008.17 
Conventional 
Sovereign Income     
Credit Suisse Growth Portfolio 1988 2002 
Postbank Aandelenfonds 1992 2008 
Alfred Berg Sverige 1994 2001 
Lansforsakringar Wasa Allemansfonden   
HQ Select   
City Financial International Fund   
Sunlife of Canada Worldwide Growth   
Dresdner RCM European Small Cos   
Abbey National Smaller Cos Fund 1988 2012 
Nordinvest Wekanord 1969 2008 
Walser Aktien International 1992 2005 
Nordglobal 1991 2013 
ADIG Fondiro 1987 2011 
Scottish Amicable Equity Strategy   
Hill Samuel Ex. Umbrella Fund 1992 2003 
Martin Currie UK Growth 1988 2010 
Banco Smabolagsfond 1993 2011 
Banco Global   
Average End Year  2007.63 
Notes: This Table represents a list of ethical and conventional funds, which did not survive throughout the 
analyses, showing the final years of the existence of funds and analyses the average closure year for both groups 
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The results of survival analysis are summarised in Table 2.5.  
Table 2.5. Survival Analysis  
Variables Excluded the funds 
with missing year 
data 
Funds’ closure a 
second to first year 
Fund closure in the 
middle of the 
timeframe 
Funds’ closure 
second to last year 
 time to event (1) time to event (2) time to event (3) time to event (4) 
 SRI -1.995** 
(-2.423) 
-0.921** 
(-2.030) 
-0.887** 
(-1.990) 
-0.832* 
(-1.902) 
Age 0.0357 
(0.539) 
0.00445 
(0.101) 
0.0505 
(0.887) 
0.0240 
(0.366) 
Size -0.0145 
(-1.308) 
-0.0129* 
(-1.827) 
-0.0124* 
(-1.756) 
-0.0113 
(-1.592) 
Sharpe ratio -1.094 
(-0.149) 
3.539 
(0.718) 
4.637 
(0.949) 
2.618 
(0.503) 
Observations 453 481 565 635 
Notes: This table represents the survival analysis, with Cox (1972) parametric distribution test. It studies the effect of a 
set of factors, such as SRI, age of the fund, size of the fund and abnormal returns on the event of fund closure (death) in 
the period between 2002 and 2015. The test was set in one main specifications. Due to lack of the closure year 
information, additional three specifications represent. The first column represents the event, when all the funds with no 
available closure information were excluded. The second, third and fourth specification a robustness tests, that funds with 
missing closing dates, were closed  in the beginning, in the middle, or in the end of the framework specification was 
constructed using the average age of the fund added to it starting date. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of the analysis suggest ethical factor to have an impact on survival. 
SRI is a dummy variable, which takes the meaning of 1, if the fund was ethical, 
otherwise 0. The age and size of the fund were tested. The data in the beginning of the 
framework was used – in 2002. Abnormal performance effects were used in the form 
of Sharpe ratio. As some data on the year of fund’s closure is not available, the test 
was performed under specification, when all the funds with no available closure 
information were excluded. The robustness results presented in column two three and 
four. Three scenarios were suggested: when the funds with missing dates were closed 
a year after the beginning of dataset, when they were closed in the middle or in the 
end of the period. The results demonstrate the SRI configuration to have lower 
prediction power for the fund closure, suggesting this configuration to be associated 
with survival capability. The results remained statistically significant across three 
robustness variations. 
Table 2.6 shows the descriptive statistics of the existing funds. The average 
monthly returns of both ethical and non-ethical funds appeared to be negative, with 
the ethical funds having a higher variation in coefficients. Risk, measured by standard 
deviation, appeared to be higher for the conventional funds, with 0.15 differences. 
These results also appear to be similar to those presented by Kreander et al. (2005), as 
well as Mallin et al. (1995) and Gregory et al. (1997), where lower risk indicators 
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consistently appear to be attributed to ethical funds (Bauer and Smeets, 2015). Table 
2.7 presents the risk-adjusted performance measured by the Sharpe and Treynor 
ratios. Sharpe ratio estimates of the average risk-adjusted performance of ethical 
funds were similar to non-ethical funds, with coefficients of 0.5379 and 0.5388 
respectively. Individually, ethical funds demonstrated higher variation of the risk-
adjusted performance indicator, with funds reaching the coefficient 0.6034, compared 
to that of the conventional funds at 0.5880. As the Sharpe ratio is often criticized for 
accounting for the normal distribution, which often does not appear to be the case for 
stock returns, the Treynor ratio is widely applied for performance evaluation as it 
measures performance against the market. It was notably favoured in the literature 
dedicated to SRI fund performance evaluation (Mueller, 1991; Travers, 1997; Tippet, 
2001; Hill, 2007). 
The average performance of the ethical funds measured by the Treynor ratio 
appeared to be higher in comparison to the conventional funds, 0.0261 against 0.0246, 
respectively. The highest performance results achieved by the ethical funds have a 
coefficient of 0.0394, which is higher than the coefficient of the non-ethical funds 
(0.0272).
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics 
Ethical Funds 
 
Mean St.Dev Median Skewness Maximum Minimum Average-Min 
Max-
Average 
Abbey Ethical Trust -0.0070 0.0416 -0.0022 -1.1707 0.1290 -0.2079 0.2010 0.1360 
Aberdeen Ethical -0.0052 0.0461 0.0021 -0.6589 0.1105 -0.1721 0.1669 0.1157 
ABF Andere Beleggingsfond -0.0044 0.0293 -0.0037 0.4411 0.1411 -0.0940 0.0896 0.1455 
Allchurches Amity -0.0032 0.0419 0.0024 -0.7875 0.1111 -0.1552 0.1520 0.1143 
ASN Aandelensfonds -0.0046 0.0492 -0.0020 -0.8678 0.1121 -0.1869 0.1823 0.1166 
CIS Environ Trust -0.0039 0.0424 0.0006 -0.9701 0.1183 -0.1963 0.1924 0.1222 
Clerical Medical Evergreen -0.0053 0.0457 -0.0007 -1.0811 0.0971 -0.1755 0.1702 0.1024 
Equitable Ethical -0.0054 0.0406 -0.0010 -0.8770 0.0898 -0.1548 0.1494 0.0952 
N Family Charities Ethical -0.0074 0.0469 0.0019 -1.5051 0.0958 -0.2557 0.2483 0.1032 
Focus Umweltechnologie -0.0075 0.0466 0.0018 -0.8438 0.0906 -0.1656 0.1581 0.0981 
Framlington Health Fund -0.0038 0.0497 0.0026 -0.6573 0.1026 -0.1506 0.1467 0.1064 
Friends Provident Stewardship Unit Trust -0.0048 0.0423 0.0013 -1.0242 0.1313 -0.1940 0.1892 0.1361 
Jupiter Ecology -0.0048 0.0456 0.0040 -1.1963 0.1138 -0.2320 0.2272 0.1186 
KD Fonds Okoinvest -0.0072 0.0565 0.0015 -1.0648 0.1352 -0.2371 0.2299 0.1424 
Luxinter Oekolux -0.0077 0.0524 -0.0008 -1.4488 0.1037 -0.2540 0.2463 0.1114 
NPI Global Care Income -0.0060 0.0465 -0.0019 -0.8886 0.0971 -0.1818 0.1758 0.1031 
Scottish Equitable Ethical -0.0018 0.0441 0.0046 -1.0214 0.0907 -0.1939 0.1921 0.0926 
TSB Environmental -0.0064 0.0446 -0.0017 -0.8829 0.1443 -0.2156 0.2092 0.1507 
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Conventional Funds 
Cavendish Worldwide -0.0040 0.0427 -0.0007 -0.9097 0.0971 -0.1668 0.1627 0.1011 
Ing Bank Global -0.0056 0.0477 -0.0005 -0.7251 0.0987 -0.1584 0.1527 0.1043 
HSBC European Growth Fund -0.0044 0.0570 0.0052 -0.7702 0.1597 -0.2189 0.2146 0.1641 
Old Mutual Worldwide Trust -0.0029 0.0471 0.0051 -0.9604 0.0820 -0.1843 0.1814 0.0848 
Henderson UK Capital Growth Fund -0.0025 0.0497 0.0040 -1.3007 0.1868 -0.2864 0.2838 0.1893 
Equitable High Income Trust -0.0043 0.0428 0.0000 -0.7999 0.1173 -0.1513 0.1470 0.1216 
Scottish Life Worldwide -0.0055 0.0426 -0.0020 -0.6533 0.0864 -0.1292 0.1237 0.0919 
Scottish Mutual Int. Growth -0.0052 0.0506 0.0009 -0.7476 0.1425 -0.2099 0.2047 0.1477 
Rathbone Income & Growth Fund -0.0032 0.0400 0.0045 -0.9555 0.1184 -0.1485 0.1453 0.1215 
Lansforsakringar Wasa Globalfonden -0.0064 0.0456 -0.0004 -0.7537 0.0908 -0.1612 0.1548 0.0973 
Notes: This table represents the descriptive statistics of both ethical and non-ethical funds that existed during the timeframe of the analysis from 2002 to 2015. It demonstrates data that describe 
mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, maximum, and minimum of equity funds. 
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Table 2.7 Financial Performance of SRI and Conventional Funds 
 
Sharpe Treynor 
  
Sharpe Treynor 
Abbey Ethical Trust 0.4857 0.0228 
    Aberdeen Ethical 0.5612 0.0258 
 
Cavendish Worldwide 0.5355 0.0254 
ABF Andere Beleggingsfond 0.4248 0.0248 
 
Ing Bank Global 0.5517 0.0252 
Allchurches Amity 0.5267 0.0232 
    ASN Aandelensfonds 0.5506 0.0262 
    
CIS Environ Trust 0.5361 0.0244 
 
HSBC European Growth Fund 0.5880 0.0272 
Clerical Medical Evergreen 0.5405 0.0253 
    Equitable Ethical 0.5185 0.0243 
    Family Charities Ethical 0.5450 0.0241 
    Focus Umweltechnologie 0.5694 0.0265 
    
Framlington Health Fund 0.6034 0.0394 
 
Old Mutual Worldwide Trust 0.5661 0.0263 
    
Henderson UK Capital Growth Fund 0.4698 0.0216 
Friends Provident Stewardship Unit Trust 0.4847 0.0223 
 
Equitable High Income Trust 0.5261 0.0222 
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Sharpe Treynor 
  
Sharpe Treynor 
Jupiter Ecology 0.5690 0.0278 
 
Scottish Life Worldwide 0.5188 0.0235 
KD Fonds Okoinvest 0.5912 0.0305 
    Luxinter Oekolux 0.5392 0.0261 
    NPI Global Care Income 0.5606 0.0269 
    
    
Scottish Mutual Int. Growth 0.5541 0.0259 
Scottish Equitable Ethical 0.5483 0.0248 
 
Rathbone Income & Growth Fund 0.5275 0.0235 
    
Lansforsakringar Wasa Globalfonden 0.5509 0.0250 
TSB Environmental 0.5273 0.0244        
Notes: This table represents the results of a risk-adjusted performance evaluation of both ethical and non-ethical funds, estimated on the basis of the Sharpe and Treynor 
ratios. The table is divided into two parts. The first three columns represent the ethical funds, and the other three the non-ethical funds. They are combined in order to match 
those pairs of funds that survived since the analysis presented in Kreander et al. (2005).  
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2.6 Robustness Test 
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show the results for the Carhart four-factor model (Carhart, 1997), 
which evaluated ethical and non-ethical fund performance accounts for the potential 
exposure to various investment styles. The t-statistics were corrected for the effects of 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation for up to four lags using the method of Newy 
and West (1987).  
Similarly to previous studies, analysis presented mixed evidence of funds’ 
abnormal performance. The range of alpha coefficients fluctuates between 0.0004 and 
0.0034, with six funds showing statistical significance. Ethical funds presented 
opportunity of risk reduction, with the majority of them demonstrating lower risk in 
comparison to the market. ABF Andere Beleggingsfond fund’s beta indicator was an 
impressive 0.4840, the Framlington Health fund had a beta indicator at 0.7897, and 
the beta of the Equitable Ethical fund was 0.8530. The beta of the other SRI funds 
ranged between 0.9877 and 0.8630. These results could potentially be a signal of an 
SRI-related risk mitigation effect, as well as being linked to the type of investment 
fund adopted. 
 An analysis of the investment styles demonstrated exposure to the small-cap 
companies for all the ethical funds apart from ABF Andere Beleggingsfond and ASN 
Aandelensfonds, which are exposed to the large-cap companies according to the 
negative coefficients. However, only the coefficient of ABF Andere Beleggingsfond 
appeared to be statistically significant; nine funds exposed to the small-cap companies 
showed a high statistical significance of the measurements. This trend was reviewed 
in previous academic studies (Luther and Matatko, 1994; Mallin et al., 1995). Value 
stocks appear to impact on the fund returns more than growth stocks; ABF Andere 
Beleggingsfond, Focus Umweltechnologie, Framlington Health Fund and Luxinter 
Oekolux were the funds exposed to growth stocks, but none of the coefficients 
indicated statistical significance. In contrast, six of the funds exposed to a value 
stocks impact had indicators significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.8 Performance of Ethical Funds 
Fund name Intercept Market exposure SMB exposure HML exposure MOM exposure Adjusted R-squared Number of observations 
Abbey Ethical Trust -0.0020 0.8630 0.2186 0.1816 -0.0433 0.8031 169 
 
-1.7164* 18.9147*** 5.5024*** 2.9768*** -1.2777     
Aberdeen Ethical   -0.0009 0.9630 -0.0004 0.0800 -0.0029 0.8036 169 
 
-0.7099 25.9616*** -0.0063 1.1551 -0.0663     
ABF Andere Beleggingsfond -0.0031 0.4840 -0.1752 -0.0698 0.0281 0.5668 169 
 
-1.4232** 15.5021*** -1.9343* -0.8420 0.8558     
Allchurches Amity 0.0016 0.9078 0.2003 0.1746 -0.0095 0.8780 169 
 
1.5212 34.9941*** 4.9679*** 2.5842** -0.2984     
ASN Aandelensfonds -0.0006 1.0091 -0.0854 0.0253 0.0516 0.7639 169 
 
-0.3919 16.8022*** -1.0007 0.2133 1.0870     
CIS Environ Trust 0.0006 0.9234 0.1203 0.1394 0.0238 0.8326 169 
 
0.4681 25.6567*** 3.0180*** 2.1536** 0.5819     
Clerical Medical Evergreen -0.0011 0.9708 0.0374 0.1019 0.0626 0.7829 169 
 
-0.7437 21.7507*** 0.6686 1.2540 1.5657     
Equitable Ethical -0.0017 0.8530 0.0226 0.0243 0.0226 0.7749 169 
 
-1.3390 23.8808*** 0.4069 0.3274 0.6492     
Family Charities Ethical -0.0020 1.0610 0.1870 0.1595 0.0332 0.8849 169 
 
-1.0436** 17.2603*** 4.0129*** 2.4288** 1.4134     
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Fund name Intercept Market exposure SMB exposure HML exposure MOM exposure 
Adjusted R-
squared 
Number of 
observations 
Focus Umweltechnologie -0.0033 0.9877 0.0192 -0.0267 0.0162 0.7883 169 
 
-2.1663** 18.5886*** 0.2746 -0.2576 0.3486     
Framlington Health Fund -0.0008 0.7897 0.0086 -0.1414 0.0346 0.4184 169 
 
-0.2671 10.2745*** 0.0922 -1.1332 0.3856     
Friends Provident Stewardship 
Unit Trust 0.0006 0.9277 0.2702 0.2316 -0.0031 0.8635 169 
 
0.6001 29.1010*** 7.4919*** 3.6644*** -0.0986     
Jupiter Ecology 0.0004 0.9660 0.2880 0.1307 0.0317 0.7568 169 
 
0.2447 20.8541*** 4.8634*** 1.6200 0.6378     
KD Fonds Okoinvest -0.0016 1.1046 0.2094 0.0717 0.0108 0.6499 169 
 
-0.6287 13.7359*** 2.4975** 0.5853 0.1719     
Luxinter Oekolux -0.0032 1.0965 0.0570 -0.0320 0.0705 0.7335 169 
 
-1.7258* 12.9110*** 0.8846 -0.2877 1.1099     
NPI Global Care Income -0.0016 0.9702 0.0747 0.0694 0.0436 0.7462 169 
 
-0.9935 21.8910*** 1.3147 0.7391 0.8044     
Scottish Equitable Ethical 0.0034 1.0208 0.2839 0.0725 0.0544 0.8284 169 
 
0.9414*** 32.0859*** 7.6511*** 1.2468 1.7347*     
TSB Environmental -0.0011 0.9493 0.1932 0.1737 -0.0366 0.8284 169 
 
-0.7666 23.4949*** 4.9647*** 2.3182** -1.0283     
Notes: The table represents results for performance analysis of ethical funds. The analysis was performed through the implementation of the Carhart model (1997). All the 
funds which survived over the analysed period were subjected to examination. Each column represents a coefficient for alpha, beta measurements, exposure to small-
capitalization stocks, growth stocks and momentum, followed by R-squared indicator and number of observations. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 
10% significance level. 
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Table 2.9 Performance of Conventional Funds 
Fund name Intercept Market exposure SMB exposure HML exposure MOM exposure Adjusted R-squared No of observations 
Cavendish Worldwide 0.0002 0.9183 0.1363 0.0547 0.0464 0.7736 169 
 0.1991 16.5173*** 2.4931** 0.5611 0.9502     
Ing Bank Global -0.0014 0.9904 -0.0802 0.0311 -0.0114 0.8206 169 
 -1.1869 20.9668*** -1.1835 0.3634 -0.2629     
HSBC European Growth Fund 0.0011 1.1992 0.0582 -0.0045 -0.0148 0.7870 169 
 0.7320 25.1077*** 0.5971 -0.0402 -0.2527   
Old Mutual Worldwide Trust 0.0014 1.0274 0.0582 0.0738 0.1007 0.7986 169 
 0.9872 26.9325*** 0.9967 0.9208 2.2697**     
Henderson UK Capital Growth Fund 0.0040 1.0583 0.2925 0.3701 -0.0452 0.8752 169 
 1.3246*** 15.9042*** 5.5672*** 5.2794*** -1.1057     
Equitable High Income Trust 0.0002 0.9798 0.0265 0.0454 -0.0028 0.9500 169 
 0.2835 49.9631*** 1.0311 1.2785 -0.1230     
Scottish Life Worldwide -0.0016 0.9045 -0.0358 0.0498 0.0093 0.8329 169 
 -1.4761 19.9031*** -0.5463 0.7539 0.2562     
Scottish Mutual Int. Growth 0.0002 1.0147 0.0445 0.1513 -0.0880 0.7971 169 
 0.1523 28.2132*** 0.7083 1.6597* -1.7254*     
Rathbone Income & Growth Fund 0.0009 0.9141 0.1172 0.0378 0.0588 0.8725 169 
 0.8373 29.6498*** 3.3577*** 0.8402 1.4444     
Lansforsakringar Wasa Globalfonden -0.0023 0.9597 -0.0552 0.0509 0.0049 0.8263 169 
 -1.8840* 19.8983*** -1.1354 0.5859 0.1216     
Notes: This table represents results of the ethical and non-ethical fund performance evaluation through implementation of the four-factor model. The funds were taken from the list composed and published in Kreander et al. (2005). 
Only funds which were open during the overall period of the analysis were included in the list. The first column represents the name of the fund, follow by the intercept, risk exposure results, followed by the evaluation of small-cap 
stock exposure, growth stocks exposure, momentum estimates, as well as R-squared and the number of observations. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level. 
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Overall, the model applied to analyse the performance of the ethical funds 
appeared to have a strong explanatory power, with only three cases of indicators 
dropping below the 70% level. Funds appeared to be exposed to high-performing 
stocks, apart from five. The momentum indicator appeared to be statistically 
insignificant for all the funds expect the Scottish Mutual Int. Growth, which was 
positively related to the factor at a 5% significance level. The model retained a strong 
explanatory power when applied to the conventional funds, with the weakest indicator 
remaining above 70%.  
Conventional funds did not demonstrate statistically significant abnormal 
performance. The Henderson UK Capital Growth Fund demonstrated the highest 
alpha coefficient of 0.0040 at the 1% significance level. The rest of the alpha 
indicators did not demonstrate a statistically significant performance. Another 
statistically significant performance coefficient belonged to these funds, in which 
alpha appeared negative at the 10% level. Despite fewer non-ethical funds 
demonstrating lower survival rates, positive alpha indicators occurred more often in 
the dataset. In comparison to the ethical funds, a larger number of conventional funds 
demonstrated higher exposure to market risk, with the beta coefficient rising above 1 
in 40% of cases. Risk indicator of funds remained close to the market at a range 
between 0.9904 and 0.9045. Similar to the SRI funds, the risk-adjusted returns of only 
three conventional funds were exposed to large-cap companies’ stocks, with no 
coefficients appearing statistically significant. However, the sample size of the 
conventional funds is significantly smaller, therefore it could be suggested that a 
larger part of the funds was subjected to large-cap stocks’ exposure.  
A statistically significant exposure to small-stock companies at the 5%, 1% 
and 1% levels was demonstrated by the Cavendish Worldwide, Henderson UK 
Capital Growth Fund, and Rathbone Income & Growth Fund, respectively. Apart 
from the HSBC European Growth Fund, no other fund in the group showed exposure 
to growth stocks. The coefficient of the Henderson UK Capital Growth Fund and the 
Scottish Mutual Int. Growth had statistically strong results. The results appear to be 
similar to those of the ethical funds, taking sample size differences into consideration.  
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The influence of the momentum of fund performance varies strongly, with no 
statistically significant coefficients. The loading on the MOM factor appeared 
insignificant for most of the funds. The coefficients presented mixed results, with 
equally positive and negative exposure to the MOM factor. Nevertheless, given the 
relatively smaller size of the sample, in comparison to the ethical funds, a negative 
momentum coefficient occurs more frequently in the case of the conventional funds. 
Ethical funds showed weaker performance in comparison to the benchmark, 
unlike the conventional funds. However, the risk-adjusted returns of the non-ethical 
funds also appeared to be exposed to higher levels of risk. The results of this analysis 
could be compared to those presented in Kreander et al. (2005), both portfolios 
performing evenly.  
 In order to take a closer look at the performance of ethical and non-ethical 
funds, ethical and conventional portfolios were constructed, which included stocks 
with small, medium or large capitalisation. In addition, performance of the long-short 
portfolio of the remaining pairs of funds was estimated, similar to methodology, 
presented in the work of Kempf and Osthoff (2007). Table 2.10 represents the results 
of a long-short portfolio evaluation of fund pairs, matched according to the cross-
section presented in Kreander et al. (2005). Only one case of outperformance was 
market with a statistically significant coefficient. Overall, the difference in coefficient 
did not appear significant. Long – short portfolio did not reveal prevalence in the 
performance strength of one particular type of portfolio.  
The robustness tests did not reveal abnormal performance of ethical or 
conventional portfolios.  These results suggest the academic discussion over abnormal 
performance associated with ethical fund specification to remain open. 
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Table 2.10 Long-Short Portfolio of Matched Funds 
Name of paired funds Intercept Market exposure SMB exposure HML exposure 
MOM 
exposure 
Adjusted R-
squared 
No of 
observations 
Aberdeen Ethical - Cavendish Worldwide -0.0011 0.0447 -0.1367 0.0252 -0.0493 0.1131 169 
T-Stats (-0.9506) (0.9839) (-2.9897)** (0.4083) (-1.2293)     
ABF Andere Beleggingsfond - Ing Bank Global -0.0017 -0.5064 -0.0950 -0.1009 0.0395 0.5691 169 
T-Stats (-1.4262) (-1.1116)*** (-1.9629)* (-1.4984) (1.2616)     
CIS Environ Trust - HSBC European Growth Fund -0.0005 -0.2759 0.0621 0.1438 0.0386 0.1553 169 
T-Stats (-0.2219) (-5.4348)*** (0.6160) (1.1185) (0.6061)     
Framlington Health Fund - Old Mutual Worldwide 
Trust -0.0023 -0.2377 -0.0497 -0.2152 -0.0660 0.1015 169 
T-Stats (-0.9550) (-3.1031)*** (-0.6791) (-2.1085)** (-0.8456)     
Friends Provident Stewardship Unit Trustl - 
Equitable High Income Trust 0.0005 -0.0521 0.2437 0.1861 -0.0003 0.2817 169 
T-Stats (0.4078) (-1.2975) (6.7248)*** (3.7699)*** (-0.0101)     
Jupiter Ecology - Scottish Life Worldwide 0.0020 0.0615 0.3239 0.0809 0.0224 0.2152 169 
T-Stats (1.3552) (1.1626) (5.6467)*** (1.2556) (0.5686)     
Scottish Equitable Ethicalt - Rathbone Income & 
Growth Fund 0.0024 0.1067 0.1666 0.0347 -0.0044 0.1045 169 
T-Stats (1.7119)** (2.8217)*** (3.9108)*** (0.5755) (-0.0804)     
Notes: This table showcases the results of the long-short portfolio evaluation. The funds were paired according to the practice presented in Kreander et al. (2005). Only pairs where both 
funds “survived” over the period subjected to the analysis were evaluated. The pairs are represented in the first column. A four-factor analysis was applied, with a cross-section of 169 
observations. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level. 
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2.7 Concluding Remarks 
The ethical approach to investment practices grants extensive opportunities to investors and 
fund managers to diversify and account for responsibility. It has generated significant interest 
from the academic community. Despite the growing body of literature, the argument over 
financial benefits, attributed to ethical settings in funds, has not been settled yet. In contrast, 
academics appear to agree more on behavioural aspects which show evidence of investors’ 
loyalty to the SRI practices (Bollen, 2007). 
A number of studies indicated the presence of survivorship bias (Bauer et al, 2005; 
Gregory and Whittaker, 2007). Despite growing examples of SRI funds to demonstrate 
stronger survival capabilities, academics have not thoroughly explored the potential effect 
that ethical characteristics could impose on funds’ survival capabilities. This essay represents 
a deep assessment of the survival of the funds and the impact the ethical investment approach 
could have on it. In addition, it has reviewed the opportunities for asset managers to improve 
earnings in association with sustainable investing, through exploration of fund survival 
capability, which further expands the work of Gil-Bazo et al. (2010).   
 The dataset developed in the study conducted by Kreander et al. (2005) was used as 
the foundation for the empirical evaluation. The majority of available studies ground the 
analyses on an ex post basis, where survivorship bias could arise (Chegut et al., 2011). This 
analysis was made ex ante in order to address funds’ potential survival issues. The Chi-
squared test allowed the detection of whether the SRI specification had a direct impact on the 
survival rates. The Cox (1972) proportional hazard model further supported the effect that 
ethical specification has on survival capabilities of the fund. The Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model was introduced as an analytical tool.  
 SRI funds demonstrate stronger survival rates over time. Analysis suggests it to be 
linked to the ethical specifications. Robustness tests did not indicate significant abnormal 
performance of both, ethical and conventional funds, supporting previously presented 
evidence in the work of Kreander et al. (2006), Renneboog et al. (2006) and many others.  
 Evidence demonstrated in this essay further expands methodological tool-kit applied 
to study ethical funds, and implements survival analysis, translated from IPO and survival 
literature (Carpentier and Suret (2011), Espenlaub et al (2012) and Espenlaub et al (2016)).  
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From a practical perspective, it expands studies of Bollen (2007) and Gil-Bazo et al 
(2010), as the evidence brings bring positive implications for asset management firms and 
their fee structure. The accumulating evidence from previous studies suggest ethical and non-
ethical funds perform on a similar level, which would indicates ethical investment to be the 
choice of managers who are willing to reflect their values in the investment process. 
Arguably, SRI fund development has not signalled an opportunity to improve income for 
asset management companies, as the size of the fees does not differentiate amongst studies of 
fund types (Gil-Bazo et al, 2010). New results might suggest the opportunity for investment 
managers to secure a steady fee-based income, as SRI funds would provide longer-term fee 
inflows.  
 The finding that positive ethical specifications impact on fund survival opens a further 
discussion, which requires a wider dataset. It is important to continue the exploration of 
potential benefits, which asset managers could extrapolate through applying ethical methods 
in investment in order for the industry to prosper. Since the study was mainly focused in the 
European region and the UK, it is important to develop a larger framework in order to 
continue its expansion across the USA. The evidence of strong survival capabilities suggests 
taking survivorship bias very seriously in future analysis.  
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Essay 3: Do Sell-Side Analysts Generate Value through ESG? 
First Evidence from European Brokerage Firms 
Abstract 
In 2018 firms, which provide services to clients linked to financial instruments will be 
subjected to new legislation: the Markets in Financial Instrument Directives II. Updated 
legislation is expected to affect significantly the operating processes of sell-side brokers. As 
new regulations encourage increase in fees transparency, it has a strong impact on the 
commission factor for brokerage, which would require a significant change in the operational 
structure to survive. This essay focuses on examining broker value generation ability, based 
on the example of a French sell-side brokerage house.  The firm developed an in-house ESG 
rating and recommendations as a means to diversify the services it offers to clients. The essay 
analyses the recommendation-based and ESG-ranking based portfolios of French and 
European stocks. The results indicated value generation capabilities linked to the introduction 
of recommendations by the broker within ESG universe, however no ability to generate 
consistent outperformance. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Services provided by brokerage houses could be seen as the vascular system of the financial 
markets. The companies issue stock recommendations for buy-side clients and execute deals. 
The implementation of the new Markets in Financial Investments Directives (MiFID II) will 
jeopardize the established operational model of brokers, which could lead to many 
participants leaving the market for good. This essay explores new value creation 
opportunities for sell-side brokers, focusing on the example of the French brokerage house 
and investment firm Oddo and Cie.22 
Brokerage houses hold established sell-side positions on financial markets. Broker 
dealers’ services comprise trade execution as well as research, which include 
recommendations and forecasting. These services represent the value generation channel for 
brokers. The buy-side, represented by fund managers, vastly relies on the information 
provided by sell-side research, as information access remains a source of competitive 
advantage. In the majority of cases, as highlighted Maber et al. (2014), the buy-side pays for 
the brokers’ services on the basis of trading commission (“soft dollars”). As brokerage houses 
execute trading in addition to research, the commission charge combines the research and 
trade execution.  
Broker deals, for fees charged for services, are the key source of income. Despite 
long-standing attention to the accuracy of the services, including recommendations and the 
ability to generate value, brokers have been operating on a commission basis for decades. 
Academics and professionals have pointed to certain inconveniences related to this system, 
suggesting that it allows brokerage houses to hide information on costs and create a certain 
level of opaqueness in the market (Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001; Marber et al., 2014). 
As indicated in Ioannou and Serafeim (2015), the existent commission-based system gives 
full control over pricing for research to brokers.  
                                                          
 
22 In 2016 Oddo and Cie accomplished the acquisition of the Belgian financial services group BHF Kleinwort Benson 
Group. This led to the formation of a Franco-German financial group Oddo BHF. In this essay the firm is still referred to in 
accordance with the previous name. Source: < https://www.bhf-bank.com/privatbank/oddo-cie-becomes-oddo-bhf-and-
presents-the-first-integrated-results-and-its-new-organisation-00254-en/index.en.jsp>, accessed 12 June 2017. 
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The changes in the European legislation through implementation of MiFID II strongly 
affects existent practices and, as predicted by market players and industry reports (Deloitte, 
2014; PwC, 2016; Bloomberg, 2017), will irrevocably transform financial markets and sell-
side and buy-side relationships. New regulations designed to facilitate transparency, and 
enable buy-side to access services based on the quality standards.  
However, with the new regulations traders in the European Union will have to report 
a host of information to demonstrate they are executing clients’ trade at the best prices and in 
the right venues. These innovations are expected to boost the implementation of machines to 
replace certain functions, as highlighted in the PWC report (2016). The new regulations are 
expected to have an impact on retail banks and asset managers; however, brokers might be 
affected the most.   
An overview of MiFID II implications on sell-side brokers are summarized in Table 
3.1. 
Under new regulations price, transactions costs, speed of execution and likelihood of 
execution are amongst the aspects of brokers’ activities to undergo drastic changes, as 
brokers will be required to provide full transparency and demonstrate best execution (EY, 
2015). The new regulations will tighten the control over soft-dollar commission for research, 
and are expected to influence strongly brokers’ value generation capabilities (PwC, 2016). 
Under the new rules, brokers are expected to separate execution and research fees, and 
disclose prices prior to the execution of services. These changes will eliminate relationship-
based interaction, and allow clients to access products of the highest quality. However, from 
the brokerage perspective, the new regulations will jeopardize their competitiveness and 
negatively impact value creation opportunities. Industry reports (PWC, 2016; Bloomberg, 
2017) predict that the biggest players will be capable of holding on in the new competitive 
environment, whilst boutique and smaller players will be at high risk of disappearing from 
the market. 
The changing landscape of the financial markets sends a strong signal to players to 
revaluate existing strategies in order to survive. Under these changing circumstances, it could 
be argued, the growing area of the ESG approach might introduce new opportunities for 
brokers that have been previously ignored. A variety of techniques affiliated to the concept 
allow market participants to advance new improved long-term strategies and develop new 
range of products to target existent and attract new clients. Brokerage houses’ access to data 
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combined with rising demand for quality ESG-related information introduces a new path for 
profitability.  
Table 3.1 Implications of MIFID II Introduction and Comparison of the Buy-Side and Sell-
Side 
Category Buy-side Sell-side before 
MIFID II 
introduction 
Sell-side after MIFID 
II introduction 
Fees Fees charged for the 
service provided by 
sell-side  
Charge fees as a part 
of the product 
bundle: blended 
advisory and 
execution rate 
Execution-only rate 
charged above; 
advisory budget is 
pre-agreed with the 
buy side 
Fees2 Broker voting 
practices 
“Consume now – pay 
later” 
“Pay now – consume 
later” 
Competition  “Relationship” based Based on the price 
and quality of 
services 
Content Fully rely on content 
provided by the sell-
side/establish in-
house analyst teams 
Duplicating offering 
with content overlap 
Reduction of content 
overlap 
Trade reporting and 
market access 
Issues with assessing 
and quantifying sell-
side contribution 
Prices not revealed in 
advance; prices not 
divided; closed 
trading platforms 
Brokers to post 
prices and trades for 
a broad range of 
securities; open 
trading platforms 
Products Use reports provided 
by sell-side analysts; 
additionally develop 
own research, which 
is not available to the 
general public 
Provide 
recommendations; 
issue reports 
available to public 
Provide exclusive 
rating structure not 
available to general 
public; provide 
recommendations; 
report availability 
limited to the type of 
access chosen by 
client and general 
public 
Notes: This table shows the potential changes in the activity of sell-side companies in response to MiFID II 
implementation. In addition it draws a parallel with buy-side activity, highlighting the opportunities for the sell-
side to implement some of the buy-side characteristics. 
 
106 
 
As brokerage houses interest towards ESG themes was narrow, existent research 
dedicated to exploring ESG and brokerage activities is very limited and rooted in CSR topics. 
The existent literature demonstrates growing evidence of material benefits linked to 
sustainability. Ioannou and Serafeim (2010) revealed that CSR has a positive effect on value 
creation and indicated that firms’ CSR strategy encourages more favourable 
recommendations from sell-side brokers. Khan et al. (2015) introduced material and non-
material sustainability issues and suggested none of the categories to have a destructive 
influence on value creation, as well as linked positive performance on material sustainability 
issues. Luo et al. (2014) suggested brokers play an important role in removing ambiguity and 
inventors’ uncertainty towards CSR and ESG, through improved recommendations.  
As the rise of voluntary ESG implementation across financial services generates a 
vast amount of questions regarding the procedures and criteria, the demand for the ESG 
ranking system has significantly risen. Lack of a regulatory body represents an opportunity 
for a company to develop an independent ESG ranking system. Brokers have a wide access to 
the information thought-out it research services. Therefore the houses could have an alleged 
advantage when adopting ESG research and recommendation practices. Current study 
reviews brokerage attempt to take advantage of its research strengths through creation of the 
ESG ranking, which the company attempted to do to withstand market competition and 
attract new clients seeking to adopt ESG. 
As studies by Loue et al (2014) indicated beneficial role of broker in developing CSR 
and ESG-related recommendations for investors. And Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010) raise 
attention towards the growing role of ranking and recommendations for investors. And 
market conditions enforce brokers to find new value generation capabilities, this essay 
explores further value generation opportunities for brokerage services with a focus on 
recommendations in relation to ESG. The angle of the research was determined by the data, 
provided by the sell-side broker. Data availability stands as a hurdle for research development 
in the area. Therefore, a unique opportunity to explore a dataset provided by the industry 
player was used to maximum advantage.  
In order to study the value generation opportunity of brokerage recommendations, a 
portfolio analysis was implemented. The Oddo provided limited information regarding the 
ranking, without actual scale. The recommendations were used to generate European and 
French-based portfolios, using the universe, provided by Oddo. Further the data was used to 
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create a portfolio based on the ESG ranking of each company, using the ASSSET4 database. 
Further, alternative portfolio based on the European and French SRI fund data were created, 
as well as Sustainability Index data, to compare the results. Long-Short portfolio strategy was 
presented as robustness test. The results appeared inconsistent across portfolios, with 
prevalence of negative alpha, with high significance.  
As this essay analyses the attempt to create a service, previously not supplied by a 
sell-side broker through development of an ESG ranking and providing ESG 
recommendations, it generates both practical and theoretical contributions. It explores 
opportunities for sell-side brokers to diversify and retain its competitive advantage amid the 
changing regulatory landscape. This is an important subject from a practical perspective, due 
to increasing pressure and tightening of competition (Bloomberg, 2017; KPMG, 2017). As 
brokers are obliged to develop prices in advance (Bloomberg, 2018), the competitive edge 
significantly narrows. This essay evaluates an alternative method of gaining competitive 
advantage, rather than focusing on the pricing.   
From the theoretical perspective, this essay adds diversity to the literature dedicated to 
ESG ranking. In Chatterji and Levine (2006), Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010), Delmas and Blass 
(2010) and Dorfleitner et al. (2015) the authors explore the development and application of 
various sustainability rankings. Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010) highlighted the rising importance 
of sustainability rankings as an instrument to encourage investors to adopt sustainable 
investment approaches. Chatterji et al (2009) highlighted the diversity of ranking systems and 
the criteria applied, linking it to compatibility issues and investor confusion. Regardless, the 
rising trend for ESG implementation encourages investors to seek for a reliable ranking 
system. Due to the costs of the procedure, many investors are looking to outsource the 
operation (Dorflietner et al., 2015). However, studies are mostly focused on the rating 
agencies’ services. This study overviews the brokerage company as an alternative player in 
the sector. 
The rest of this essay is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview 
of the existing literature, which offers insight into the current state of research as well as an 
understanding of the issue in the industry. The following section introduces the methodology, 
which is applied to the analysis of the European and French portfolios, created to evaluate the 
potential of implementing an ESG rating, which can shed light on the opportunities for 
brokers in a changing financial climate. This is followed by a detailed introduction of the 
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data, which provides a unique opportunity for analysing the broker and exploring ESG-
related opportunities. Next, the results, robustness tests are presented and the findings 
summarized. 
 
 3.2 Literature Review 
Gathering and analysing financial information is known to be a costly activity. The buy-side 
values high quality information and prioritizes prime access to it, as it is linked to generating 
excess returns opportunities (Gilson et al., 2001). Investors seek to expand their in-house 
ability to do research. However, due to high expenses and limited information outreach, the 
key source of information comes from the relationship with broker dealers, who are able to 
provide an extensive amount of information covering various markets as well as providing 
the trade execution service (Groysberg et al., 2013).  
 
3.2.1 Sell-Side Brokers’ and Financial Markets 
The academic community has been closely watching brokers’ activities and their 
implications for capital markets, focusing on the quality of recommendations, value 
generation ability and the dynamic of the relationship with clients.  
Numerous academics supported the importance of the broker dealers’ role in 
information transfer across the markets (Gilson et al., 2001; Gleason and Lee, 2003). The 
quality of recommendations draws academics’ attention. They link it directly to the value 
generation capabilities of sell-side brokers, as suggested in Womack (1996). The author 
provided evidence of stock picking and market timing abilities as expressed by research 
analysts (Womack, 1996). The following research papers provided further evidence of sell-
side ability to affect stock process and trading volumes (Francis and Soffer, 1997; Barber et 
al., 2001). Jegadeesh et al. (2004) suggested two alternative ways of value creation. One 
through developing recommendations on the basis of certain criteria associated with future 
returns predictions. The second is derived from analysts’ information processing ability, 
which would allow identifying over and undervalued stocks. Due to the broker priority of 
value creation, certain studies have confronted the quality of recommendations. Eames et al. 
(1999) argued that research analysts suffering from “objectivity illusion” (p. 102), as well as 
the research of Mola and Guidolin (2009), produced evidence of recommendations being 
overly positive. Rising evidence suggested an interpersonal relation impacts on the 
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recommendations settings. Mola and Guidolin (2009) revealed ties between the degree of 
recommendation and the affiliation between brokers and funds. Cohen et al. (2010) 
demonstrated that former educational ties between the buy and sell-sides play a role in the 
quality of recommendations. Additionally Green et al. (2014) presented evidence of 
dependencies of analyst advantage on the information access gained through interpersonal 
communication.  
Brokerage houses function on a commission basis. The compensation system remains 
highly opaque in the industry, as brokers are not obliged to disclose detailed information on 
the structure of the commission, and service exchange rarely takes place through direct 
transaction (Brennan and Chrodia, 1993). Buy-side clients pay a fixed commission fee, which 
combines research fees and execution rates. Researchers could not provide clear evidence of 
brokers’ compensation dependency on the quality of recommendations. Groysberg et al. 
(2010) indicated that analysts’ popularity and recognition as an “All-Star”, or as ranking 
amongst the top stock pickers, affects remuneration. 
 
3.2.2 MiFID II Implications 
The new regulations (MiFID II), which are introduced in 2018, are expected to bring 
significant changes to the operational model of sell-side brokers. Very little information is 
available which reflects the potential changes associated with MiFID II, and there are no 
analytics available on the issue either.  
 Change driven by effort to improve market transparency would directly impact on the 
opaque broker dealer fee structure, enforcing the revealing and separating of charges for 
research and execution. These measures would enforce brokers to improve the quality of 
research as a matter of tighter competition, as the clients will be able to estimate the value 
and compare the prices of research, as suggested by the repost published by Bloomberg.23  
However, such factors as the expanding number of in-house research analysts, rising costs, 
the natural reduction of clients and rising competition create an extremely unfavourable 
environment for brokers, where the majority of weaker industry players are predicted to 
withdraw from the market (D’Antona, 2017).  
In the changing environment sell-side brokers are looking for the opportunity to find an 
alternative way to generate value. The current essay focuses on the example of a brokerage 
                                                          
 
23Bloomberg: MiFID II. Intake. < https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/mifid-making-markets-fair>, accessed 1 
September 2016. 
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firm attempting to generate value through suggesting an alternative product. In response to 
the growing demand for the ESG-related product, Oddo and Cie developed its own 
sustainability rating. It is important to overview the trajectory of sustainable rating 
developments, to estimate its potential.  
It is important to note that this is the first attempt of a broker dealer to develop an ESG 
product. Therefore no academic studies were conducted on the subject of an ESG framework 
and brokerage. However, there are studies available, which focus on sell-side brokers’ 
capabilities to add value. Ryan and Taffler (2006) could be highlighted, as these authors drew 
attention to the growing market consolidation and initial rise of research costs, which were 
predicted to have a negative impact on brokerage services. These findings indicate an 
additional burden, which falls on the brokers under changing market circumstances.   
 
3.2.3 Sell-Side Broker and ESG 
ESG is becoming a popular research subject amongst brokers, which is reflected in the 
growing number of reports. In late 2013 the report of Novethic drew attention to emerging 
brokers who were attempting to introduce non-financial analysis into their practices. Among 
these were SG CIB (Société Générale Corporate and Investment Banking), 24  Kepler 
Cheuvreux25 and Oddo Securities, which take a central place in the analysis of the current 
study. The report suggested that brokers were seeking potential benefits and attracting new 
clients through the adoption of ESG-related practices (Novethic, 2013).  The direction of the 
broker’s interest towards ESG was initially directed towards research opportunities. In-house 
development of ESG ranking is a novel approach, explored in the current study.  
The demand for sustainability ratings and ESG recommendations has significantly 
grown. The rise is determined by companies, which search for a comprehensive ESG 
evaluation methodology, which could be implemented in the investment process (Richardson 
and Cragg, 2009; Scalet and Kelly, 2007). The potential benefits, which ratings bring for 
financial performance, were noted in the meta-analysis presented in Orlitzky et al. (2003) and 
Chatterji et al. (2009). Originally the practice was implemented as part of the CSR. The 
ratings and indices were applied as part of the evaluation of CSR benefits and the 
investigation of its connection to corporate financial performance (Fowler and Hope, 2007).  
                                                          
 
24SG CIB:  https://cib.societegenerale.com/en/,accessed 2 September 2016. 
25 Kepler Cheuvreux: <www.keplercheuvreux.com/index2.aspx>, accessed 2 September 2016.  
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However, recently ESG assessment became an independent process more engaged with 
the investment process. Agencies provide a range of products, which are tailored to the 
customer’s demands. A norm-based analysis implies evaluation of issues in accordance with 
international conventions and standards (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Chatterji et al., 2009).  
There are different types of information and providers available to investors, namely 
social indices and rating agencies. Social indices track the performance of the companies, 
which satisfy ESG criteria. There are two indices currently on the market, the Domini 400 
Social Index,26 which is a value-weighted index that tracks companies in the USA, and the 
MSCI KLD 400 Social Index,27 another market participant that provides a wide range of 
financial and non-financial data and actively participates in the further development of 
responsible investment. Agencies such as EIRIS Ltd (UK), MSCI ESG Research (USA), 
Sustainalytics (Netherlands) and Rep Risk (Switzerland) are among the leading and most 
active market participants. According to the report of Novethic (2013), traditional financial 
analysis providers, such as brokers, have begun to express interest in ESG ratings and 
providing non-financial analytics as an additional part of their business, with SGCIB (Société 
Generale Corporate and Investment Banking), Natixis and Oddo Securities among the leading 
agents.  
ESG rating agencies and rankings were criticized for low transparency, standardization 
and objectivity (Fowler and Hope, 2007; Chatterji et al., 2009). The lack of a standardized 
approach in addition to a high level of privacy can impact on the accuracy of the ESG rating, 
which raises concerns and undermines the trust of investors. The report provided by Novethic 
(2013) characterized the ESG rating agencies’ market as highly competitive and dynamic, yet 
concentrated. However, as was noted by Fowler and Hope (2007), the ESG ratings industry 
has a growth potential which suggests opportunities for new entrants. Therefore, it could be 
suggested, that Oddo and Cie have an opportunity for the product to succeed in the market, if 
it demonstrates competitive performance results.  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
26 Domini Social Investments: <http://domini.com/>, accessed 10 September 2016. 
27 MSCI: www.msci.com/resources/factsheets/index_fact_sheet/msci-kld-400-social-index.pdf>,accessed 10 September 
2016. 
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3.3 Methodology 
The methodology applied in this study aims to evaluate value generation opportunity through 
the development of ESG recommendations as the new product and diversification 
opportunity for a sell-side broker. For the accuracy of the analysis it consists of two parts.  
Firstly, the focus was made on assessment of the ESG recommendations developed by 
Oddo and Cie. The examination is performed through the empirical analysis of European and 
French equally and value-weighted portfolios built on the basis of data provided by the 
broker. Further, the data was analysed through the creation of ESG ranking-based portfolio 
using the ASSET4 data.  
 The second part includes evaluation of the alternative SRI French and European 
portfolio performances. Additionally a European sustainable benchmark was added to the 
analysis, developed to provide more in-depth evaluation of the accuracy of Oddo’s database 
portfolio. As financial players are not prone to disclose the information regarding ESG factor 
evaluation methodologies, ASSET4 rating data was used to create ESG ranking based 
portfolio.  
To study the ESG ranking-based portfolio, the analysis followed methodology presented in 
the study of Kempf and Osthoff (2007).  Using the ASSET 4 ranking, equally and value-weighted 
portfolio were created. ASSET4 reports stock rating every April of the t-1 year. On the basis of the 
rating the portfolios are formed. Each portfolio is held till the next year. It is rebalanced every May of 
the year t, using the newly issued data to construct the portfolio for the following year (t+1). The 
procedure was repeated annually with similar time structure. This approach resulted in the times series 
of weekly returns data. 
The portfolios were created following environmental, governance and social themes, as well 
as overall ESG scores, given by the rating provider. Each portfolio included companies provided by 
the Oddo and Cie. After the rating of companies issued each year, the portfolio companies were 
ranked in accordance with data. The top-ranked companies were included in the high-ranked 
portfolio; companies with the lowest ranking were included in the low-rated portfolio. Portfolio with 
consisted of 10%, 15% and 20% high and low rated stock scenarios. The portfolios are formed 
separately on the basis of each screen. The long-short portfolio represents a trading strategy, when 
long position is taken with the high-rated and going short position is in low-rated portfolio  
Additionally, SRI-fund stocks based portfolios were introduced in order to compare 
the alpha generation capabilities to Oddo and Cie recommendations – based portfolio. Two 
113 
 
equally weighted based portfolios were introduced: the one, which represented European and 
French market. Introduction of European Sustainability index-based portfolio introduced 
another alternative to compare Oddo-based portfolio. Data for French sustainability index 
was not available.  
Long-Short portfolio strategies were implemented as robustness tests, following 
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) methodology, which allow analysing if investor could generate 
positive alpha through alternating long and short positions. In addition, Oddo-based European 
and French small-medium and large stock – based portfolio were created to evaluate, if 
various market capitalisation of various stocks could impact portfolio’s abnormal 
performance.  
 The CAPM is one of the most respected models applied within financial theory to 
evaluate the performance of portfolios and individual stocks. This model investigates the 
links between an asset’s rerun fluctuation and the systematic risk the asset is bearing (Sharpe, 
1964). The simplistic nature of the model allowed it to gain wide recognition; however, it 
cannot be applied as a universal evaluation tool. 
 Jensen addressed the forecasting abilities of the CAPM model in 1967. He modified 
the existing model by including the portfolio’s beta and average market return, which allowed 
him to determine the portfolio or individual stock return over and above the ones predicted by 
CAPM.  
 As this study focuses on estimating the potential gains from the implementation of 
ESG criteria in the investment process, Jensen’s CAPM model is an efficient instrument. It 
serves as an indicator of a portfolio’s ability to generate excessive returns, as well as allowing 
comparison between the performances of different portfolios, as in equations (21) and (22): 
 
 𝛼𝑝 = 𝑅𝑝 − [?̅?𝑓 + 𝛽𝑝(?̅?𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)] 
 
(21) 
 
 (𝑟𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡−1) =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 (22) 
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Where (𝑟𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡−1) is the continuously compounded return of portfolio p at time t in excess 
of the continuously compounded risk-free rate of return; 𝛼𝑝  is the previously discussed 
Jensen’s alpha; (𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡−1) is the continuously compounded return of the market m at time 
t in excess of the continuously compounded risk-free rate of return; the systematic risk 
exposure of portfolio p to the market over the sample period is represented by the coefficient 
𝛽𝑝 ; and, last, 𝜀𝑝,𝑡  is a random disturbance term, implemented to seize the deviation of a 
fund’s return variation, overlooked by the OLS regression. 
 The CAPM model was put under scrutiny when Banz (1981, p. 3) suggested it to be 
“misspecified” and provided evidence of smaller firms’ tendency to generate higher risk-
adjusted returns on average in comparison to larger firms. This phenomenon was called a 
“size effect”. Fama and French (1993) also described another phenomenon related to stock 
returns. They provided evidence of book-to-market values and market capitalization factors 
that could influence expected returns. Fama and French (1993) reported in their paper that 
companies with a large market capitalization outperformed companies with a small market 
capitalization. In the same way, they demonstrated the evidence of stocks with a high book-
to-market ratio outperforming in contrast with stocks with a low book-to-market ratio. In 
other words, value stocks have a tendency to outperform growth stocks. As a result, the 
authors presented a modified version of the CAPM model in their paper in 1993. Fama and 
French introduced the SMB factor, to control for the small-firm effect, and the HML factor, 
to control for the value premium (Fama and French, 1993); see equation (23):  
 
 (𝑟𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡−1) =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡−1) + 𝛾𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛿𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 (23) 
 
Where 𝛽𝑝  and (𝑟𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡−1) are described as in equation (2); 𝛼𝑝  represents portfolio p’s 
systematic return component not captured by the independent variables of the model; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is 
the continuously compounded return of small-cap stocks in excess of the continuously 
compounded return large-cap stocks at time t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the continuously compounded return 
of value stocks in excess of the continuously compounded return of growth stocks at time t; 
𝛾𝑝  and 𝛿𝑝  represent portfolio p’s exposure to small-cap and value investment styles, 
respectively; and  𝜀𝑝,𝑡 is a random disturbance term.  
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 The Fama–French model was also applied in the analysis of the portfolio based on the 
Oddo & Cie data. Equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios were subjected to the 
analysis, with one portfolio representing the European stock universe, and the other the 
French stock universe. A Newey–West (Newey and West, 1987) estimator was applied in the 
regression analysis to avoid autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.  
 In order to perform an analysis with more depth, robustness tests were introduced to 
look more closely at the risk-adjusted performance by dividing the portfolio according to the 
market capitalization of the stocks. CAPM and Fama and French models were applied to the 
European and French stock universes. Each of the equally-weighted and value-weighted 
portfolios was divided according to company size. Stocks with a top 33.33% market 
capitalization calculated yearly were allocated to the portfolio with large market 
capitalization companies, followed by medium-sized stocks (66.66–33.33%), and small-cap 
firms (33.33–0.00%).  
 
3.4 Data Description 
3.4.1 Oddo and Cie ESG Approach 
This study is constructed on the basis of data provided by the investment banking and capital 
management company Oddo and Cie. The company has been operating in the European 
market for over a century. It is placed amongst the strongest industry players, with brokerage 
business accounting for its substantial share. As new regulations were due to come into 
power in 2018, the company took a new approach to tackle the changing market conditions 
and the rise of competition, through diversifying the brokerage business. With the growing 
popularity of ESG-related products and rising investors demand for it, the company 
developed its ESG ranking. As developing the service in house becomes a heavy financial 
burden for a substantial amount of buy-side companies, Oddo provides leverage for this 
challenging task. The company has developed a growing ESG ranking since 2007. Exclusive 
access to the dataset allows investigating the product and assessing it as an alternative 
solution for sell-side market participants. The data, provided by the broker represented ESG 
recommendations, as the scale for the rating was not provide. 
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 Oddo and Cie28 revealed a strong positive attitude to the future of ESG development: 
“the 2010–2020 decade in terms of ESG integration and it may become the rule, with the 
practical merger of two main themes and sector best-in class” (SRI Convictions, ESG 
Integration – Just do it, p. 7). The company has developed a recommendation approach: an 
ESG model, which allows selecting stocks on the basis of the upstream test of information 
relevance and transparency, followed by integration of the best in class analysis. The ESG 
model of Oddo focuses on the business model, management quality and the financial 
statement as the prime criteria for evaluation. It characterizes the approach by the 
concentration of long-term ESG themes that contribute to sustainable development solutions 
(ageing populations, alternative energy, reducing exposure to the risk of corruption, etc.).  
The model is constantly evolving as the industry diversifies. The original one-step 
approach was best in class on an industry-by-industry basis. It was further evolved into a two-
step methodology: sector allocation in absolute terms and relative best-in class analysis sector 
by sector. This approach, as indicated Oddo and Cie, allowed addressing certain sectors that 
are highly intensive and ESG opportunities and risk. 
At the first stage, the strategy team issues a rating of the stocks. The review and 
scoring is based on of 20 long-term ESG themes, such as energy efficiency, corruption or 
population ageing. The sectors that contribute (positive sector scores) more to sustainable 
development solutions than problems are thereby overweighed. Conversely, sectors that we 
find contribute more to sustainable development problems than solutions (negative sector 
scores) are underweighted. On the basis of the sum of market capitalization data, 
overweighed sectors balance out the underweighted sectors (the “market neutral” approach).  
This allows identifying the sector with the optimal risk/opportunity pairing. 
At the second stage, a sector-by-sector best in class analysis is implemented. The ESG 
factors are assessed in absolute terms.   
                                                          
 
28 Oddo and Cie provided equity report “SRI Conviction – ESG Integration, Just DO it”, issued for investors in 
addition to the dataset. It introduced its methodological approach. However, the report did not provide in-depth 
details of the methodology, apart from the one translated in this paper. 
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3.4.2 Data Sample 
The data provided by the company, in addition to the overview of its methodology, included 
its yearly ESG forecast for the period from December 2007 to December 2016. The data 
contained the company name as well as the matching international securities’ identification 
numbers (ISINs). Oddo provided a list with the companies; however it did not provide a 
detailed methodology applied for the selection. Due to this reason the focus was on the 
quantitative evaluation. The ESG investment universe contained 380 companies in 2016. The 
number of companies has increased over the years, with the dataset accounting for 89 
companies in 2008, 120 in 2009, and 140, 170, 200, 220, 250 and 255 in 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively. Companies were represented by 11 industries, including 
basic materials, communication services, consumer cyclical, consumer defensive, energy, 
financial services, healthcare, industrials, real estate, technology and utilities. Companies, 
which represent the industrial sector, have a dominating presence in the universe, accounting 
for a quarter of it. Technology and consumer cyclical follow, accounting for the second 
quarter of the cross-section.  
Fifteen European countries were present in the list of ESG companies. The majority 
of those on the list were in France and the UK, followed by Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, 
Norway, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Finland, Denmark, Belgium and Austria; Ireland 
and Portugal only had four representatives each. The dataset was used to create two different 
portfolios. A complete list of companies was used as the basis of a European portfolio, 
whereas the data on French companies’ returns were additionally used separately to create a 
French portfolio. 
The market data for the ESG companies was retrieved from Datastream. The Total 
Return Index and Market Value data was downloaded for the period from December 2007 to 
December 2015. The data were downloaded in local and euro currencies in order to verify the 
accuracy of the Datastream data. The European currency was used as the main one for the 
analysis. Weekly data were collated for the dataset that provided the larger number of 
observations, allowing us to perform an empirical analysis at a deeper level, as well as to 
align the calculations to the calendar of the trading days on the markets.  
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To create ESG rating-based portfolio, Thomson Reuter’s ASSET4 rating29 was used to collect 
ESG-related data. The rating has an established reputation in the academic community and has a wide 
range of application; dedicated to study sustainability and ESG-related events (Wimmer, 2013; 
Halbritter and Dorfleitner, 2015).  
The rating was created to evaluate ESG performance of the companies; and tailored to 
eliminate assessment biases. ASSET4 rating provides a global coverage, with the universe accounting 
for over 7000 companies. The rating incorporates over 400 ESG measures, which are separated in 
accordance with 10 themes and is based on the information provided by the companies. ASSET4 uses 
information provided in the company reports. The data is grouped under 10 categories, which covers 
three key scores: Environmental (Resource use, Emission, Innovation), Governance (Management, 
Shareholders, CSR Strategy) and Social (Workforce, Human Rights, Community, Responsibility). 
There is also a joined ESG score, ESG Controversies Score and ESG combined score, which 
incorporates ESG score and ESG controversies score. 10 categories were applied to create portfolios 
and measure the performance.  
 
3.4.3 Portfolio Construction 
For the comparative analysis the portfolio of European and the portfolio of French SRI funds 
were created. The Total Return Index data were downloaded for the period December 2007 to 
December 2015 from Bloomberg. As Market Value data were not available, the analysis was 
narrowed to the creation of an equally weighted portfolio only. 
The European Stoxx Europe 600 index30 and the French SBF 120 index31 were used 
to create a market benchmark for the European and French portfolios. The total return index 
data were retrieved on a weekly basis. Stoxx Europe 600 and SBF 120 are value-weighted 
indexes, composed of small, medium and large-cap companies. Stoxx Europe 600 includes 
companies from the UK, France, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Italy, Denmark and Belgium, whereas the SBF 120 tracks 120 French companies. The Stoxx 
Sustainability 40 Return Index32 was used to create a sustainable benchmark for the European 
                                                          
 
29 Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4:https://financial.thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/financial/esg-scores-
methodology.pdf, accessed July, 10 
30 Stoxx Digital:< www.stoxx.com>, accessed 10 September 2016. 
31 EURONEXT: <www.euronext.com>, accessed 10 September 2016. 
32 Stoxx Sustainability 40 
ReturnIndex:https://www.stoxx.com/document/Bookmarks/CurrentFactsheets/SUBU.pdf>, access 10 Sept 2016 
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market. The total return index data were retrieved on a weekly basis. An important discovery 
was made during the process. No sustainability index was detected in France. The importance 
of this finding derives from the fact that France is the leading market for responsible 
investment; therefore the lack of a sustainability market index stands out significantly and 
should be addressed in the future. This imposed a further limitation on the analysis.  
The risk-free rate of return applied in the model was created on the basis of the three-
month Euribor rate.  
The investment style benchmark was generated on the basis of weekly return data 
from the MSCI Europe Small Cap index, the MSCI Europe Large Cap index, the MSCI 
Europe Value index, the MSCI Europe Growth index, the MSCI French Small Cap index, the 
MSCI French Large Cap index, the MSCI French Value index and the MSCI French Growth 
index. The MSCI Europe indexes are spread over 15 developed markets. The Small Cap 
index covers around 14% of the free float-adjusted market cap of the European equity 
universe, whereas the Large Cap index covers 70%. The value and growth indexes are built 
on the basis of large and mid-cap securities, which align with value and growth style 
characteristics, respectively.33 
All the collected data were adjusted to the weekly based observations and transformed 
to fit the model. 
The three-month Euribor rate of return was collected on an annual basis and 
transformed to fit the weekly-based timeframe, as in equation (24): 
 
 𝑟𝑓,𝑡.1𝑤 = 𝑙𝑛 [(1 + 𝑠𝑟𝑓,1𝑦/100)
7 365.25⁄
] (24) 
 
Where 𝑠𝑟𝑓,𝑡,1𝑦 is the annualized three-month Euribor rate at time t and 𝑟𝑓,𝑡.1𝑤 is the weekly 
risk-free rate of return at time t.  
                                                          
 
33 MSCI: < www.msci.com>, accessed 10 September 2016. 
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To define the portfolio’s excess returns and create benchmark returns, the total return 
indices were transformed through the application of continuously compounded rates of return 
to the return index, as in equation (25): 
 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) (25) 
 
Where 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the total return of firm or index i at time t, 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 is the total return of firm or 
index i at time t–1, and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the continuously compounded rate of return of stock or index i 
at time t. To construct the excess market returns or excess firm returns, the weekly risk-free 
rate of return at time t–1 is subtracted from the continuously compounded rate of return of 
stock or index i at time t.   
Both equally and value-weighted portfolios were constructed for the regression 
analysis. To construct the continuously compounded rates of return for an equally weighted 
portfolio we employ equation (26): 
 𝑟𝑝𝑡 = ln [
1
𝑁
(
𝑝𝑖,1,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,1,𝑡−1
+
𝑝𝑖,2,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,2,𝑡−1
+ ⋯ +
𝑝𝑖,𝑁,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑁,𝑡−1
)] (26) 
Where the simple returns of each stock are first summed and then divided by the number of 
stocks contained in the portfolio, represented by 𝑁, at time t. The continuously compounded 
rate of return (𝑟𝑝𝑡 ) for portfolio p at time t is the natural logarithm of the previously 
mentioned calculations.  
The continuously compounded rate of return for a value-weighted portfolio p at time t 
is the natural logarithm of the weighted sums of each stock’s simple return at time t where 
each stock is weighted by its market capitalization in proportion to the overall portfolio at 
time t–1, as in equation (27): 
 𝑟𝑝𝑡 = ln [(𝑤𝑖,1,𝑡−1𝑥
𝑝𝑖,1,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,1,𝑡−1
+ 𝑤𝑖,2,𝑡−1𝑥
𝑝𝑖,2,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,2,𝑡−1
+ ⋯ + 𝑤𝑖,𝑁,𝑡−1𝑥
𝑝𝑖,𝑁,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑁,𝑡−1
)] (27) 
 To calculate the excess returns of either portfolio, the weekly risk-free rate of return at time   
t–1 is subtracted from the continuously compounded rate of return of the chosen portfolio.  
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 MSCI indexes were used to construct the investment style SMB and HML factors for 
the European and French equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios. The SMB factor 
was created on the basis of the MSCI European Small Cap index, the MSCI European Large 
Cap index, the MSCI French Small Cap index and the MSCI French Large Cap index returns. 
The premium was calculated as the difference between the continuously compounded rate of 
return of the small-cap index at time t and the continuously compounded return of the large-
cap index at time t. The HML factor was constructed in a similar way. The continuously 
compounded rates of return were calculated for the growth and value indices. The 
continuously compounded rates of return of the growth index were then deducted from the 
return of the value index, to define the premium. 
 The methodology described above was applied to the database of the complete 
European investment universe and solely French equities from the provided list of ESG 
companies. In order to analyse the impact of small, mid and large-cap companies on the 
portfolio’s risk-adjusted performance, the three cases were then analysed separately by 
applying a similar methodology.  
 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
The results of the analysis provide an overview of European and French portfolio 
performance constructed on the basis of an ESG best-in-class equity universe provided by 
Oddo & Cie. 
Table 3.2 represents the results for the regression analysis of European equally- 
weighted and value-weighted portfolios.  
Table 3.2 European Portfolio 
 CAPM model Fama–French model   
Portfolio 
weights 
Alpha Beta Alpha Beta SMB HML Adj R2 
CAPM 
Adj 
R2 FF 
Equally 
weighted 
-0.0033*** 
(-3.91) 
1.0123*** 
(49.94) 
-0.0040*** 
(-5.22) 
0.9978*** 
(71.84) 
0.4445*** 
(8.69) 
0.1013** 
(2.12)  
0.912 0.938 
Value-
weighted 
0.0011*** 
(2.92) 
0.9958*** 
(67.77) 
0.0008*** 
(2.93) 
0.9715*** 
(94.62) 
-0.0467*** 
(-1.39) 
0.1233*** 
(3.33) 
0.976 0.979 
Notes: This table represents the analysis results of a European equally weighted and value-weighted portfolio evaluation. 
The table combined results for two methodologies: the CAPM model and the Fama–French model. The second and third 
column represents the results for the alpha and risk indicators of the CAPM model. Results for both equally and value-
weighted portfolios are presented. The next set of columns represents the Fama–French model, including alpha, beta 
indicators, small-cap stock exposure, and growth stock exposure. The adjusted R-squared indicators are listed in the two 
final columns. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level. 
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The results of the regression analysis appear to demonstrate strong statistical 
significance. In the equally weighted portfolio assessment with the application of the CAPM 
model, alpha appeared to be negative. The market coefficient under the CAPM model 
appeared significant estimated.. In contrast to the equally weighted portfolio, the value-
weighted portfolio generated a statistically significant positive alpha with a coefficient of 
0.0011, measured on a weekly basis. In both variations, the CAPM model appeared to have a 
strong exploratory power of 91% for the equally weighted portfolio, and a stronger power of 
over 97% in the setting of the value-weighted portfolio.  
In the Fama–French results, appeared significant estimated demonstrated a weaker 
risk-adjusted performance of the equally weighted portfolio against the benchmark, with a 
negative, yet strongly significant alpha coefficient of 0.004. In the context of the value-
weighted portfolio, alpha appeared positive with a strong statistical significance. The 
systematic risk of the equally weighted portfolio appeared to be less volatile than the market. 
Exposure to the different investment styles portrays small-cap stocks to have an impact on the 
performance as well as the value of stocks in the case of the equally weighted portfolio. In the 
case of the value-weighted ESG portfolio, the performance is exposed to the large-cap stock, 
with a 0.0467 coefficient. The value-weighted portfolio has an exposure to value stocks under 
a 1% significance level. The Fama–French model demonstrates a strong explanatory power 
for the risk-adjusted performance of the equally and value-weighted portfolios.   
Table 3.3 combines the results from the analysis of the French ESG portfolio.  
Table 3.3 French Portfolio 
 CAPM model Fama–French model   
Portfolio 
weights 
Alpha Beta Alpha Beta SMB HML Adj R2 
CAPM 
Adj 
R2 FF 
Equally 
weighted 
-0.0047*** 
(-3.72) 
0.9009*** 
(34.47) 
-0.0048*** 
(-4.50) 
0.9373*** 
(52.94) 
0.5078*** 
(11.62) 
-0.0385 
(-1.01) 
0.831 0.895 
Value- 
weighted 
-0.0005 
(1.48) 
0.9645*** 
(56.01) 
0.0008* 
(1.78) 
0.9704*** 
(51.85) 
-0.0272 
(-1.15) 
-0.0580** 
(-1.98) 
0.968 0.969 
Notes: This table represents the analysis results of the French equally weighted and value-weighted portfolio 
evaluation. The table combines results for two methodologies: the CAPM model and the Fama–French model. 
The second and third columns represent the results for the alpha and risk indicators of the CAPM model. The 
results for both equally and value-weighted portfolios are presented. The next set of columns represents the 
Fama–French model, including alpha, beta indicators, small-cap stock exposure and growth stock exposure. The 
adjusted R-squared indicators are listed in the two final columns. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance 
level; * 10% significance level. 
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 The regression analysis of the French portfolio provided statistically significant 
results. The performance of the equally weighted portfolio assessed through the 
implementation of the CAPM model is characterized by a negative alpha with a coefficient of 
0.0026 with a significance of 1%. The alpha of the value-weighted portfolio demonstrated 
risk-adjusted outperformance; however, it appeared statistically insignificant. Market, size 
and book-to-market value appeared to have strong significance for abnormal returns. In the 
case of both portfolios, the equations, applied for the evaluation, demonstrated strong 
explanatory power. However, the adjusted R-squared of the value-weighted portfolio 
demonstrated a weaker power by 13.7%. 
 An application of the Fama–French model to the equally weighted portfolio 
demonstrated a similar negative alpha, as in the cases examined above, giving a similar 
coefficient as in the case of the CAPM model application. The risk-adjusted performance of 
the value-weighted portfolio demonstrated a minor positive outperformance; however, the 
statistical strength of the results declined in comparison to the equally weighted portfolio. In 
the case of the equally and value-weighted portfolio, the former was exposed to the small-cap 
stocks, with a coefficient characterized by a strong statistical significance. As both the 
benchmark and the value-weighted portfolio were constructed on the basis of the market 
capitalization weights, it could be considered an explanation of the value-weighted portfolio’s 
exposure to the large-cap stocks. However, the result is not statistically significant. Unlike the 
European portfolio, the performance of the French portfolio appeared to be impacted on by 
growth stocks. However, the results appear to be significant solely for the value-weighted 
portfolio, with a coefficient of 0.058 at a 5% significance level. The Fama–French model 
implemented for the portfolio analysis demonstrated a strong explanatory power, with an 
adjusted R-squared at the 89.5 % and 96.9% level.  
The summary of the analysis presented in the tables (3.4-3.9) demonstrates results of Fama-
French model (1993) for portfolios based on the screens presented by the ASSET4 ranking. The tables 
contain the results for high-rated and low-rated portfolios, which consists of three specifications: top 
10%, 15% and 20%, bottom 10%, 15% and 20%, as well as long-short strategy. Across all 
specifications market risk appeared to have a strong impact on portfolio’s alphas, as indicated by high 
significance rate across all specifications for equally and value-weighted portfolios. Overall 
significance of SMB and HML factors appears strong, however, the strength varies across factors. The 
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results suggest the importance to control for the market, size and book-to-market factors when 
evaluating high (low) rated portfolios, as was highlighted in the paper of Kempf and Osthoff (2007). 
Table 3.4 Value-Weighted Portfolios with 10% Stock 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Resource Use       
 High-rated 0.0015*** 1.0155*** 0.0227 0.1885*** 0.9274 
 Low-rated 0.0007 0.9959*** 0.4511*** -0.1521** 0.8481 
 Long-short 0.0008 0.0196 -0.4284*** 0.3406*** 0.1741 
Emission Score       
 High-rated 0.0004 0.9603*** -0.0219 0.3179*** 0.9229 
 Low-rated 0.0002 0.9399*** 0.0116 -0.1951* 0.7926 
 Long-short 0.0002 0.0204 -0.0336 0.5130*** 0.1642 
Environmental 
Innovation 
      
 High-rated 0.0022*** 1.1002*** 0.1093** 0.3910*** 0.9179 
 Low-rated 0.0013** 0.9771*** 0.1748*** -0.6487*** 0.8595 
 Long-short 0.0009 0.1231*** -0.0656 1.0397*** 0.5131 
CSR Strategy       
 High-rated 0.0014** 1.0403*** -0.0726 0.2401*** 0.9307 
 Low-rated 0.0009 0.9541*** 0.2643*** -0.5091*** 0.8777 
 Long-short 0.0005 0.0862 -0.3369*** 0.7491*** 0.4046 
Management       
 High-rated 0.0018*** 1.0561*** -0.0390 0.1573** 0.9252 
 Low-rated 0.0010* 0.9999*** 0.1806** -0.1810** 0.8484 
 Long-short 0.0008 0.0561 -0.2195*** 0.3383*** 0.1321 
Shareholder 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0013** 0.9909*** -0.1339** 0.0644 0.9031 
 Low-rated 0.0006 0.9290*** 0.0859* -0.3796*** 0.8977 
 Long-short 0.0007 0.0619** -0.2198*** 0.4440*** 0.2471 
Community 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0001 0.9344*** -0.1588*** 0.0184 0.9265 
 Low-rated 0.0013** 0.9974*** 0.3729*** -0.2719*** 0.8704 
 Long-short -0.0014* -0.0630*** -0.5317*** 0.2902*** 0.2334 
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Table 3.4 Value-Weighted Portfolios with 10% Stock (Continued) 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Human Rights 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0002 0.9247*** -0.1422*** -0.0304 0.9106 
 Low-rated 0.0013** 0.9812*** 0.3009*** -0.4042*** 0.8781 
 Long-short -0.0015** -0.0565** -0.4431*** 0.3738*** 0.2291 
Product 
Responsibility 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0001 0.9341*** -0.2002*** 0.0944* 0.9180 
 Low-rated 0.0023*** 1.0550*** 0.4993*** -0.0104 0.8701 
 Long-short -0.0023** -0.1209*** -0.6996*** 0.1048 0.2546 
Workforce 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0017*** 0.9982*** -0.0613 -0.0375 0.9300 
 Low-rated 0.0004 0.9466*** 0.3802*** -0.2352*** 0.8704 
 Long-short 0.0013* 0.0516** -0.4414*** 0.1976** 0.2050 
ESG Score       
 High-rated 0.0016*** 1.0042*** -0.0858 0.3989*** 0.9386 
 Low-rated 0.0015** 0.9838*** 0.4307*** -0.4945*** 0.8751 
 Long-short 0.0001 0.0203 -0.5165*** 0.8933*** 0.5173 
Combined 
ESG Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0020*** 1.0457*** 0.1122** 0.1809*** 0.9110 
 Low-rated 0.0019*** 1.0555*** 0.3504*** -0.1172 0.8766 
 Long-short 0.0002 -0.0097 -0.2381*** 0.2982*** 0.0966 
ESG 
Controversies 
      
 High-rated -0.0018*** 0.8093*** -0.0225 -0.3296*** 0.8107 
 Low-rated 0.0016*** 1.0293*** -0.1359*** 0.2771*** 0.9382 
 Long-short -0.0034*** -0.2200*** 0.1134 -0.6066*** 0.3910 
Notes: This table represents a summary for annual abnormal returns, factor loading and adjusted R-Sq for a set of 
Environmental Social and Governance factors represented in ASSET4. The portfolio generated using Fama French 
model. The high-rated  (low-rated) portfolio consists of 10% of all stocks with the highest (lowest) ratings. The 
portfolios are value-weighted. The long-short portfolio represents a trading strategy, when long position is taken 
with the high-rated and going short position is in low-rated portfolio. The observation timeframe is 2008-2015. 
New-West method implemented to compute standard errors. The significance levels: p***<0.01; p**<0.05, 
p*<0.1Description: 
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Table 3.5 Equally-Weighted Portfolio with 10% Stock 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Resource Use       
 High-rated 0.0015*** 1.0474*** 0.2601*** 0.3085*** 0.9447 
 Low-rated -0.0007 1.0420*** 0.7071*** -0.2096*** 0.8550 
 Long-short 0.0022* 0.0054 -0.4470*** 0.5182*** 0.2655 
Emission 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0008 1.0215*** 0.2596*** 0.3331*** 0.9296 
 Low-rated -0.0015 1.0127*** 0.5768*** -0.1626** 0.8099 
 Long-short 0.0022 0.0088 -0.3172*** 0.4956*** 0.1770 
Environmental 
Innovation 
      
 High-rated 0.0009** 1.0825*** 0.4321*** 0.4270*** 0.9384 
 Low-rated -0.0133*** 1.1620*** 0.3912* -0.6015*** 0.5046 
 Long-short 0.0142*** -0.0795 0.0409 1.0285*** 0.1036 
CSR Strategy       
 High-rated -0.0196*** 1.0032*** 0.2031** 0.1668* 0.6829 
 Low-rated -0.0041** 1.0093*** 0.4866*** -0.3337*** 0.7386 
 Long-short -0.0155*** -0.0061 -0.2835** 0.5004*** 0.0528 
Management       
 High-rated 0.0013** 1.0553*** 0.2082*** 0.1190 0.9473 
 Low-rated 0.0001 1.0045*** 0.5683*** -0.0466 0.9180 
 Long-short 0.0011* 0.0508* -0.3600*** 0.1655** 0.1953 
Shareholder 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0055*** 1.1250*** 0.4735*** 0.1484* 0.7928 
 Low-rated -0.0100*** 0.9134*** 0.2210*** -0.3346*** 0.6506 
 Long-short 0.0045 0.2116*** 0.2525 0.4831*** 0.1190 
Community 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0002 1.0680*** 0.2067*** 0.0825 0.8940 
 Low-rated -0.0002 0.9834*** 0.4802*** -0.2300*** 0.8938 
 Long-short -0.0001 0.0846*** -0.2735*** 0.3125*** 0.1702 
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Table 3.5 Equally-Weighted Portfolio with 10% Stock (Continued) 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Human Rights 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0049*** 0.9733*** 0.2445*** 0.2044* 0.7975 
 Low-rated 0.0007 0.9959*** 0.5724*** -0.2377*** 0.8957 
 Long-short -0.0056*** -0.0226 -0.3280*** 0.4420*** 0.1394 
Product 
Responsibility 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0004 0.9569*** 0.1098** 0.1460** 0.9267 
 Low-rated -0.0038** 1.1502*** 0.6314*** -0.1315 0.7999 
 Long-short 0.0034** -0.1933*** -0.5216*** 0.2775** 0.1504 
Workforce 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0007 1.0409*** 0.2172*** 0.0787 0.9196 
 Low-rated 0.0008 1.0037*** 0.5000*** -0.1385** 0.8806 
 Long-short -0.0001 0.0371 -0.2829*** 0.2172** 0.1159 
ESG Score       
 High-rated 0.0017*** 1.0759*** 0.2152*** 0.4977*** 0.9415 
 Low-rated -0.0009 1.0098*** 0.5857*** -0.2931*** 0.8401 
 Long-short 0.0025* 0.0661** -0.3705*** 0.7908*** 0.3870 
Combined 
ESG Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0005 1.0827*** 0.3657*** 0.1535* 0.8811 
 Low-rated -0.0049** 0.9843*** 0.4906*** -0.1458* 0.7440 
 Long-short 0.0044* 0.0984** -0.1249 0.2993*** 0.0721 
ESG 
Controversies 
      
 High-rated -0.0007* 0.9371*** 0.2371*** -0.2485*** 0.8687 
 Low-rated 0.0013*** 1.0811*** 0.1922*** 0.2741*** 0.9473 
 Long-short -0.0020** -0.1440*** 0.0449 -0.5226*** 0.3318 
Notes: This table represents a summary for annual abnormal returns, factor loading and adjusted R-Sq for a set of 
Environmental Social and Governance factors represented in ASSET4. The portfolio generated using Fama French 
model. The high-rated  (low-rated) portfolio consists of 10% of all stocks with the highest (lowest) ratings. The 
portfolios are equally-weighted. The long-short portfolio represents a trading strategy, when long position is taken 
with the high-rated and going short position is in low-rated portfolio. The observation timeframe is 2008-2015. 
New-West method implemented to compute standard errors. The significance levels: p***<0.01; p**<0.05, p*<0.1 
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 The result for the value and equally weighted portfolios of 10% top (bottom) stocks 
demonstrated significant impact market beta size and book-to-market to impact the alpha. Resource 
use-based portfolio yielded positive significant alpha for both equally a value-weighted portfolios.  
The results vary for the environmental innovation- based portfolio, CSR strategy shareholder score, 
product r and ESG score, where alpha coefficients of equally-value portfolios appeared negative, in 
comparison to value-weighted. ESG Controversies rating portfolio includes companies involved 
companies with negative connotation. The high rated portfolios represent most controversial 
companies, whereas the lowest-ranked portfolios represent the least. The top-rated portfolios 
consistently yielded negative excess return, opposed to low-rated portfolios, which generated positive 
alpha. In case of equally-weighted portfolio, the top-rated scenario appeared less significant. The 
explanatory power of the model appeared to be ranked in the 90%-80% rates apart from Shareholder 
management and CSR strategy score-based equally weighted portfolios.  
 Kempf and Osthoff (2007) highlighted in the paper the importance of long-short strategy. 
Authors presented it as opportunity to generate abnormal returns, if investor takes a long position with 
high-rated portfolio stocks and short with low-rated portfolio stocks. Resource emission, 
environmental innovation, management and shareholder score, ESG score demonstrated positive 
long-short portfolio alphas, however the results appear insignificant.  
129 
 
 
Table 3.6 Value – weighted portfolios with 15% stocks 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Resource Use       
 High-rated 0.0017*** 1.0243*** 0.0135 0.3028*** 0.9416 
 Low-rated 0.0008 0.9981*** 0.4327*** -0.2863*** 0.8962 
 Long-short 0.0010 0.0263 -0.4191*** 0.5891*** 0.3576 
Emission 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0009** 0.9832*** -0.0124 0.2908*** 0.9388 
 Low-rated 0.0004 0.9618*** 0.1153 -0.2789*** 0.8497 
 Long-short 0.0005 0.0214 -0.1276 0.5697*** 0.2561 
Environmental 
Innovation 
      
 High-rated 0.0015*** 1.0652*** 0.0510 0.4035*** 0.9185 
 Low-rated 0.0013*** 0.9667*** -0.0099 -0.1164* 0.9053 
 Long-short 0.0003 0.0985*** 0.0609 0.5199*** 0.2535 
CSR Strategy       
 High-rated 0.0015*** 1.0353*** -0.0855** 0.0991** 0.9606 
 Low-rated 0.0013** 0.9582*** 0.3424*** -0.3840*** 0.9048 
 Long-short 0.0002 0.0771** -0.4279*** 0.4831*** 0.4059 
Management       
 High-rated 0.0020*** 1.0532*** -0.0253 0.2705*** 0.9442 
 Low-rated 0.0018*** 1.0229 0.1570* -0.1475** 0.8922 
 Long-short 0.0001 0.0303 -0.1823 0.4180*** 0.1632 
Shareholder 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0016*** 1.0034*** -0.0597 0.1771*** 0.9340 
 Low-rated 0.0007 0.9400*** 0.0526 -0.2270*** 0.9271 
 Long-short 0.0009 0.0634*** -0.1122* 0.4041*** 0.2682 
Community 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0008*** 0.9721*** -0.1256*** -0.0345 0.9559 
 Low-rated 0.0017*** 0.9911*** 0.2620*** -0.0219 0.8966 
 Long-short -0.0009 -0.0190 -0.3876*** -0.0126 0.1252 
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Table 3.6 Value – weighted portfolios with 15% stocks (Continued) 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Human Rights 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0003 0.9539*** -0.1382*** 0.1677*** 0.9468 
 Low-rated 0.0016*** 0.9914*** 0.3163*** -0.3508*** 0.9253 
 Long-short -0.0012** -0.0376* -0.4545*** 0.5184*** 0.4120 
Product 
Responsibility 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0006 0.9148*** -0.2045*** 0.1308** 0.9385 
 Low-rated 0.0019*** 1.0370*** 0.3322*** -0.2360*** 0.9251 
 Long-short -0.0025*** -0.1223*** -0.5366*** 0.3668*** 0.3735 
Workforce 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0008*** 0.9617*** -0.0617 -0.0338 0.9508 
 Low-rated 0.0013*** 1.0197*** 0.4419*** -0.1287** 0.8983 
 Long-short -0.0005 -0.0580** -0.5036*** 0.0949 0.2073 
ESG Score       
 High-rated 0.0019*** 1.0334*** -0.0917** 0.3534*** 0.9559 
 Low-rated 4.2003*** 1.0151*** 0.4809*** -0.3944*** 0.9160 
 Long-short -0.0001 0.0183 -0.5726*** 0.7478*** 0.5564 
Combined 
ESG Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0018*** 1.0151*** 0.1092*** 0.1416*** 0.9372 
 Low-rated 0.0001 0.9667*** -0.0622 -0.1125* 0.9011 
 Long-short 0.0018*** 0.0484** 0.1713*** 0.2541*** 0.0974 
ESG 
Controversies 
      
 High-rated -0.0018*** 0.8138*** 0.0548 -0.3069*** 0.8547 
 Low-rated 0.0011*** 1.0014*** -0.1655*** 0.2341*** 0.9683 
 Long-short -0.0029*** -0.1875*** 0.2203*** -0.5410*** 0.4800 
Notes: This table represents a summary for annual abnormal returns, factor loading and adjusted R-sq for a set of 
Environmental Social and Governance factors represented in ASSET4. The portfolio generated using Fama French 
model. The high-rated  (low-rated) portfolio consists of 15% of all stocks with the highest (lowest) ratings. The 
portfolios are value-weighted. The long-short portfolio represents a trading strategy, when long position is taken 
with the high-rated and going short position is in low-rated portfolio.  The observation timeframe is 2008-2015. 
New-West method implemented to compute standard errors. The significance levels: p***<0.01; p**<0.05, p*<0.1 
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Table 3.7 Equally-Weighted Portfolios with 15% Stocks 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Resource Use       
 High-rated 0.0017*** 1.0565*** 0.2616*** 0.2892*** 0.9578 
 Low-rated -0.0002 1.0372*** 0.6832*** -0.2376*** 0.8977 
 Long-short 0.0019** 0.0193 -0.4216*** 0.5268*** 0.3592 
Emission 
Score 
 
     
 High-rated 0.0013*** 1.0673*** 0.2874*** 0.3104*** 0.9462 
 Low-rated -0.0027* 1.0148*** 0.6374*** -0.1754*** 0.7993 
 Long-short 0.0040** 0.0525* -0.3500*** 0.4858*** 0.2028 
Environmental 
Innovation 
 
     
 High-rated -0.0002*** 1.1087*** 0.4313*** 0.3648*** 0.9172 
 Low-rated -0.0126*** 1.0778*** 0.3834*** -0.0748 0.7213 
 Long-short 0.0124*** 0.0310 0.0479 0.4396*** 0.0550 
CSR Strategy  
     
 High-rated -0.0163*** 0.9877*** 0.1421* 0.0969 0.8118 
 Low-rated -0.0037** 1.0190*** 0.5150*** -0.2238*** 0.8101 
 Long-short -0.0126*** -0.0313 -0.3729*** 0.3207*** 0.1040 
Management       
 High-rated 0.0001 1.0794*** 0.2655*** 0.1982** 0.9196 
 Low-rated -0.0023* 1.0285*** 0.4957*** -0.0145 0.8688 
 Long-short 0.0023 0.0509* -0.2303*** 0.2127*** 0.0824 
Shareholder 
Score 
 
     
 High-rated -0.0047*** 1.1394*** 0.4980*** 0.1943** 0.8124 
 Low-rated -0.0096*** 0.9590*** 0.3209*** -0.2452*** 0.7724 
 Long-short 0.0049* 0.1804*** 0.1771 0.4395*** 0.1124 
Community 
Score 
 
     
 High-rated 0.0007 1.0711*** 0.2272*** 0.0623* 0.9335 
 Low-rated -0.0011 0.9889*** 0.4738*** -0.1703*** 0.9017 
 Long-short 0.0018 0.0822*** -0.2465*** 0.2326*** 0.1647 
 
132 
 
Table 3.7 Equally-Weighted Portfolios with 15% Stocks (Continued) 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Human Rights 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0079*** 1.0041*** 0.1752*** 0.3112*** 0.8293 
 Low-rated 0.0015*** 1.0238*** 0.5653*** -0.2047*** 0.9353 
 Long-short -0.0094*** -0.0196 -0.3901*** 0.5159*** 0.2184 
Product 
Responsibility 
Score 
 
     
 High-rated -0.0105*** 0.9619*** 0.1750** 0.1023 0.7883 
 Low-rated -0.0237*** 1.0833*** 0.6201*** -0.0874 0.8125 
 Long-short 0.0133*** -0.1214*** -0.4451*** 0.1896* 0.0643 
Workforce 
Score 
 
     
 High-rated 0.0009* 1.0410*** 0.2662*** 0.0875 0.9464 
 Low-rated 0.0014*** 1.0471*** 0.5677*** -0.1232** 0.9219 
 Long-short -0.0006 -0.0061 -0.3015*** 0.2107*** 0.1532 
ESG Score       
 High-rated 0.0005 1.0828*** 0.1707*** 0.3435*** 0.9297 
 Low-rated 0.0001 1.0534*** 0.5992*** -0.2572*** 0.8967 
 Long-short 0.0005 0.0294 -0.4286*** 0.6007*** 0.3801 
Combined 
ESG Score 
 
     
 High-rated 0.0006 1.0830*** 0.3576*** 0.0961* 0.9276 
 Low-rated -0.0033** 0.9835*** 0.3947*** -0.0336 0.8464 
 Long-short 0.0038*** 0.0995*** -0.0371 0.1297* 0.0608 
ESG 
Controversies 
 
     
 High-rated -0.0049*** 0.8931*** 0.3184*** -0.1834*** 0.8131 
 Low-rated 0.0008** 1.0501*** 0.1740*** 0.2249*** 0.9649 
 Long-short -0.0057*** -0.1570*** 0.1444 -0.4083*** 0.2881 
Notes: Description: This table represents a summary for annual abnormal returns, factor loading and adjusted R-Sq 
for a set of Environmental Social and Governance factors represented in ASSET4. The portfolio generated using 
Fama French model. The high-rated  (low-rated) portfolio consists of 15% of all stocks with the highest (lowest) 
ratings. The portfolios are equally-weighted. The long-short portfolio represents a trading strategy, when long 
position is taken with the high-rated and going short position is in low-rated portfolio. The observation timeframe 
is 2008-2015. New-West method implemented to compute standard errors. The significance levels: p***<0.01; 
p**<0.05, p*<0.1 
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The results of the top (bottom) 15% high (low) rated stocks appear inconsistent. ESG scores 
and ESG controversies-based portfolio demonstrated consistent results, with high significant level for 
ESG controversies high and low-rated scenarios. The high-rated portfolios across resource use, 
emission score, management score, community score, workforce indicator, combined ESG score 
generated positive abnormal returns, however alphas do not tend to hold similar significance level. 
Long-short strategy generated strong positive abnormal return for the product responsibility score-
based portfolio. The R-squared coefficients have strengthened further in comparison to the portfolios 
of 10% stocks.
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Table3. 8 Value-Weighted Portfolios with 20% Stocks 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Resource Use       
 High-rated 0.0016*** 1.0069*** -0.0131 0.2687*** 0.9492 
 Low-rated 0.0011*** 1.0006*** 0.4013*** -0.3101*** 0.9335 
 Long-short 0.0005 0.0062 -0.4143*** 0.5788*** 0.4269 
Emission 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0013*** 0.9908*** 0.0090 0.3567*** 0.9553 
 Low-rated 0.0004 0.9625*** 0.1352** -0.2383*** 0.8845 
 Long-short 0.0008 0.0283 -0.1262* 0.5950*** 0.3230 
Environmental 
Innovation 
      
 High-rated 0.0023*** 1.0832*** 0.0630 0.7125*** 0.9454 
 Low-rated 0.0038 1.1380** 0.2482 -0.4095 0.9243 
 Long-short -0.0015* -0.0548** -0.1852*** 1.1219*** 0.5469 
CSR Strategy       
 High-rated 0.0014*** 1.0099*** -0.1260*** 0.0089 0.9720 
 Low-rated 0.0014*** 0.9740*** 0.3720*** -0.3644*** 0.9236 
 Long-short 0.0002* 0.0358 -0.4981*** 0.3733*** 0.4245 
Management       
 High-rated 0.0020*** 1.0507*** -0.0187 0.2674*** 0.9555 
 Low-rated 0.0015*** 1.0132*** 0.1466** -0.0570 0.9310 
 Long-short 0.0004 0.0375 -0.1653 0.3244*** 0.1698 
Shareholder 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0017*** 1.0193*** 0.0194 0.1005** 0.9556 
 Low-rated 0.0006 0.9442*** 0.0601 -0.1525*** 0.9460 
 Long-short 0.0011** 0.0751*** -0.0407 0.2530*** 0.2166 
Community 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0013*** 1.0007*** -0.1134*** -0.0106 0.9706 
 Low-rated 0.0017*** 1.0041*** 0.2589*** 0.1017 0.9205 
 Long-short 0.0152*** 1.0131*** -0.2262 -0.3020* 0.4616 
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Table3. 8 Value-Weighted Portfolios with 20% Stocks (Continued) 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Human Rights 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0004 0.9628*** -0.1346*** 0.1551*** 0.9571 
 Low-rated 0.0016*** 1.0032*** 0.3035*** -0.3118*** 0.9314 
 Long-short -0.0012** -0.0404** -0.4381*** 0.4669*** 0.4164 
Product 
Responsibility 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0003 0.9082*** -0.2077*** 0.1055** 0.9522 
 Low-rated 0.0022*** 1.0797*** 0.4339*** 0.0618 0.9247 
 Long-short -0.0025*** -0.1714*** -0.6416*** 0.0438 0.3849 
Workforce 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0008** 0.9582*** -0.0950*** -0.0374 0.9596 
 Low-rated 0.0007 0.9900*** 0.3819*** -0.0929 0.9200 
 Long-short 0.0001 -0.0318 -0.4770*** 0.0554 0.2413 
ESG Score       
 High-rated 0.0011*** 0.9875*** -0.1309*** 0.2347*** 0.9689 
 Low-rated 0.0022*** 1.0470*** 0.5570*** -0.3184*** 0.9181 
 Long-short -0.0011* -0.0595*** -0.6879*** 0.5530*** 0.5297 
Combined 
ESG Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0020*** 1.0208*** 0.1372*** 0.1214** 0.9440 
 Low-rated 0.0008* 0.9955*** -0.0933** 0.0675* 0.9509 
 Long-short 0.0013** 0.0253 0.2304*** 0.0540 0.0625 
ESG 
Controversies 
      
 High-rated -0.0013*** 0.8534*** 0.1222** -0.2474*** 0.8904 
 Low-rated 0.0009*** 0.9815*** -0.1641*** 0.1933*** 0.9763 
 Long-short -0.0022*** -0.1281*** 0.2863*** -0.4407*** 0.4639 
Notes: Description: This table represents a summary for annual abnormal returns, factor loading and adjusted R-Sq 
for a set of Environmental Social and Governance factors represented in ASSET4. The portfolio generated using 
Fama French model. The high-rated  (low-rated) portfolio consists of 20% of all stocks with the highest (lowest) 
ratings. The portfolios are value-weighted. The long-short portfolio represents a trading strategy, when long 
position is taken with the high-rated and going short position is in low-rated portfolio. The observation timeframe 
is 2008-2015. New-West method implemented to compute standard errors. The significance levels: p***<0.01; 
p**<0.05, p*<0.1 
 
136 
 
Table 3.9 Equally Weighted Portfolios with 20% Stocks 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Resource Use       
 High-rated -0.0045*** 1.0457*** 0.2655*** 0.2601*** 0.8968 
 Low-rated 0.0001 1.0448*** 0.6367*** -0.2423*** 0.9177 
 Long-short -0.0044*** 0.0009 -0.3713*** 0.5024*** 0.3021 
Emission 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0014*** 1.0585*** 0.2826*** 0.3154*** 0.9595 
 Low-rated -0.0072*** 1.0419*** 0.6420*** -0.1591*** 0.8387 
 Long-short 0.0085*** 0.0167 -0.3594*** 0.4744*** 0.2198 
Environmental 
Innovation 
      
 High-rated 0.0008 1.1211*** 0.4254*** 0.5056*** 0.9474 
 Low-rated -0.0091*** 1.1445*** 0.4833*** -0.3080*** 0.7815 
 Long-short 0.0099*** -0.0234 -0.0580 0.8136*** 0.2306 
CSR Strategy       
 High-rated -0.0124*** 0.9825*** 0.1477*** 0.0105 0.8720 
 Low-rated -0.0035*** 1.0297*** 0.5443*** -0.2069*** 0.8668 
 Long-short -0.0089*** -0.0472 -0.3966*** 0.2174*** 0.1201 
Management       
 High-rated 0.0005 1.0829*** 0.2941*** 0.1936*** 0.9444 
 Low-rated -0.0020** 1.0248*** 0.5072*** 0.0379 0.9068 
 Long-short 0.0025** 0.0580*** -0.2130*** 0.1556*** 0.1011 
Shareholder 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0032** 1.1161*** 0.5008*** 0.1412** 0.8748 
 Low-rated -0.0068*** 0.9836*** 0.3828*** -0.1651** 0.8553 
 Long-short 0.0011** 0.0751*** -0.0407 0.2530*** 0.2166 
Community 
Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0010 1.0656*** 0.2137*** 0.1082*** 0.9541 
 Low-rated -0.0007 0.9927*** 0.5058*** -0.0905** 0.9349 
 Long-short 0.0036* 0.1325*** 0.1180 0.3063*** 0.0990 
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Table 3.9 Equally Weighted Portfolios with 20% Stocks (Continued) 
  Alpha Market SMB HML R-sq 
Human Rights 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0094*** 1.0033*** 0.1921*** 0.2067** 0.8760 
 Low-rated -0.0040*** 1.0687*** 0.5532*** -0.2247*** 0.8483 
 Long-short -0.0054*** -0.0654* -0.3612*** 0.4314*** 0.1394 
Product 
Responsibility 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0102*** 0.9727*** 0.2115*** 0.1594** 0.8600 
 Low-rated -0.0056*** 1.0936*** 0.5599*** -0.0316 0.8464 
 Long-short -0.0046** -0.1208*** -0.3484*** 0.1910* 0.0570 
Workforce 
Score 
      
 High-rated -0.0001 1.0352*** 0.2450*** 0.0703 0.9409 
 Low-rated -0.0006 1.0277*** 0.5518*** -0.1241** 0.9156 
 Long-short 0.0005 0.0075 -0.3068*** 0.1944*** 0.1612 
ESG Score       
 High-rated 0.0002 1.0520*** 0.1426*** 0.2424*** 0.9507 
 Low-rated -0.0063*** 1.0798*** 0.6445*** -0.2572*** 0.8472 
 Long-short 0.0065*** -0.0279 -0.5019*** 0.4995*** 0.2632 
Combined 
ESG Score 
      
 High-rated 0.0011* 1.0798*** 0.3676*** 0.0817* 0.9438 
 Low-rated -0.0019* 1.0085*** 0.3522*** -0.0100 0.9041 
 Long-short 0.0030** 0.0713** 0.0154 0.0917* 0.0453 
ESG 
Controversies 
      
 High-rated -0.0036*** 0.9199*** 0.3452*** -0.1686*** 0.8761 
 Low-rated -0.0020** 1.0154*** 0.1202*** 0.2515*** 0.9207 
 Long-short -0.0016*** -0.0955*** 0.2250*** -0.4201*** 0.3980 
Notes: Description: This table represents a summary for annual abnormal returns, factor loading and adjusted R-Sq 
for a set of Environmental Social and Governance factors represented in ASSET4. The portfolio generated using 
Fama French model. The high-rated  (low-rated) portfolio consists of 20% of all stocks with the highest (lowest) 
ratings. The portfolios are equally-weighted. The long-short portfolio represents a trading strategy, when long 
position is taken with the high-rated and going short position is in low-rated portfolio. The observation timeframe 
is 2008-2015. New-West method implemented to compute standard errors. The significance levels: p***<0.01; 
p**<0.05, p*<0.1 
 
138 
 
 The results for the equally and value-based portfolios for the 20% specification did not 
generate consistent results. Positive alpha generation ability did not hold across various factors. Long-
Short strategy demonstrated alpha –generation capability for the shareholder score and ESG-score 
based portfolio. 
Overall, the analysis of ranking based equally and value-weighted European portfolios did not 
demonstrate clear tendency of the high-rated and low-rated portfolio performance. Portfolio alphas 
behaved differently depending on the % consistency of the portfolio with varying significance level. 
As certain portfolio performance result demonstrated consist performance in value and equally 
weighted portfolios, as “Environmental Innovation”, “CSR Strategy” or “ESG Controversies”, it 
could be suggested, that portfolio performance is dependent on the individual factor and the portfolio 
construction characteristics, rather represents a trend. The results were supported strong explanatory 
power of the model, the R-squared in the long-short strategy. Similar coefficients were presented in 
the work by Kempf and Osthoff (2007). 
 In order to further explore the potential of ESG recommendations provided by Oddo and Cie 
broker, the performance of European and French portfolios was evaluated against portfolios of 
European and French funds, as well as Index portfolio.  
 In Table 3.10, the performance of equally weighted French SRI and European SRI 
funds’ portfolios is presented, as well as the Sustainable European benchmark portfolio based 
on the Stoxx Sustainability Index.
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Table 3.10 Fund and Index Portfolios: Europe and France 
 CAPM model Fama–French model   
Portfolio 
weights 
Alpha Beta Alpha Beta SMB HML 
Adj R2 
CAPM 
Adj R2 
FF 
Equally-
weighted 
European 
Fund 
portfolio 
-0.0071*** 
(-20.39) 
0.6067*** 
(56.69) 
-0.0072*** 
(-20.03) 
0.6213*** 
(45.61) 
0.1828*** 
(5.36) 
-0.0652 
(-1.86) 
0.889 0.902 
Equally 
weighted 
French 
Fund 
portfolio 
-0.0082*** 
(-20.36) 
0.5916*** 
(52.36) 
-0.0084*** 
(-19.46) 
0.5937*** 
(50.18) 
0.0952*** 
(3.97) 
0.0288 
(1.08) 
0.894 0.899 
Index 
portfolio 
-0.0053*** 
(-0.01)* 
0.6771*** 
(13.61) 
0.0063*** 
(-6.51) 
0.6201*** 
(16.71) 
0.2563 
(1.22) 
0.3121 
(1.96) 
0.467 0.484 
Notes: This table represents the combined results of a European equally weighted fund portfolio and an equally weighted portfolio of 
French funds, focused on the European universe. The table combines results for two methodologies: the CAPM model and the Fama–
French model. The second and third columns represent the results for the alpha and risk indicators of the CAPM model. The results for 
both equally and value-weighted portfolios are presented. The next set of columns represents the Fama–French model, including alpha, 
beta indicators, small-cap stock exposure and growth stock exposure. The adjusted R-squared indicators are listed in the two final 
columns. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level. 
 
Results reveal that neither European nor French SRI fund portfolios were able to 
generate abnormal performance. However the alpha coefficients appeared strongly significant 
for the CAPM and Fama French Models. Both portfolios have statistically significant beta 
characteristics. When controlling for the size and value exposure, both European and French 
portfolio performance appeared to be influenced by small-cap stocks. The results are 
statistically significant, with the impact having an almost double strength on the European 
fund’s portfolio, at 0.1828. Growth stock portfolio exposure was detected for the European 
portfolio, whereas the French portfolio is not exposed to the influence of growth stocks. 
However, the results were not significant. The CAPM model appeared to have strong 
explanatory power for European and French portfolios at 88.9% and 90.2% respectively. 
Similar evidence applies for the Fama–French model, with 84.4% and 89.9% of adjusted R-
squared indicators. 
The explanatory power of the model dropped down to 46.7% and 48.8% in the case of 
the performance of the Stoxx Sustainability Index-based portfolio, which demonstrated 
stronger performance when controlling for the size and growth effects, with the positive alpha 
coefficient at 0.0063. It could be suggested that the ESG implementation pioneers are 
relatively smaller growth-oriented companies. 
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Table 3.11 was generated to represent the comparison of Oddo’s data based portfolio 
performance and the European and French SRI fund portfolios.  
Table 3.11 Results Overview 
 CAPM model Fama–French model   
Portfolio 
weights 
Alpha Beta Alpha Beta SMB HML Adj R2 
CAPM 
Adj R2 
FF 
Equally 
weighted 
European 
Oddo 
portfolio 
-0.0033*** 
(-3.91) 
1.0123*** 
(49.94) 
-0.0040*** 
(-5.22) 
0.9978*** 
(71.84) 
0.4445*** 
(8.69) 
0.1013** 
(2.12) 
0.912 0.938 
Equally 
weighted 
French Oddo 
portfolio 
-0.0047*** 
(-3.72) 
0.9009*** 
(34.47) 
-0.0048*** 
(-4.50) 
0.9373*** 
(52.94) 
0.5078*** 
(11.62) 
-0.0385 
(-1.01) 
0.831 0.895 
Equally 
weighted 
European 
fund portfolio 
-0.0071*** 
(-20.39) 
0.6067*** 
(56.69) 
-0.0072*** 
(-20.03) 
0.6213*** 
(45.61) 
0.1828*** 
(5.36) 
-0.0652 
(-1.86) 
0.889 0.902 
Equally 
weighted 
French fund 
portfolio 
-0.0082*** 
(-20.36) 
0.5916*** 
(52.36) 
-0.0084*** 
(-19.46) 
0.5937*** 
(50.18) 
0.0952*** 
(3.97) 
0.028811 
(1.08) 
0.894 0.899 
Equally 
weighted 
index 
portfolio 
-0.0053*** 
(-0.01) 
0.6771*** 
(13.61) 
0.0063*** 
(-6.51) 
0.6201*** 
(16.71) 
0.2563 
(1.22) 
0.3121 
(1.96) 
0.467 0.484 
Notes: This table presents comparative results of European and French portfolios based on the data provided by 
Oddo and Cie against portfolios composed of European and French SRI funds as well as sustainable benchmark 
performance. All portfolios are equally weighted. The second and third columns represent results for the CAPM 
model evaluation. The next set of columns demonstrates the results of the Fama–French model.  The table is 
completed with the adjusted squared data for the CAPM and Fama–French models. *** 1% significance level; 
** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level. 
  
The analysis demonstrated strong statistically-significant results.. Portfolios combined 
on the basis of Oddo’s ESG recommendations– generated significant negative alpha 
coefficients, with 0.0032 differences in coefficients for European portfolios, adjusted for the 
size and value effects, and 0.0036 differences for French portfolios. European and French SR 
fund-based portfolios similarly underperformed the market with coefficients to be statistically 
significant. Market and size indicators appear to have significant impact in case of Oddo 
recommendations and SRI fund – based portfolios, however book-to-market exposure turned 
insignificant. Notably, market indicator coefficients are lower for the SRI fund-based 
portfolio in comparison to Oddo-based. Index-based portfolio demonstrated abnormal 
significant outperformance estimated with Fama-French model (1993).CAPM-estimated 
alpha appeared negative but statistically significant. 
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Overall performance of Oddo recommendation -based European and French 
portfolios characterised by negative abnormal returns with high statistical significance. As the 
ESG ranking scale was not provided, it performance was compared to the ASSET4 ESG-
based rating, SRI-based European and French portfolios and Index-based portfolio. In case of 
ESG-weighted portfolios, returned appeared inconsistent, yet with specific themes to 
demonstrate abnormal performance with statistically significant coefficients.. SRI-based 
portfolios demonstrated negative alpha coefficients with strong statistical significance for 
both European and French markets. Index-based portfolio generated positive alpha indicator 
estimated by Fama French model (1993). Further robustness tests were implemented to 
analyse the results. 
 
3.6 Robustness Test 
Robustness tests were performed for a deeper investigation of portfolio performance and the 
rating efficiency of the broker. Similarly to Kempf and Osthoff (2007), who implemented the 
long-short portfolio strategy to compare performance, this section applies a similar 
methodology to examine if the Oddo ESG index based portfolio generates better returns in 
comparison to the SRI fund portfolio alternative. Similarly to the analysis presented above, in 
this case Oddo-based European portfolio was long, and short portfolio consisted of European 
SRI funds. Same approach was implemented for French – based Oddo-based and fund-based 
portfolio. 
Table 3.12 Long-Short Portfolios 
 CAPM model Fama–French model   
Portfolio 
weights 
Alpha Beta Alpha Beta SMB HML Adj R2 
CAPM 
Adj R2 
FF 
European 
Long-Short 
Portfolio 
0.1226*** 
(9.7867) 
0.5428*** 
(3.1574) 
0.1226*** 
(9.6117) 
0.5876*** 
(3.1285) 
0.4878 
(0.9896) 
-0.2042 
(-0.4681) 
0.022 0.021 
French 
Long-Short 
Portfolio 
0.1141*** 
(8.0262) 
0.4497** 
(2.7657) 
0.1139*** 
(7.9121) 
0.4997** 
(2.9975) 
0.6443* 
(1.7678) 
-0.0771 
(-0.1960) 
0.021 0.016 
Sustainable 
Index Long-
Short 
Portfolios 
0.0021 
(1.5162) 
0.3352*** 
(6.4145) 
0.0024* 
(1.8498) 
0.3778*** 
(9.0356) 
0.1882 
(0.8163) 
-0.2197 
(-1.1647) 
0.149 0.164 
Notes: This table summarizes long-short strategy analytics. The methodology was applied as a robustness test in 
order to examine the performance of portfolios constructed on the basis of Oddo and Cie ranking versus portfolios 
constructed on the basis of SRI fund performance. The fourth row represents results of a European Oddo and Cie-
based long and SRI fund-based short portfolio performance estimated according to the CAPM model and Fama–
French model. The following column represents similar results for the French region. The next column represents 
long-short results with the European Sustainability index to substitute for the SRI European funds. The two final 
columns represent adjusted squared results. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance 
level. 
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The long-short strategy (Table 3.12) allows looking closer on the capabilities to 
generate an abnormal return by the Oddo and Cie-based portfolio. The test considers the 
scenario of Oddo and Cie’s long portfolio and short with the SRI fund-based portfolio. The 
first scenario was considered for European portfolios. The second one was for the French – 
based portfolios. The third scenario, long European stocks Oddo-based portfolio was 
analysed against European region, the STOXX Sustainability 40 return index (short strategy). 
As no specific sustainability index for the French market was identified, it was not possible to 
perform analysis for the French Oddo portfolio (long strategy) and French sustainability 
index.  
 The overall results indicated long-short strategy provides an opportunity for investor 
to generate abnormal returns with the long position in the Oddo recommendation-based 
generated portfolio and short in the SRI fund-based portfolio for both European and French 
market. Similar results are indicated for the long in Oddo-based portfolio and short in Index-
based portfolio. Although in CAPM-estimated scenario alpha results loose significance, in 
Fama-French case significance drops to 1%.  These results suggest recommendations to be a 
valid information source for ESS recommendations.  
Additional leg of analysis studies performance of small, medium and large-
capitalisation European and French Oddo’s information based portfolios. As suggested by 
empirical evidence, information distribution for companies with small capitalisation creates 
opportunity for abnormal performance due to lower analytics coverage. This was tested 
though implementation of CAPM and Fama–French models. Further, the long-short 
portfolios were introduced to continue the investigation of the performance of Oddo’s 
portfolios and SRI fund portfolios.  
Table 3.13 represents results for the equally weighted European portfolio.The equally 
weighted small-cap portfolio estimated through implementation of the CAPM model 
demonstrated a positive coefficient; however no statistical significance supported the results. 
Application of the Fama–French model revealed a positive alpha coefficient with statistical 
significance. The medium-cap portfolio did not demonstrate a strong risk-adjusted 
performance. Estimated with both CAPM and Fama and French models, the coefficients 
appeared negative in both cases, with the results for the medium-cap portfolio having no 
statistical significance. The model carries a strong explanatory power for small, mid and 
large-cap specifications. 
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Table 3.13 Equally Weighted European Portfolio 
 
Portfolio weights Portfolio capitalization 
Model 
 
Small Medium Large 
CAPM Alpha 0.0003* -0.0005 0.0011*** 
 
(0.38) (-0.56) (2.78) 
Beta 0.9108*** 1.0413*** 1.0655*** 
 
(24.75) (41.65) (73.04) 
Adj R2 CAPM 0.841 0.906 0.974 
Fama–French Alpha -0.0005 -0.0009 0.0006** 
 
(-1.22) (-1.28) (1.96) 
Beta 0.9048 1.0555 1.0465 
 
(41.98)*** (63.92)*** (100.62)*** 
SMB 0.8001*** 0.5727*** 0.1689*** 
 
(23.82) (13.07) (5.75) 
HML 0.0787** -0.0402 0.1085*** 
 
(2.01) (-0.78) (2.83) 
Adj R2 FF 0.938 0.950 0.978 
Notes: This table represents the results of the equally weighted portfolio analysis. The table represents the 
results for small, medium and large-cap portfolio composition. Two methodologies were applied for the 
evaluation: the first section represents the results for the CAPM model implementation and the second section 
introduces the Fama–French model. The adjusted R-squared indicators are presented after each model 
specification. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level. 
 
Table 3.14 Value-Weighted European Portfolio 
 
Portfolio weights Portfolio capitalization 
Model 
 
Small Medium Large 
CAPM Alpha 0.0021** 0.0029*** 0.0014*** 
 
(2.28) (5.12) (5.21) 
Beta 0.9718*** 1.0136*** 1.0165*** 
 
(31.38) (50.54) (100.58) 
Adj R2 CAPM 0.853 0.931 0.986 
Fama–French Alpha 0.0012** 0.0027*** 0.0012*** 
 
(1.91) (6.70) (-6.34) 
Beta 0.9635*** 1.0311*** 0.9961*** 
 
(51.07) (83.62) (142.18) 
SMB 0.7897*** 0.4816*** -0.0741*** 
 
(20.39) (16.17) (-4.63) 
HML 0.0885** -0.06312 0.1013*** 
 
(2.11) (-1.11) (4.21) 
Adj R2 FF 0.938 0.964 0.988 
Notes: This table represents the results of the value-weighted European portfolio analysis. The table represents 
the results for small, medium and large-cap portfolio composition. Two methodologies were applied for the 
evaluation: the first section represents the results for the CAPM model implementation and the second section 
introduces the Fama–French model. The adjusted R-squared indicators are presented after each model 
specification. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level 
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In the case of large-cap portfolios, a statistically significant positive alpha was estimated 
through the implementation of CAPM and Fama–French models.  
 The results from implementing the Fama–French model demonstrated similarity in the 
case of market exposure. The risk volatility coefficient reduced by 0.0106 points in the case 
of the small-cap portfolio. The market indicator remained above 1 in the case of the medium 
or large-cap portfolios. The SMB factor estimator demonstrated a statistically significant 
exposure to small-cap stocks. Interestingly, the portfolio of medium-cap stocks signalled 
value stock exposure in comparison to the small and medium-cap portfolios. However, the 
results appeared not to carry statistical significance. The explanatory power of the model 
increased with market capitalization improvement, with the R-squared indicator at 88.4% in 
the case of small-cap companies, rising to 97.8% in the case of the large-cap portfolio. 
The value-weighted portfolios (Table 3.14) demonstrated a stronger risk-adjusted 
performance in comparison to the equally weighted portfolios. The results attained through 
the implementation of the CAPM analysis estimated a statistically significant positive alpha, 
with the small-cap portfolio’s coefficient the strongest at 0.002 and the large cap portfolio’s 
alpha coefficient at 0.014. The results do not demonstrate significant outperformance; 
however, the small-cap portfolio appears statistically strong. The pattern of beta performance 
remains similar to that of the equally weighted portfolio, with only the small-cap portfolio 
coefficient demonstrating volatility slightly less in comparison to the market. The model 
demonstrated a strong explanatory power, with all specifications apart from the small-cap 
portfolio at above 96%. 
The alpha for the three portfolio specifications remained positive under the Fama–
French model-based analysis. The alpha coefficient of the small-cap portfolio dropped by 
0.0009 points; however, it is important to mention that overall, despite statistical support, the 
alpha indicators did not demonstrate notably strong results, and remained close to the market. 
Interestingly, both the small and large-cap portfolios demonstrated an influence from growth 
stock, whereas the medium-cap portfolio showcased a value-stock impact; however, the 
impact was not statistically supported. An r-squared indicator above 90% demonstrated the 
strong explanatory power of the model. 
In the case of the French portfolio, the accuracy in predictions and rating system 
could be assumed to portray stronger results. As the analysed data belonging to the broker 
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originated in France, a prime access to information could potentially provide an opportunity 
for analysis and prediction capabilities of the highest accuracy (Table 3.15).  
The performance of the equally weighted French portfolio (Table 3.15) indicated a 
stronger risk-adjusted performance, generating a negative alpha only in the case of the mid-
cap portfolio, as discovered after the implementation of both the CAPM and Fama–French 
models. However, these results did not demonstrate either positive or negative deviation from 
the market, according to the weak alpha coefficient. In addition, it should be emphasized that 
only the alpha performance of the small-cap portfolio appeared to be statistically significant.  
 
Table 3.15 Equally Weighted French Portfolio 
 
Portfolio weights Portfolio capitalization 
Model 
 
Small Medium Large 
CAPM Alpha -0.0040*** -0.0001 0.0005** 
 
(-3.51) (-0.12) (-1.48) 
Beta 0.6614** 0.972*** 1.0024*** 
 
(15.35) (26.33) (71.91) 
Adj R2 CAPM 0.642 0.84 0.957 
Fama–French Alpha - 0.0048*** -0.0004 0.0007** 
 
(-5.59) (-0.77) (2.13) 
Beta 0.6558* 1.0157*** 1.0258*** 
 
(18.11) (35.60) (83.39) 
SMB 0.7782*** 0.6953*** 0.1452*** 
 
(12.57) (13.32) (7.05) 
HML 0.1122*** -0.0049 -0.1097*** 
 
(1.69) (-0.11) (-2.92) 
Adj R2 FF 0.753 0.941 0.967 
Notes: This table represents the results of the equally weighted French portfolio analysis and the results for 
small, medium and large-cap portfolio composition. Two methodologies were applied for the evaluation: the 
first section represents results for the CAPM model implementation and the second section introduces the 
Fama–French model. The adjusted r-squared indicators are presented after each model specification. *** 1% 
significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level. 
 
Three portfolio specifications appeared to be exposed to small-cap stocks, indicated 
through the statistically significant positive coefficients. The medium and large-cap portfolios 
also appeared to be influenced by value stocks.  
The strength of the model’s explanatory power significantly decreased in comparison 
to the case of the European small-cap portfolio’s performance evaluation, which dropped 
down to 61.9%, although it still allows us to accept the outcome. In case of the medium and 
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large-cap portfolios, the explanatory power remained strong. The results of the Fama–French 
portfolio implementation appeared to be stronger, with 79.2% explanatory power. 
 
Table 3.16 Value-Weighted French Portfolio 
 Portfolio 
Weights 
Portfolio Capitalization 
Model  Small  Medium  Large 
CAPM Alpha -0.0023** 0.0011 0.0007** 
 (-1.75) (-1.41) (1.01) 
Beta 0.6991*** 0.9791*** 1.0084*** 
 (13.46) (23.12) (52.06) 
Adj R2 CAPM 0.59 0.842 0.962 
Fama Frech Alpha -0.0028** 0.0009* 0.0007 
 (-2.78) (1.72) (1.54) 
Beta 0.7243*** 1.0244*** 1.0064*** 
 (19.38) (27.74) (52.29) 
SMB 0.6883**** 0.651*** -0.0444* 
 (10.02) (3.08) (-1.77) 
HML 0.1319** -0.0387 -0.0058 
 (2.05) (-0.68) (-0.18) 
Adj R2 FF 0.711 0.932 0.962 
Notes: This table represents the results of the value-weighted French portfolio analysis and the results 
for the small, medium and large-cap portfolio composition. Two methodologies were applied for the 
evaluation: the first section represents the results for the CAPM model implementation and the second 
section introduces the Fama–French model. The adjusted r-squared indicators are presented after each 
model specification. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level. 
 
 The results for value-weighted portfolio are demonstrated in table 3.16. In contrast 
with the equally weighted portfolio, the value-weighted portfolio’s alphas of the small-cap 
portfolio in both the CAPM and Fama–French settings appears negative. It is also the only 
statistically significant alpha measurement in the value-weighted method setting, with 
another low-significant alpha indicator belonging to the medium-cap portfolio estimated 
through the Fama–French model. The beta indicators mimic the results estimated through the 
equally weighted portfolio, which suggests that the geographic aspect might have a potential 
contribution to make to the risk minimization process. Unlike the case of the equally 
weighted portfolio, the value-weighted large-cap portfolio demonstrates the expected 
exposure to large-cap stocks. The small-cap portfolio also demonstrates a statistically 
significant exposure to growth stocks. 
  Overall analysis indicated the results and alpha coefficients to remain statistically 
significant across stocks’ size variations, with large-cap stocks to demonstrate abnormal 
return generation capabilities for European and French Portfolios.  
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3.7 Conclusion 
The current study addresses issues, which broker dealers are facing due to implementation of 
MiFID II. New regulations, which are dedicated to improve transparency in the market, will 
have a strong impact on the operating model of sell-side brokers. Brokerage houses operate 
on the commission basis where clients are charged with fees after services are provided. The 
fees combine research and execution fees, which makes the structure not transparent. As new 
regulations come into power, brokerage houses are requested to disclose fee structure and 
separate research and execution fees. The research fees are required to be announced upfront. 
These measures would significantly increase competition and put the existence of small 
boutique firms under jeopardy. Therefore it is important for brokerage houses to find 
alternative ways generate value and to secure demand from the clients.  
This study evaluates ESG-related value creation opportunities for brokers following the 
example of the French broker and investment firm Oddo and Cie. The company developed an 
alternative ESG rating and issued stock recommendations in response to growing demand 
from French and European investors. Opportunities for brokers within an ESG framework as 
a subject are yet to be deeply explored by academics. Growing evidence demonstrates 
significant interest from the buy-side as suggested in Dorflietner (2015), as well as positive 
evidence of value creation opportunities associated with ESG (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010; 
Luo et al., 2014), making the framework a promising opportunity worth exploring for the 
sell-side broker.  
To estimate the value-generating capability of the ESG recommendations issued by 
Oddo and Cie broker, methodology based on portfolio analysis was implemented. Two 
geography-based portfolio were generated on the basis of provided recommendations: 
European and French one. As the broker did not disclose the metrics used to develop ESG 
rating and recommendations, ASSET4 data was used to create alternative ESG rating-based 
portfolio and evaluate performance of high and low – rated stocks on the bases of the thirteen 
chosen factors, which reflect environmental, social and governmental features. Equally 
weighted portfolio performance was further compared to the portfolio generated on the basis 
of European and French SRI funds, as well as European sustainability index-based portfolio. 
The introduction of SRI fund-based portfolios allowed the comparison of the value 
generation capability of Oddo’s portfolio in the perspective of the alternatives available. 
Long-Short portfolio strategy was implemented for robustness tests. 
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The results revealed the ESG recommendations developed by Oddo and Cie provide 
data, which allow generating statistically significant return, however the generated alpha 
indicator appeared negative. ESG-rating based portfolios represented similar strong 
significant result. The portfolios indicated positive and negative abnormal returns, 
suggesting, the performance results are indicator-specific. The only alternative, which 
indicated positive abnormal return, was index-based portfolio, however the results were not 
consistent. The SRI-based portfolio demonstrated statistically significant results with 
negative alpha. The robustness test revealed ability to generate abnormal portfolio returns 
through implementation of long-short strategy with Oddo-based portfolio in long position. 
From the analysis results, it could be suggested; recommendations provided by Oddo to have 
relevance, when implemented within ESG investment framework, and could be taken into 
consideration by investors. In other words, the study demonstrates, how brokerage through 
the implementation of vast data resource could implement ESG framework to generate 
alternative product for a responsible investment universe. However, the recommendation-
based portfolios did not deliver abnormal outperformance. This suggests further improvement 
could be introduced, to upgrade its competitive advantage characteristics. 
During the data analysis it was discovered that the French market does not employ a 
French sustainability index. This issue has not been addressed by the literature or the 
industry. However, as France holds the position of the leading player on the ESG investment 
market, creating such could provide benefits for market players as well as offering a market 
opportunity for others.  
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Essay 4: Returns to Corporate Social Responsibility in Private 
Equity? A First Exploratory Study 
 
 
Abstract 
Private equity is the industry where responsible investment practices, and the ESG 
framework in particular, have been adopted at a slower pace in comparison to other asset 
classes. The opaque nature of the industry makes it complicated to access the necessary 
information to examine thoroughly the ESG-related issues and opportunities. The author 
takes a further step to examine the factors, which hinders the process. Additionally, she 
presents an exploratory study of the connection between ESG-driven events and private 
equity multiples, which is based on the data exclusively provided by the industry participant. 
The study establishes that institutional investors and limited partners drive the interest in 
ESG, with tendencies to implement framework at the due diligence, investment decision-
making stage. Through a thorough evaluation of the existent literature the study identifies 
investor scepticism, the investment time frame, the lack of reporting practices and overall 
opaqueness to be amongst the major obstacles. The results of the explorative study 
demonstrate insightful information on the potential positive implications from ESG 
framework implementation for the investment portfolios of private equity firms.
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4.1 Introduction 
The implementation of environmental, social and governance practices into the 
investment process has been accompanied by a steep rise amongst financial market 
participants. Over the decade 2006 to 2016 the amount of assets under management by PRI 
signatories has grown from $6.5 trillion to $64 trillion as reported by Intertrust (2017). The 
equity is the leading asset class within the scope of ESG and has a strong presence of 
European funds in the market, evolving a variety of investment strategies to attract new 
investors (MSCI, 2015).  
 In contrast ESG adaptation in the private equity sector has moved at a visibly slower 
pace and investors are reluctant to utilize the new framework. Information availability, cost 
and resource constraint remain serious obstacles to the path of ESG adaptation, despite strong 
demand from institutional investors, as has been highlighted in numerous reports (e.g. 
Intertrust, 2017; Mercer, 2015). Despite the existing problems, some private equity firms 
have embraced an ESG perspective, motivated by the potential for improvements in risk-
adjusted returns and benefits for reputation risk management (Mercer, 2015).  
As ESG became a central topic to a growing body of academics, the lack of research 
dedicated to the process and practices of ESG integration within the private equity sector is 
distinctively noticeable. This could be due to the opaque nature of the sector’s activity, 
predefined by the lack of public reporting. In order to promote ESG implementation in the 
investment process of private equity firms, it is important to equip general partners (GPs) 
with efficient tools to do that and raise overall awareness of related methodologies and 
processes.  
This essay explores motivation, methodologies and constraints for ESG practice 
implementation within the private equity context to discover the key factors, which influence 
the framework’s development in the sector. The research is presented in the form of an 
explorative study focusing on the publicly available research and literature. It provides a wide 
overview of the current practices of ESG implementation applied by general partners and 
explores methodologies, motivation and obstacles. ESG-related practices on the equity 
market are presented as a comparison in order to identify the factors, which slow the process 
in private equity. In addition, the essay introduces a clinical study of the impacts that ESG 
considerations have on a company’s portfolio. This became possible due to the exclusive 
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accessibility to the data provided by the industry player. The study explored the impact that 
negative ESG-related events have on the portfolios.  
The results of this study provide further support for the evidence generated in the 
work of Cornelli et al (2015) that investors (limited partners (LPs) are the key sources that 
motivate ESG implementation, as they are links between ESG integration and risk mitigation 
and value creation. In addition, ESG is linked to a reputational strength. It was also found that 
the methodological aspect is characterized by a low development linked to poor information 
compatibility and the lack of publicly accessible data. The tendency of GPs to ignore the exit 
and hold stages during the investment process has been indicated in a few studies. Strong 
obstacles were revealed through an analysis of the literature. In comparison to the equity 
market, where information transparency and improving reporting standards facilitate the 
development of methodologies, private equity industry remains reluctant to the reviewing of 
reporting standards. Low information availability hinders methodological development, and 
the positive value creation implications are harder to notice due to the prolonged investment 
horizon. It could be suggested that, on the basis of evidence presented by the equity industry, 
reporting and information availability require a switch in the investor’s approach to create a 
positive environment for ESG implementation.  
The explorative study developed steps towards studying the connection between 
private equity and ESG on the basis of the evolution of the relationship between private 
equity multiples and ESG-related negative events. The analysis became possible due to 
accessing the information provided by the industry representative. Results revealed positive 
evidence of a connection between the two. 
The literature overview reveals a strong lack of academic work featuring extensive 
empirical analysis. 34  The majority of the available data was available through industry 
reports. As information distribution is limited in the sector, it hinders the growth of 
substantial academic background.   
 The study introduces a step further towards the theoretical landscape development. It 
provides an extensive overview of existent methodologies and obstacles, as well as drawing 
                                                          
 
34 It is important to note that after the second overview dedicated to the updated literature no new academic 
publications were available after the year 2015. PRI and Interstrust provided the only prominent overview on the 
subject available for 2017. 
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parallels to the equity sector to underline accurately the hurdles for ESG framework 
development. From a practical perspective, the empirical element of the essay represents 
evidence of a connection between PE multiples and ESG-related incidents. This is a strong 
indicator of a relationship, which could have a positive or negative impact on portfolio 
performance. 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explores the rise of the ESG 
framework in the context of the equity market, overlooking the motivation factor, applied 
methodologies and a review of the existent barriers. Section 4.3 introduces the ESG 
framework in the private sector. It explores the framework from different angles through the 
prism of the existent literature. It focuses on similar factors to explain why an ESG 
framework does not have a similar speed of growth in private equity. Section 4.4 presents an 
explorative study to determine the links between the ESG framework and portfolio 
performance, based on exclusive data provided by an industry participant. The essay is 
completed with a concluding summary. 
        
4.2 Evolvement of a Sustainable Investment Approach: The Equity Market 
and the ESG Framework35  
As mentioned, the equity market was one of the first sectors where investors addressed the 
material benefits of the implementation of the ESG concept. Therefore, it is worth taking a 
look at how the framework evolved within the sector, which might provide a better 
understanding of the way the process is being incorporated within the private equity market. 
 
4.2.1 Motivation for ESG Implementation 
Since the introduction of the UN PRI initiative in 2005, investors’ attention towards the ESG 
framework has increased dramatically. This was significantly fuelled by the growing 
evidence of material benefits provided by several reports and academic studies (PWC, 2012b; 
Khan et al., 2015; MSCI, 2015).  
                                                          
 
35 The literature and industry reports, which were analysed on the literature overview are summarised and 
presented separately in the Appendix 3. 
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 Existing reports highlight two main motivation factors for ESG adoption relevant to 
the equity market. The first is the growing demand from asset owners. According to the 
report issued by PRI (2015), asset owners are the most likely to incorporate ESG factors, as 
confirmed by 96.7% of respondents. They also expressed the expectations of managers to 
implement similar policies, as asset owners have a tendency to withdraw from managing 
assets directly, as was also indicated in the PRI report. Among asset owners, the pension 
funds and insurance companies, whose investment strategies tend to be distributed over a 
long-term perspective, appeared to show the highest interest in ESG implementation (BSR, 
2013; PRI, 2015).  
The second important driver for the expansion of interest within the investors’ 
community has been the growth of financial opportunities provided by ESG. For the past 
three decades a substantial transformation in the structure of companies’ market value has 
occurred, making intangible assets accountable for 80% of such value, as reported by the 
International Integrated Reporting Council (2011). Under these circumstances ESG indicators 
can be perceived as one of the most reliable techniques for the evaluation of intangible assets. 
The study for Deutsche Bank (2012) demonstrated evidence that a higher change adoption 
capability, a lower cost of capital and lower capital constraints were among the attributes of 
companies with reportedly strong ESG performance. Moreover, more evidence has now 
emerged which links long-term positive financial performance with the adoption of ESG 
concepts by investors (Mercer, 2012). This case is particularly strong for companies for 
which intangible assets, such as brand and reputation, have led to a competitive advantage 
(Eccles et al., 2011).  
The growing evidence of material benefits from the implementation of the ESG 
framework has motivated more and more investors who seek ways to improve the portfolio’s 
alpha by incorporating the methodologies analysed above. Two studies, by MSCI (2015) and 
Khan et al. (2015), have provided robust positive feedback on the financial potential of the 
ESG framework; particularly good results were achieved through the implementation of the 
ESG Tilt and ESG Momentum strategies, which both demonstrated outperformance against 
the benchmark in the study (MSCI, 2015). In comparison to these results, a significantly 
smaller pool of studies has covered the private equity field. The progress that private equity 
investors have so far made in the responsible investment domain is analysed in subsequent 
sections. 
154 
 
 
4.2.2 Mechanisms and Methodologies for ESG Integration within the Equity Market  
There are a number of mechanisms available for investors’ adoption. The choice of a 
particular mechanism is usually driven by investors’ motives. Quitinet (2012) suggested that 
the willingness to concentrate on either value creation or financial performance improvement 
lies behind the methodology of choice. However, on the basis of newly presented evidence, 
both aims could be embodied in one strategy. In practice, most of the companies tend to rely 
primarily on personal experience and combine several available methodologies, making each 
case of ESG framework implementation unique (Allianz, 2015).  
 Deep research and due diligence is the first methodological part of ESG 
implementation. Therefore ESG-related research and a precise evaluation of value generation 
potential is an important first step for investors. Involvement of sell-side research in the 
process positively accelerated the speed of this step (Intertrust, 2017).  
 As the ESG framework is mainly dedicated to reflecting the intangible aspect of 
business, quantification of the framework is an exceedingly complicated task for the 
investors. This is therefore a critical second step towards the implementation process. As 
highlighted in PRI (2017) quantification of the process through the improved data science 
approach and the ability to prioritize the impact of various factors in portfolio performance 
quickly resolved the efficiency issue.  
 After acquiring important information and developing the valuation method, 
further investment steps vary depending on the investor’s desire to engage in the management 
process. Amongst the first method to be adopted by equity investors was ESG screening 
(MSCI, 2011; Deutche Bank, 2012). This involves stock-picking practice, and is motivated 
by excluding the companies with a negative ESG record, or including the companies that 
have demonstrated a strong positive ESG performance. This approach has recently been 
largely abandoned as a central one, and is now mostly applied in connection with other 
methods (BSR, 2012).  
Another approach was defined as an ESG tilt in multiple reports (MSCI, 2011, 2013, 
2015; BSR, 2012). The concept suggests the use of a portfolio rebalancing practice, where 
the portfolio is overweighed with the company’s stocks granted a high ranking in the ESG 
rating of choice (such as the MSCI ESG, Thomson Reuters or Bloomberg ratings), as well as 
minimizing the weight of the stocks at the bottom of the ESG rating. The ESG rating is used 
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as a benchmark in this case. The methodology aims to grasp the return, while minimizing the 
risk exposure, through limiting the number of poorly performing stocks.  
An approach dedicated to a focus on companies that have demonstrated a significant 
improvement in their ESG ranking within a 12-month time frame is the ESG Momentum 
strategy introduced in the MSCI reports (2011, 2013 and 2015). The application of this 
strategy requires the investor to overweight the portfolio stocks of companies which have 
demonstrated a strong positive growth in the ESG rankings over the past 12 months, and 
underweight the stocks which have dropped in the rankings over the same period of time 
(MSCI, 2013, 2015). This strategy allows investors with a short-term approach to grasp any 
ESG-related opportunities, as it allows them to take advantage of any trends occurring in the 
market over a limited period of time.  
From available sources, it is seen how the techniques vary across different cases. A 
descriptive case is demonstrated in the report of the Itaú Company (2013), which developed a 
wide range of activities dedicated to the quantification of ESG-related information, both 
quantitative and qualitative. The range of activities implemented by Itaú include: an 
evaluation of the time estimation of factors, which could enforce cash flow generation; a 
quantification of social and environmental impact; an estimation of the time horizon for a 
potential event to have an impact on the target company’s performance; and the ESG-related 
activities engaged in or considered by the target company. The results of these steps allow the 
investor to choose the most appropriate ESG implementation approach.  
One of the approaches, active ownership, is based on the investor’s engagement in the 
management processes of the companies, which allows them to facilitate changes within the 
company’s structure with a potentially positive financial outcome. This is usually realized 
through tools such as voting, direct engagement in the management processes or engagement 
in a public activity related to promoting ESG-related policies. This set of activities goes 
beyond standard portfolio management practices, allowing investors to gain a better control 
over the company in order to secure its long-term dedication to ESG-related practices (MSCI, 
2011; BSR, 2012). In the equity sector active ownership is more accessible for large 
institutional investors, as smaller investors have a relatively minor stake within the company, 
which creates a limitation on their actions; in addition, active ownership undermines the long-
term commitment on the investors’ side, which is not particularly common in the equity 
sector (Institute for Responsible Investment, 2012). This practice has gained a wider 
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popularity within private equity investors, as demonstrated later in the essay.   
   
4.2.3 Barriers to ESG Implementation in the Equity Market 
One of the key components of the successful integration of ESG concepts within the equity 
market, as highlighted in the report of the Sustainalytics agency (2012), is the availability and 
compatibility of the related data, as the investors’ decision-making process is severely 
dependent on such factors. A few reports have demonstrated significant improvements in data 
availability over the period between 2005 and 2017 (BSR, 2009; Kahn et al., 2015; PRI, 
2015, 2016). Companies’ reporting practices have become more structured and open, and 
there are also now several ESG data providers on the market, such as Thomson Reuters, 
Bloomberg ESG Analytics AG and MSCI. The reports are strongly performance-driven. 
However, the voluntary nature of information disclosure hampers the data verification 
process (Itau, 2013). It is important to note that the context in which this data is incorporated 
by the investors has a significant impact on the type of investment approach, which is 
applied.  
 The integration practice has become more sophisticated over time as techniques of 
factor quantification became more widespread (PRI, 2017). The practice has become more 
systematized as well. Finally reports increase investment in resource development, which 
allows improving the quality of existing methodologies (Intertrust, 2017). 
 As highlighted in the reports, the equity market has strong drivers to grow ESG 
practices with no powerful impeding barriers, which explains the high rate of framework 
development within the sector.  
 
4.3 Private Equity and ESG Framework: Review of the Existent Literature 
The aim of the literature review of private equity is to identify which factors motivate and 
which slow down the process of ESG implementation. 
 
4.3.1 Concept Development and First Implementation Steps 
As the subject of the implementation of ESG factors within the investment strategy of private 
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equity funds is relatively new, the availability of studies and reports dedicated to this topic is 
very limited. Most of the existing reports provide either an overview of the existing 
methodologies and motivation factors for the implementation of ESG-related strategies, or 
guidelines for limited partners or general partners; only a very few studies provide analytics 
and statistics, most of which have been acquired through conducted surveys. A more detailed 
list of available reports is presented in Appendix 3. 
It can immediately be seen in Appendix 2 that industry reports prevail in the available 
information pool. The majority provide a reflection of the latest trends or implement 
recommendations and guidelines for investors, rather than performing any in-depth data 
analyses. One of the first attempts to analyse the economic impact of joining the PRI 
initiative was made in Teti et al. (2012), where the authors used the data from US private 
equity funds and demonstrated a positive financial impact from ESG engagement. Despite 
being one of the first data-oriented studies in the field, it provides limited results, connecting 
positive to neutral revenue growth to the participation of the funds in the PRI initiative.  
The majority of the available reports are based on the qualitative information gathered 
through interviews and interaction with industry representatives, which is in line with data 
shortage and the lack of reporting practices. Companies like Malk (2012, 2013, and 2015) 
introduce annual reports on ESG development in the industry and the trends amongst the LPs 
and GPs. Other reports, like those issued by PWC, focus on conceptual development.  
      One of the biggest trends in the research and reporting practices became an issue 
of methodologies and guidelines to support ESG integration. MSCI and PRI are major data 
providers in this field, with companies issuing up-to-date reports on the progress and 
introducing case studies (MSCI, 2013; PRI 2013, 2015, 2016). Despite the consistency of the 
reports and the theoretical insights, the representativeness of the data could be argued to be 
limited because of the few respondents in comparison to the market size (e.g., the number of 
PRI signatories was 936; PRI, 2015). Interestingly, reporting systems were not systematized 
and general partners’ communication over progress in the ESG grid implementation domain 
remained unstructured (Malk 2012, 2015).    
 The existing pool of literature represents an interesting overview of the work 
performed on the topic of the ESG framework within private equity. Investors’ positive 
attitudes and a growing recognition of the potential for value creation produce strong 
potential for further investigation. Despite some limited partners, as well as investors at large 
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who express a certain scepticism over ESG potential, others provide encouragement; risk 
mitigation also provides a strong stimulus for further development of the framework. 
However, a lack of empirical evidence leaves some investors reluctant to embrace the 
concept further. In the following sections, this study conducts a further in-depth analysis of 
the current stage of ESG grid integration into private equity.  
 
4.3.2 Motivation for ESG Adoption within Private Equity 
The acceleration of interest from private equity funds could be linked to multiple changes in 
the financial markets, such as increasing environmental concerns, governmental initiatives, 
enhanced regulations, growing demand from limited partners, the appearance of new sectors 
of investment interest, such as renewable energy, and the growing evidence of potential 
financial benefits (Teti et al., 2012; BVCA, 2013, 2014; Doughty Hanson & Co. and WWF, 
2013; Cornelli et al., 2015).  
Firstly, Cornelli et al. (2015) highlighted the demand from investors to be one of the 
key sources of motivation for general partners to take ESG strategies into consideration: 73% 
of small-sized funds (less than $1 billion), 67% of mid-sized funds ($1–10 billion) and 85% 
of large-sized (more than $10 billion) reported the pressure of limited partners to be the 
strongest motivation. A similar factor was featured as the key motivation for ESG 
development in the equity market. The authors provided evidence of value creation 
opportunities, which positively affected GP’s interest. This trend is also supported by the 
PWC (2015) and Malk (2014) reports. The fiduciary duty of limited partners to their clients 
to provide high-quality services aligned with recognized standards also adds to the pressure 
on them (BSR, 2012); in return, they also seek an improvement in standards of fund reports 
as a key tool to communicate the process of ESG integration. 
Secondly, risk mitigation, return growth and value creation opportunities, featured in 
multiple reports (Doughty Hanson & Co. and WWF, 2012; PRI, 2014; Mercer and Capital 
Partners, 2015; PWC, 2015), became a strong motivation factor. The report by Mercer and 
LGT Capital (2015, p. 10) indicated that 57% of respondents acknowledged the 
implementation of ESG factors as a positive influence on risk-adjusted returns.  
Additionally, reputation benefits related to ESG implementation were indicated as 
another motivational factor. In a highly competitive industry, a corporate reputation is one of 
the key intangible assets that can contribute to the creation of a firm’s advantage. A fund 
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could benefit from a positive ESG profile as there are greater chances to attract potential 
investments and funding, and a positive image facilitates the creation of a positive profile in 
the media (Mercer and LGT Capital Partners, 2015; PWC, 2015). In comparison, in the case 
of the equity market reputation did not come as a leading motivational factor, which could be 
attributed to differences in the investment time frame. In the case of private equity improved 
reputation is an important factor impacting on the value.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that external sources of encouragement for ESG grid 
adoption can come from government, the media and NGOs (Malk, 2014). The foundation of 
the UN PRI and similar initiatives (BVCA, 2012; PWC, 2015) has created an extra pressure 
on peers to address ESG-related issues in order not to lose a competitive edge. There are also 
growing environmental concerns and rising demand for ethical behaviour from society at 
large (BSR, 2012; BVCA, 2012; US SIF Foundation, 2013). 
 With these multiple sources of motivation for ESG strategy implementation, it is 
worth mentioning that, despite pressure from institutional investors, society and regulatory 
bodies, as well as the necessity to mitigate risk, these factors do not necessarily provide 
enough stimulus for the implementation of responsible investing practices. It could be 
suggested that the growth potential for value creation could soon change views on ESG and 
add a positive drive for its integration with investors’ strategy; however, another reason could 
be stronger obstacles, in comparison to the equity market. 
  
4.3.3 ESG Integration Process within the Private Equity Context 
The recent move of the ESG framework from being a factor in compliance to taking a central 
place within investment strategy development could be regarded as a signal of a positive 
attitude shift within the industry (Cornelli et al., 2015). The role of general partners in this 
process has played an important role, as pointed out in PRI (2014), as their commitment has a 
direct impact on each step of the ESG framework implementation process, from motivation 
and communication with the team to the success of an adequate technique development and 
evaluation process. 
  Each private equity investment strategy initially comprises three basic steps: pre-
investment, hold period and exit. The possibilities for ESG implementation evolve in every 
step of the process; however, numerous reports have suggested the integration of ESG factors 
in the earliest investment stage as an opportunity to gain the most benefits from the ESG 
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framework (PWC, 2012; BVCA 2012, 2013; PRI, 2014). 
The scheme of an ESG implementation process within a private equity context is 
presented in Figure 4.1, which is based on the information provided by company reports.  
 
Figure 4.1 Private Equity Investment Process and Opportunities for ESG Framework 
Implementation 
 
Source: Data for the Private Equity Investment Process and Opportunities for ESG 
Framework from BVCA (2012), PWC (2012), PRI (2014).  
At the pre-investment stage, the ESG framework is applied as a supporting technique 
to identify potential investment opportunities. During the screening process, which is the first 
step in the analysis, the ESG factors’ grid could be applied in order to assess the investment 
target for compatibility with the values of the investors, as well as to estimate any ESG-
related risk factors. Due diligence is another part of the pre-investment stage, and represents 
an in-depth evaluation of the potential investment candidate. This activity is often outsourced 
to specialist companies that provide a narrow range of specialized expertise, some of which 
focuses solely on ESG practice. The ESG-related due diligence phase allows the investor to 
assess company performance with respect to ESG practices, in order to identify any potential 
risks and predict any opportunities for value creation.  
  The next important step, which links the pre-investment and holding periods, is the 
investment decision. At this stage, the results of screening and due diligence are reviewed. As 
suggested in the investors’ guidelines presented by PRI (2014), ESG-related risks and 
opportunities can play an important role in the decision-making process, and come into 
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consideration alongside the financial forecasts. The results of the ESG surveys could also be 
used as comparative metrics when the private equity house explores different investment 
alternatives (PRI, 2014).  
 PRI (2014) also indicated that the investment agreement should be a separate stage, 
suggesting it as an opportunity to negotiate and develop further an ESG strategy with the 
management of the portfolio company. 
 The ownership stage is a central phase of value creation. At this stage, general 
partners take a significant part in the managerial practices of the portfolio companies, and 
focus on strategy implementation, which corresponds with the investment goals. Depending 
on the strategy dimension, ESG framework implication could potentially make a significant 
contribution. The responsibility for communicating ESG principles to the management of 
portfolio companies falls on the general partners, who are the key communication point in the 
process of framework implementation. The higher the level of engagement within portfolio 
companies, the more opportunities for ESG integration evolve. This practice is identified as 
active ownership in the private equity field, and has gained popularity among investors in 
recent years. 
Monitoring portfolio companies is another phase of engagement during the ownership 
phase. This activity allows investors to control the process of the implementation of ESG 
indicators. At this stage, the key considerations for investors include the quality of the 
process, the prioritizing of the ESG framework elements, the development of an appropriate 
toolkit for assisting in framework integration, the monitoring of related issues and the 
development of appropriate solutions, among other things.  
It is equally important for general partners to be able to communicate the progress and 
results with the stakeholders. This can be delivered through reporting practices. The demand 
for detailed reports by limited partners on sustainability and ESG activity has increased 
significantly over recent years. (BVCA, 2013; PRI, 2014). This trend, as suggested by some 
available reports, has stimulated the development of new reporting standards for general 
partners, which can be used as a prior communication method for demonstrating the progress 
achieved (BVCA, 2013; PWC, 2014).  
 The final round of the investment cycle is the exit stage. In BVCA (2012) it was 
suggested that a predetermined exit strategy could influence the ESG integration levels 
throughout the investment cycle. Taking exit through an initial public offering (IPO) as an 
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example, public scrutiny can play an encouraging role as an element of pressure on investors 
to provide more detailed reports, and in general to create a stronger reporting system. In this 
case, closer implementation of ESG factors could be even more beneficial for investors 
(BVCA, 2012). Nonetheless, no matter which type of exit is chosen by the investors, a 
detailed inside report on the ESG activity could become a useful source of insight on the 
chosen management trajectory.  
The lack of robust empirical evidence linking ESG implementation and financial 
performance is not a unique case for the exit stage of the investment circle, as was indicated 
in the previous section, but a common issue for the private equity sector. Some surveys 
suggest that introducing ESG factors for evaluation in the earlier stages of investment 
consideration and strategy development could potentially accelerate higher value creation in 
the long run (PWC, 2012; PRI, 2014; Cornelli et al., 2015). However, existent practices 
showcase GPs to be more prone to include ESG practices at the due diligence and investment 
decision stage, and less during the hold period. 
 
4.3.4 Methodologies of ESG Implementation in Private Equity 
Currently, a standardized set of tools for estimating the ESG-related contribution does not 
exist, and the majority of available techniques have been independently developed by 
agencies, such as MSCI (MSCI, 2013) or by the companies themselves, like the KKR Green 
portfolio (KKR, 2015) or Goldman Sachs’s programme GS Sustain (2015). In comparison, 
the equity sector demonstrated strong progress on quantifying the ESG factors, which 
facilitated methodologies. 
 Investors often associate ESG factors with an intangible aspect of business (Doughty 
Hanson & Co. and WWF, 2012; PWC 2012). The physical nature of the factors that might 
cause ESG-related problems, such as carbon emissions, global warming, climate change, 
human rights violation, child labour, bribery, corruption and others, clearly have a strong 
negative impact on companies and generate high risks for investors. However, most of 
private equity industry associates risks with the reputational aspect of business, which falls 
under the intangible factor definition. Therefore, the line between an actual contribution to 
financial value and intangible benefits, such as improved brand, reputation and stakeholders’ 
perception, becomes very thin, and appears to create a certain challenge for the private equity 
houses. 
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 Due to the diversity of evaluation techniques among the investment companies, it 
becomes hard to develop an approach to quantify them. However, a report by Doughty 
Hanson & Co. and WWF (2012) suggested two main forms of typology. 
 The first set of methods is based on the development of a metric system and indices. 
The purpose of these approaches is to identify and measure which ESG-related factors have a 
potential influence on shareholder values, and how strong the influence is within a certain set 
of companies over a certain time frame. This is achieved through the application of 
econometric analyses in order to detect the metric, or set of metrics, which can demonstrate 
the degree of correlation with stock price performance, the indicator of shareholders’ value. 
The higher levels of correlation represent the stronger influence of sustainability factors on 
shareholders’ value; even though the method appears very accessible, the main issue remains 
how to discover which of the existing metrics is most suitable for a specific case and 
portfolio. 
 Another range of methodologies is based on the bottom-up approach. This method 
implies finding a particular influence, created through the implementation of the ESG factors 
into investment strategy, on a specific element of financial performance metrics, such as cash 
flow or earnings. In other words, these methods are tailored to identifying specific ESG-
related drivers of value creation. This methodology is based on the implementation of 
accounting data. The level of ESG framework complexity limits the effectiveness of this 
range of methodologies; with every additional ESG factor, it becomes harder to estimate the 
programme’s effectiveness in the context of tangible and intangible business assets (Doughty 
Hanson & Co. and WWF, 2012, p. 23).  
 The methodologies described above represent a more generalized view on potential 
strategies, which could be considered by private equity houses, depending on their views.  
 Another interpretation of evaluation methodologies was presented in the report by 
Novethic (2009), which suggested the implementation of a thematic approach. This is 
characterized by establishing the portfolio construction process around companies with an 
environmental focus (renewable energy, climate change, water management, or waste 
management), sustainability approaches (agriculture or fair trade) or a focus on social 
prosperity (healthcare services). It is important to note that certain issues arise with this 
approach, as it encourages a narrow-angled view on the company’s activities, with the 
potential risk of overlooking any negative ESG impact caused by other important practices, 
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such as the company’s behaviour towards employees, management practices and shareholder 
relations. 
 The practices that were previously reviewed in this essay reflect a significant 
progress, which has put private equity funds on the path to adopting ESG practices. However, 
the lack of data compatibility and slow development of quantifying the ESG factors impede 
the development of the framework within the sector.    
  
4.3.5 Barriers and Criticism 
The slow growth of the engagement of private equity funds with responsible investment 
could be linked to a discrepancy in their investment horizons, as the investment cycle within 
the industry is arguably short, in order to see the rapid beneficial gains that occur with ESG-
related investment strategies (Chertok and Braendel, 2010; Crifo and Forget, 2013). The lack 
of rapidly generated evidence facilitates further investor scepticism towards the potential for 
value creation through the implementation of the ESG grid (PWC, 2013, 2015).  
Due to the lack of empirical evidence, the process of ESG criteria implementation in 
financial analytics has been limited. In addition, some investors have suggested, on the basis 
of the market efficiency hypothesis, that if such potential financial gains were possible then 
the ESG sector would have developed at a faster pace (Commonfund Institute, 2013).  
Another significant issue is the lack of standardized evaluation approaches. As strong 
financial performance is one of the key priorities for private equity houses, they practise the 
development of the framework in-house, according to surveys reflected in the report by Malk 
Sustainability Partners with EDF, Environmental Defence Fund (2013). This issue leads to 
significant discrepancies amongst data. Moreover, the variation in the provided information 
increases across different sectors and geographic markets, often making it highly 
incompatible. The survey carried out by Mercer and LGT Capital Partners (2015) suggests 
that institutional investors are not aware of the absence of clear assessment techniques, which 
complicates the process of evidence detection for value creation potential, and impedes a 
more in-depth adoption of ESG practices. 
  Information disclosure is another significant barrier in the sector. The agencies, 
which promote responsible investment approaches, have encouraged the systematization of 
evaluation and reporting standards. The UN PRI or Sustainability Accounting Standards 
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Board introduced and are constantly updating their metric systems and guidelines available 
for investors to apply in their financial strategies (PRI, 2013, 2015). However, the voluntary 
nature of the framework leaves investors to make a personal choice (RobecoSAM 2012; 
Malk, 2015). Moreover, despite the growing demand for the sector to become more 
transparent, a substantial number of funds still chooses not to disclose information regarding 
their investment activity.  
Finally, Cornelli et al. (2015) suggested in their study that the growth of the ESG 
concept and the quality of its implementation within the business environment has been 
hindered by the misallocation of ESG-related responsibilities to lower managerial levels, such 
as the compliance and risk management departments.  
We now look at the strong barriers which clearly impact on the speed of ESG 
implementation in the sector. Equity sector investors do not share the same level of 
scepticism; this is conditioned upon the faster speed of value generation visible for the market 
players as well as the longer history of practice implementation. Another strong barrier is 
information disclosure, which decelerates empirical investigation and the development of 
methodologies. The evidence suggests it to be crucial to encourage industry transparency and 
reporting practices to accelerate the adoption of ESG practices. 
 
4.4 Explorative Study of the Relationship between Private Equity Multiples 
and ESG Incidents 
4.4.1 Data Description 
As has been pointed out by numerous reports, the opaqueness of private equity houses’ 
activities is considered to be one of the biggest obstacles to research development (Doughty 
Hanson, 2012; PWC, 2013; Mercer, 2015). The opportunity for making a contribution to the 
scarce pool of research on the topic became possible due to access to the unique data sources 
provided by industry representatives and research bodies.  
RepRisk2 is one of the largest providers of ESG-related data in its class, starting from 
2006, with an extensive pool of information on non-publicly traded companies. The dataset 
provided by the company includes a full list of ESG-related incidents, organized by company 
name and year. RepRisk leverages a proprietary solution to monitor more than 80,000 online 
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information sources in 15 languages for controversial news items relating to ESG. 
Information sources include research firms, think tanks, government agencies, NGOs, 
regulatory agencies, Internet blogs, news websites and more. RepRisk’s solution searches for 
news items on controversial products and services, health and environmental issues, 
violations of international standards, violations of national legislation and supply chain 
issues. 
Another section of the data was presented by one of the largest industry players. The 
dataset was acquired from a private equity firm with an extensive coverage of three 
geographical regions: Asia, Europe and the USA. The available dataset represented 
information on portfolio companies with both realized and unrealized assets. Company, fund 
and management names were reflected in the dataset, with details on basic financial data, 
including costs, proceeds, net asset value, total value and multiples. The data covered 
information on deals at the start and close points, including data on enterprise value, equity, 
net debt, current revenue, EBITDA and net income. As a real-life dataset was provided for 
the evaluation, some parameters from the set lack availability, which had an impact on the 
analysis scale. Each investment was also ranked according to the internally developed 
system.  
 The dataset was constructed by matching the RepRisk data with the information 
provided by the private equity firm. The results of merging the two datasets and transforming 
them into the cross-section prepared for the analysis is summarized in Table 4.1. The time 
frame was set between 2007 and 2012. With regard to the regulations and restrictions on data 
availability within the private equity sector, all the data with the potential to fall under the no 
disclosure policy and classified as secret were hidden through a system of codes. The final 
overall dataset included over 7500 portfolio companies, of which 847 originated from Asia, 
2025 from Europe and 4672 from the US region.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Data Summary 
Geography US Europe Asia 
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 overall % overall % overall % 
Observations  4672  2025  847  
Companies matching the “RepRisk” database 1129 24.15 491 24.25 174 20.53 
Total amount of funds 185  149  76  
General managers 91  70  47  
Notes: This table represents the summary of the dataset, which was created on the basis of paring data from the 
PE fund and Rep Risk.  
 
4.4.2 Methodology 
Due to the novelty of the study, a substantial amount of work was performed manually. The 
first step included the merger of two data files in order to create a new dataset which would 
capture the ESG concept, expressed through the reflection of RepRisk data on the 
information obtained from the fund. In other words, all the ESG-related incidents indicated in 
the RepRisk dataset were transferred to the new dataset. The new file contains information 
about the incidents, source of information and date, and was also ranked according to 
“novelty”, “severity” and “sourcereach”. The dataset was constructed in a way to allow us to 
grasp the impact of negative ESG-related scenarios on the performance of portfolio 
companies presented in both initial datasets. Therefore only the events that occurred before or 
during the investment cycle were considered in the dataset.  
The dataset preparation was accomplished in several phases: 
 Manual data coding and matching to the initial RepRisk dataset separately for 
each region. 
 The datasets were then merged in order to create one spreadsheet covering all 
the regions. 
 Information on ESG-related incidents provided by RepRisk was added to the 
dataset. The file contained a description of the incident, with information 
source and data, and was ranked according to novelty, severity and 
sourcereach. 
 The dataset was rearranged according to the event information. All the events 
were divided into those that happened prior to the investment, and those prior 
to the exit date.  
The choice of methodology for the analysis was driven by the limitations caused by 
data availability. Despite the lack of variables to perform an in-depth examination, the dataset 
provided an opportunity to perform a preliminary analysis to detect the impact of ESG-
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related trends on the portfolio companies. The dataset was constructed in a form that reflected 
the impact of negative ESG-related events. Therefore, it was possible to perform a 
comparative analysis in order to detect any potential relationship. The limitations also do not 
allow making a conclusive judgement about the influence of the ESG factors, but only 
revealing the existence of interrelation. The evaluation was performed with the application of 
performance indicators from Invested Capital multiple, Revenue Growth and EBITDA. The 
companies were divided according to two scenarios: the companies which featured a negative 
ESG event (matched on the basis of RepRisk information); and the companies with no 
featured negative ESG event. To test the strength of the relationship the size factor was 
implemented. Four size specifications were applied: all companies; companies which did not 
demonstrate any growth on a chosen multiple; growth above the 25% level; and growth 
above the 50% level. The results are illustrated in the figures provided in the following 
section.  
 
4.4.3 Results and Analysis 
Despite the preliminary nature of the research, some positive ESG-related implications could 
be discerned from the results of the analysis.  
§Figure 4.2 represents the distribution of the multiple of invested capital. Data on invested 
capital was amongst the few fully available data points. The companies were categorized by 
size: less than 0%, 25–50%, 50% and more, and a portfolio of all firms. This division allows 
identifying the power of a relationship between company performance with and without 
negative events. The first specification of firms with no invested capital multiple increase 
graph has the lowest difference between companies with no negative ESG event and those 
which suffered negative ESG events. The difference grows in parallel with size specification. 
The final specification indicates the majority of companies, which demonstrated the strongest 
performance, to be those free from negative ESG events.  
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Figure 4.2 Distribution of Multiple of Invested Capital by ESG Incident(s) (%) 
 
Description: This graph represents distribution of multiple of invested capital by ESG 
incidents. Axis X is the size in relation of multiple of invested capital indication in percentage 
equivalent. It has four specifications. The first one represents which did not demonstrate any 
growth of invested capital indicator. The second specification represents all companies from 
PE firm’s list. The third specification reflects companies with invested capital multiple to 
grow between 25 % and 50% per year. The fourth specification represents companies, with 
annual growth of multiple of invested capital over 50%. Each specification reflects a group of 
companies, each group represents 100%. Further each specification indicates which 
percentage of total number of companies’ fir into a category, were companies involved in 
negative ESG-related event, and which percent of these companies were not involved. The 
percentage is captured by axis Y. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Revenue Growth per Annum by ESG Incident(s) (%) 
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Description: This graph represents distribution of revenue growth per year by ESG 
incidents. Axis X is the size of revenue growth expressed in percentage equivalent. It has four 
specifications. The first one represents group pf companies, which did not demonstrate any 
revenue growth. The second specification represents all companies from PE firm’s list. The 
third specification reflects companies with revenue growth indicator between 25 % and 50% 
per year. The fourth specification represents companies, with annual growth over 50%. Each 
specification reflects a group of companies. Each group represents 100%. Further each 
specification indicates which percentage of total number of companies’ fit into a category, 
were companies involved in negative ESG-related event, and which percept of these 
companies were not involved. The percentage is captured by axis Y. 
In Figure 4.3, the portfolios were analysed on the basis of revenue growth. This 
metric was chosen due to its popularity among private equity investors, as it provides 
estimates of business expansion and growth improvement. An indicator was also available 
from the dataset representing the full portfolio companies’ coverage. A similar methodology 
was applied. On the basis of the revenue growth indicator, companies demonstrated a similar 
pattern, however, with less steep differences. In the specification of companies which did not 
demonstrate any revenue growth, up to 70% had no involvement with ESG negative events. 
Similar results characterized all companies, on the basis of specification. The discrepancy 
between the top performing companies on the basis of the revenue growth indicator was 60%. 
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This result, similarly to Figure 4.2, indicated a connection between negative ESG events and 
company performance, based on the growing discrepancies between the two categories.  
 
Figure 4.4 EBITDA Growth per Annum by ESG Incident (%) 
 
 
Description: This graph represents distribution of EBITDA growth per year by ESG 
incidents. Axis X is the size of EBITDA growth expressed in percentage equivalent. It has 
four specifications. The first one represents group pf companies, which did not demonstrate 
any EBITDA growth. The second specification represents all companies from PE firm’s list. 
The third specification reflects companies with EBITDA growth indicator between 25 % and 
50% per year. The fourth specification represents companies, with annual growth over 50%. 
Each specification reflects a group of companies. Each group represents 100%. Further each 
specification indicates which percentage of total number of companies fit into a category, 
were companies involved in negative ESG-related event, and which percept of these 
companies were not involved. The percentage is captured by axis Y. 
The relationship between private equity multiple and negative ESG events becomes 
more clear, as the companies with an EBITDA indicator growth above 50% are barely 
represented by any companies affected by negative ESG events (less than 10% of the whole 
portfolio), as presented in Figure 4.4. This multiple was chosen as a widespread measure of 
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profitability that is widely applied in the private equity and financial sector. In addition, the 
dataset used for the analysis provided all the required elements. The figure in a way mimics 
the trends demonstrated in Figure 4.3; however, the results are more drastic.. The 
specification that included companies that did not demonstrate strong EBITDA data had a 
43.32% difference between those, which were and were not affected by negative ESG events. 
The all-firm specification demonstrated a 49.02% difference. The companies that 
demonstrated EBITDA growth at 25% and more annually performed 67.44% better, in the 
case of the companies with a negative ESG-related track record during the investment period. 
The portfolio that was built on the basis of top-performing companies, and included 
companies with a record of negative ESG-related events demonstrated the most significant 
drop in performance. Those companies generated low performance indicators in comparison 
to the overall portfolio with negative events; the performance dropped by 18.82%, which also 
a significant indicator in comparison with the similar results is shown in Figure 4.3. 
Moreover, the difference in the performance of the portfolio that included companies that 
were involved in negative ESG incidents was 86.65% worse in comparison to the portfolio of 
top-performing companies, where companies with negative events were excluded.  
 Despite the explorative characteristics of the analysis, the clear trend across the three 
multiples reveals a clear relationship with ESG indicators, presented in the form of negative 
ESG events. This provides a strong foundation for further empirical evaluation, and one 
which requires more detailed examination of the influence that the ESG factor has on 
portfolio performance, which would be possible with a more extensive dataset.  
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
The rapid development of an ESG framework across financial markets exposed a reluctance 
of private equity to follow the growing trend. The industry remains amongst the slowest to 
adopt new standards. This trend is accompanied with a significant lack of deep studies, as the 
private equity market has been largely disregarded by academics. This gap becomes 
especially visible in comparison to the equity market, which has attracted significant attention 
and empirical examination of various aspects of ESG-related subjects from both academics 
and practitioners.  
This study has presented a prominent overview of the progress of ESG integration in 
173 
 
the private equity context with the main aim to define the obstacles present in the industry. In 
addition, market participants provided the investment data, which was adopted in the 
explorative study, tailored to establish the relationship of private equity multiples and ESG 
incidents, as the second part of this essay. This study has provided a strong basis for more 
prominent empirical research, which requires in-depth data availability.  
A few dominating trends were detected to define ESG framework development within 
the private equity industry. Firstly, the main impulses for ESG implementation are based on 
the growing evidence of value creation and portfolio risk minimization opportunities 
(Cronelli et al., 2015), and stimulated by institutional investors and LPs. Additionally, the 
changing environment of the financial markets creates a positive environment for framework 
development (Malk, 2014; PWC, 2015).  
Further, as demonstrated in numerous industry reports, the integration process has 
occurred unevenly, with a major shift toward ESG implementation at the due diligence and 
investment decision stages (PRI, 2014).  
Thirdly, measurement techniques were reviewed. This appeared to be the most 
problematic area, as suggested by reports (Doughty Hanson & Co. and WWF, 2012; Crifo 
and Forget, 2013). This outcome was linked to low information availability. The majority of 
private equity firms rely on developing methodology in-house, which makes information not 
compatible across the industry. In comparison to the equity market, the quantification process 
was visibly slow, similarly complicated by information availability constraints. Another 
factor that makes the measuring approach hard to define is the thin line between financial and 
intangible benefits, which are related to the implications of ESG (RobecoSAM, 2012; 
Commonfund Institute, 2013). It has been established that the majority of existing approaches 
are based on the development of a metric system and the application of econometric analysis 
tailored to detect added value in the portfolio.  
Finally, significant barriers were identified. In addition to the complications with metric 
development, due to the investment horizon, which was significantly longer in comparison to 
the equity market, it is hard to demonstrate ESG-related benefits in a short period of time. 
This creates significant investor scepticism (Commonfund Institute, 2013; PWC, 2014). An 
additional big issue is the lack of reporting standards and information availability, which 
negatively impact on development in industry transparency (PRI 2013; 2015).  
The literature overview has revealed transparency, reporting practices and, as a result, 
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investor scepticism to be strong obstacles across the industry and to delay ESG framework 
development in the context of private equity. 
 The exploratory study of the industry player revealed valuable insight. Due to 
significant limitations in data availability it was not possible to perform an in-depth analysis; 
however the results demonstrated an overall trend of companies with strong multiples to be 
classified as those without negative ESG implication prior or during the investment period. 
These results provide evidence of a relationship between the ESG negative factor and 
portfolio companies’ performance.  
It is important to obtain more detailed data to evaluate the nature of this influence, for it 
would allow us to understand the influence ESG factors have on portfolio performance. More 
detailed datasets are also required to examine the opportunities to mitigate ESG-related risk, 
as well as to create added value. As this study has demonstrated, the increase in information 
sharing and the assistance of a private equity firm with a coherent standardized approach to 
measurement techniques can contribute to a more in-depth analysis which, in return, will not 
only attract academics but encourage investors to implement ESG on a deeper level and 
develop more sophisticated approaches. 
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Appendix 3 Literature Table 
Company/ 
name 
Research Year Description 
BSR Reporting for 
Environmenta
l, Social and 
Governance 
Consideration
s in the 
Private Equity 
Sector. Report 
for General 
Partners. 
Augu
st,  
2012 
Provide short overview on current stage of 
reporting practices for private equity funds, 
Stakeholder expectations and drivers for 
introducing ESG factors into investment strategy. 
The British 
Private 
Equity and 
Venture 
Capital 
Association 
(BVCA) 
and PWC 
Guide to 
Responsible 
Investment. 
2012 Growing acknowledgement of the financial 
proprietaries of ESG framework and growing 
investors’ interest towards the framework stands 
behind reports’ motivation. BVCA provided in-
depth PE industry overview and grasps how the 
interest towards ESG framework unfolds, 
switching from simple attempt to boost 
company’s image to understanding the hidden 
financial potential. Further, the report investigates 
key drivers for GPs to incorporate PE. Risk 
management is the top priority, followed by LPs 
demand; opportunities for cost savings and 
regulations pressure. The report also considers 
potential for ESG framework implementation on 
pre-investment, hold and exit period, with case 
studies for each step.  
The British 
Private 
Equity and 
Venture 
Capital 
Association 
(BVCA), 
PWC and 
Waterman 
Responsible 
Investment. A 
Guide for 
Private Equity 
and Venture 
Capital Firms. 
2014 Report on development of ESG-dimension in 
investment strategies of PE firms. Provides 
detailed guidance for implementing ESG factors 
into investment stage on pre-investment, 
investment and exit stages. Study also suggests 
potential option for reporting standardizations.  
The British 
Private 
Equity and 
Venture 
Capital 
Association 
(BVCA), 
PWC 
Guide to 
Responsible 
Investment. 
Putting 
Principles to 
Practice. 
2015 Series of reports continues, with new thoroughly 
explored case studies of ESG implementation on 
each stage of investment cycle. The style of 
analyses remains unchanged, and several case 
studies were transferred from previous report (3i, 
Terrafirma PE). Comparing to the first report, 
issued in 2012, these reports are mostly focused 
on case studies, rather than following trends in the 
industry.  
Commonfu
nd Institute 
From SRI to 
ESG: The 
Changing 
World of 
Responsible 
Septe
mber, 
2013 
Brief overview of existent responsible investing 
practices including SRI funds, impact investment 
and ESG factor implementation. Overview on rise 
of ESG, with showcase of practical 
implementation of ESG into investment process.  
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Investing. 
Cornelli, 
F., 
Ioannou, I. 
and Zhang, 
T. 
ADVEQ 
Applied 
Research 
Series. ESG 
Moving Out 
of the 
Compliance 
Room and 
into the Heart 
of the 
Investment 
Process. 
Febru
ary, 
2015 
Lond
on 
Busin
ess 
Schoo
l, 
Coller 
Institu
te of 
Privat
e 
Equit
y 
In-depth study on the rise of implementing ESG 
factors into PE investment strategies, supported 
by the interviews with LPs and GPs. The study 
overviewed the roots of pressure on ESG 
integration, existent barriers on strategy 
adaptations and explored existent policies and 
strategies in ESG integration. 
Crifo, P 
and Forget, 
V. D.  
Think Global, 
Invest 
Responsibly. 
Why the 
Private Equity 
Goes Green.  
2013. 
Journ
al of 
Busin
ess 
Ethics
, Vol. 
116, 
No. 
21, 
pp. 
21–
48. 
 
This paper focuses on French private equity 
industry, analysing the implementation of ESG 
factors in the strategy, which is commonly 
characterized as an “engagement” type. The data 
gathered from UN PRI, French PE firms and 
survey data directed to PE firms. Main finding 
supports the suggestion that managing ESG 
factors could facilitate value creation. 
DB Climate 
Change 
Advisors, 
Deutsche 
Bank 
Group 
Sustainable 
Investing. 
Establishing 
Long-Term 
Value and 
Performance. 
Climate 
Change 
Investors 
Research. 
2012 This report does not provide an overview on 
private equity firms’ activities; however it 
represents a big picture of studies dedicated to the 
entire spectrum of responsible investment, 
focusing on evolution of sustainability literature, 
sustainability and corporate costs, sustainability 
and corporate financial performance, and 
sustainability and fund performance. It compares 
studies dedicated to CSR and ESG separately, and 
includes analyses of practices of SRY funds. 
Doughty 
Hanson and 
Co together 
with WWF 
Private Equity 
and 
Responsible 
Investment: 
An 
Opportunity 
for Value 
Creation. 
2012  One of the broadest reports on the integration of 
ESG practices by private equity funds. The report 
covers the rise of ESG issues and the growing link 
between PE and ESG. It covers the possibilities 
for PE to implement ESG factors at the pre-
investment stage and provides an overview on the 
growth of active ownership trends. Another big 
part of the report is dedicated to the major trends 
in ESG, including valuation issues, understanding 
the link between sustainability and value creation, 
identification of key factors which impact on 
value creation, as well as the hurdles created by 
reporting policies. The report provides some 
statistical data.  
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ESG 
Analytics 
ESG 
Reporting in 
Private 
Equity. 
June, 
2014 
Brief on reporting requirements for IPO and 
increased regulations for ESG reporting. 
Global 
Sustainable 
Investment 
Alliance 
(GSIA) 
Global 
Sustainable 
Investment 
Review. 
2014 Overview on the rise of global sustainable 
investment 2011–2014. Growth of SRI funds, SRI 
strategies and market characteristics, overview on 
investors’ position and asset allocation approach. 
Statistics on investment growth by region 
introduced by investment size, growth and 
development of practices. Brief mention of ESG 
and statistics on overall investors’ engagement 
and trends in investment.  
INSEAD 
and Global 
Private 
Equity 
Initiative 
ESG in 
Private 
Equity: A 
Fast-Evolving 
Standard. 
May, 
2014 
After introducing the emerging role of the ESG 
factor in PE investment strategy, provides brief 
reflection on position of GPs on each of ESG 
aspects, as well as mentioning the Total Impact 
Measurement model and KPI approach, without 
analysis, followed by representative cases of ESG 
engagement by PE funds. 
Ioannou, I. 
and 
Serafeim, 
G. 
The Impact of 
Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
on Investment 
Recommendat
ions. 
Harva
rd 
Busin
ess 
Schoo
l, 
Worki
ng 
Paper, 
Febru
ary, 
2015 
Rather than focusing on ESG concept, this 
extensive study focuses on CSR, its development 
and recent shift in the perception of the 
framework. It helps to understand changing in 
reporting practices and the occurrence of a general 
positive shift toward RI appreciation.  
Malk 
Sustainabili
ty Partner 
together 
with EDF 
Environme
ntal 
Defense 
Fund 
ESG in 
Private 
Equity. 
Perspective 
and Best 
Practices for 
Managing 
Environmenta
l, Social and 
Governance 
Issues. 
2012, 
2013 
Provides annual reports on the development of 
ESG approaches within PE sector. The results are 
based on the interview of GPs and LPs, which are 
geographically allocated between North America 
and European regions. The report sheds light on 
motivation, stages in which ESG factors are 
integrated in the investment process, and analyses 
LPs position on the matter in more detail. Another 
substantial part of the reports focuses on the most 
successful practices funds implement to manage 
ESG-related risks and opportunities, divided into 
several categories: leadership, people, diligence, 
operations, metrics and communication. 
Malk 
Sustainabili
ty Partner 
ESG in 
Private 
Equity. Issue 
Focus: Large 
Enterprise 
Customer 
Sustainability 
Requirements 
Emerge as 
2014 Specialized report on how the views of the media, 
consumers and NGOs affect companies, and 
subsequently private equity funds and their 
position on ESG-related issues and strategies. The 
survey supports the idea of increased enquiries 
from customers regarding sustainability directed 
to companies. Some companies have their own 
approach to working with customers’ enquiries. 
However, as suggested in the report, it could be 
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Drivers of 
ESG 
Management. 
more beneficial for GPs to develop their own 
evaluation technique in order to navigate potential 
risks related to portfolio companies and their 
customer relations. So far GPs have not 
demonstrated a standardized approach to meet the 
enquiries.  
Malk 
Sustainabili
ty Partner 
ESG in 
Private 
Equity. ESG 
Becoming 
Core to 
Investment 
Process. 
2015 One of the latest reports on ESG trends. The 
report is based on the interviews of GPs and LPs. 
Statistics represent growing role of ESG in the 
investment strategy. Majority of LPs especially in 
Europe consider ESG as one of the most 
significant factors during the manager’s selection 
process. The key results of the survey indicated 
that NGO and media power in affecting 
company’s image has risen, therefore managing 
ESG effectively is important. A significant shift in 
perception of ESG has occurred as GPs see it as a 
crucial risk management technique, rather than 
adopting ESG due to LPs’ demand.  
Mercer Shedding 
Light on 
Responsible 
Investments: 
Approaches, 
Returns and 
Impacts. 
Nove
mber, 
2009 
A literature review rather than a report on existent 
studies, mainly focuses on increased acceptance 
of environmental, social and governance factors 
affecting financial performance, as well as 
overviewing the negative screening approach. 
However, no link or mention of the private equity 
sector is made.  
Mercer and 
LGT 
Capital 
Partners 
Global Insight 
on the ESG in 
Alternative 
Investing. 
Marc
h, 
2015 
One of the very few detailed reports based on the 
results deducted from the survey of pension funds, 
asset management firms, 
endowments/foundations, insurance companies, 
banks, sovereign wealth funds and family offices 
on a global perspective. The report comprises 
insight into the volume of ESG criteria integration 
into investment process, motivation and 
expectation linked to it, as well as studying 
existent issues and firstly tries to preview future 
opportunities for the sector. The results suggest 
that the practice is growing; three-quarters of 
respondents implement ESG criteria, which 
demonstrates supportive evidence of growing 
interest in ESG from the private equity sector.  
MSCI Optimizing 
Environmenta
l, Social, and 
Governance 
Factors in 
Portfolio 
Construction.  
Febru
ary, 
2013 
Guidance to implement ESG factors in the 
portfolio to measure risk and performance for 
institutional investors. Showcases the process on 
the bases of three strategies: “ESG worst in class 
exclusion”, “simple ESG tilt” and “ESG 
momentum”. The results were limited given the 
short time frame; however the third strategy 
demonstrated positive risk-adjusted performance, 
whereas other results were slightly negative or did 
not show any improvements. 
Novethic Where Does 
Private Equity 
Business 
July 
2009, 
Worki
One of the earlier works on studying the 
implementation of ESG factors within private 
equity investment universe. Working paper did 
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Stand on the 
Integration of 
ESG Issues? 
ng 
Paper 
not demonstrate high integration of any statistics, 
limiting the overview by covering global trend of 
years 2008 and 2009. Further deepening into why 
private equity turned to adopt ESG screening after 
the recession. Also the switching to an overview 
of existing practices and strategies, hurdles (such 
as business diversity, lack of structure and 
reporting standards) and poor availability of 
financial research. The final part focuses on 
drivers for ESG-related strategies and provides 
some recommendations. 
PGGM PGGM 
Responsible 
Investing in 
Private 
Equity. 
Augu
st, 
2014 
Provides guidance and expresses expectation from 
the position of LPs to GPs. 
PRI Responsible 
Investment in 
Private 
Equity. 
June, 
2011 
Another complete guide for GPs with detailed 
introduction of possibilities for creating ESG-
based portfolios. 
PRI Integrating 
ESG in 
Private 
Equity. A 
Guide for 
General 
Partners.  
2014 One of the most complete guides for detailed 
direction of possibilities for ESG implementation 
into every stage of investment. Supported by 
examples. 
PRI Report on 
Progress  
2015 Summarizes the programme of the sustainable 
investment industry over the past year. Provides 
representative statistical data of positive moves 
and growing share of PRI portfolios. Reported 
growing interest from asset owners; however there 
is a lack of deep integration into strategic 
decisions. The report suggests asset owners to be 
the key driver for ESG implementation and better 
transparency from investment managers. 
PWC Do Investors 
Care about 
Sustainability
? Seven 
Trends 
Provide 
Clues. 
Marc
h, 
2012 
The report provides an overview of investors’ 
changing attitudes towards sustainability and the 
ESG grid. It is based on seven key trends, which 
prove expectations to be positive: (1) ESG 
concept gains popularity with shareholders; (2) 
unwavering sustainable investment growth; (3) 
positive interdependence between ESG factors 
and financial performance; (4) foundation of 
related initiatives and ESG data providers; (5) 
involvement of data providers’ sector leaders, 
such as MSCI; (6) growing demand from 
institutional investors. 
PWC Responsible 
Investment: 
Creating 
Value from 
Environmenta
l, Social and 
May, 
2012 
PWC presents its view and provides some 
recommendations for such factors as drivers and 
procedures, and analyses possibilities and issues 
in measuring value created through ESG-
integration practices. Also points out that 
extracting value created through ESG is hard to 
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Governance 
Issues. 
deduct and is not necessarily viewed as financial.  
 
 
PWC Putting the 
Price into 
Value. 
2013 The report addresses the issue of communicating 
the value created through ESG-related practices. 
The report focuses on GPs’ perspective and is 
based on the survey of 108 PE houses from 13 
countries. With a short statistically supported 
review of GPs’ position towards ESG, the report 
focuses on the necessity of creating standardized 
value assessment practices.  
PWC Bridging the 
Gap: Aligning 
the 
Responsible 
Investment 
Interests of 
Limited 
Partners and 
General 
Partners. 
2015 One of the newest researches, targeting the lack of 
dialogue between LPs and GPs on the PRI matter. 
The report is based on a sample of 60 LPs in 14 
countries, which collectively allocate around $500 
billion to private equity fund managers. Majority 
of LPs believe in future growth of ESG and 
consider it as one of the key factors for investment 
decisions. As well as risk management, corporate 
values and reputation management were named as 
top three motivating factors for ESG 
consideration. Growing number of LPs considers 
quantitative gains from ESG. However, this study 
supports evidence of hesitance among investors 
regarding the possibility of creating tangible 
value. 
RobecoSA
M 
Sustainabili
ty Investing 
Responsible 
Investing in 
Private 
Equity. 
ESG 
Engagement 
Report. 
2013 An investment company with global presence, 
which focuses on responsible investing, provides 
annual report on the results of its engagement with 
PE funds. The company was one of the pioneers, 
which established its own PE Fund programme in 
2006. Every year the company provides ESG 
assessment of the program, which currently 
includes seven programs. It is based on the KPI 
evaluation approach, handled through a survey of 
66 fund managers. This is an investors’ report, 
crafted to reflect fund activities to LPs. This study 
represents an example of reporting practices. The 
report highlights overall ESG performance of the 
PE funds on a yearly basis, assessing ESG policy, 
strategy and environmental, social and governance 
performance, on the basis of scores attributed by 
the respondents. Another key aspect of the report 
investigates the influence of fund size, fund 
vintage year, investment region, PE segment and 
how UN PRI subscription affects ESG 
performance. 
RobecoSA
M 
Sustainabili
ty Investing 
Responsible 
Investing in 
Private 
Equity. 
ESG 
Engagement 
Report. 
2014 This report continues the RobecoSAM ESG 
series. It represents the analysis of a “company’s 
engagement with private equity funds on ESG 
integration” (RobecoSAM 2014, p. 4). An 
example of a report to investors, based on the 
ESG assessment of seven programmes through a 
survey of 79 fund managers. 
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Teti, I., 
Dell’Acqua 
and Zocchi 
UN PRI and 
Private Equity 
Returns. 
Empirical 
Evidence 
from US 
Market. 
Investment 
Management 
and Financial 
Innovations, 
Vol. 9, Iss. 3 
2012 The paper examines if the loyalty to PRI 
principles adds economic value for PE funds in 
the USA. The dataset is analysed in the article 
using multivariate regressions on the funds; 
returns, using UN PRI compliance variable as an 
explanatory one. The outcomes demonstrate 
positive economic contribution from UN PRI 
compliance. 
US SIF 
Foundation 
The Impact of 
Sustainable 
and 
Responsible 
Investment. 
Septe
mber, 
2013 
A report taken from the sustainable perspective. It 
encloses positive influence created through 
implementation of responsible investment, such as 
growing options for investors, benefits of active 
ownership and engagement, contributions to 
communities and individuals, and changes in 
public policies and standards for organizations.  
Notes: This table represents  summary of studies and industry reports dedicated to the 
topics of ESG and Private equity 
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Conclusion 
C.1 Summary   
Responsible investment is an ever growing topic in the academic field as well as in 
the financial sector. Interest to this subject remains high from both communities. 
Nevertheless, as sustainable approach in business and investment is characterised by steady 
growth, it unravels more and more unanswered questions, which creates an exciting research 
opportunity.  This thesis represents a kaleidoscopically arranged set of essays, which not only 
evolve around ESG implementation issues within setting of various financial market 
participants, but makes a step further to embed a subject which is closely linked to 
sustainability – reputation management. Different from the first glance, academic literature 
reveals both subjects to be centric for the CSR area. As it was indicated in numerous studies, 
firms, which tackle sustainability approach to business highly prioritise reputation (Sarbutts, 
2003; Adams, 2008, Robinson et al, 2011). Therefore, the closer look was taken on firm’s 
reputation management interest, and reputations power over time.  It set a challenging task to 
disclose a theme of reputation management, as it is a key contributing factor to the subject of 
ESG.  
This thesis unravels with the essay dedicated to reputation management. Academic 
studies indicated, that addressing sustainability gives a strong positive boost to company’s 
reputation. It is common to find literature, which addresses sustainable business approach and 
reputation management in one dimension, and advocates CSR to be a strong reputation 
management tool (Robinson et al, 2011). However, academic discussion over if reputation 
management works remains on-going. This essay addresses this question, and explores the 
power of reputation management remains strong over time. Understanding the power of 
reputation management over time is an important factor for company’s strategic 
development.  
For analysis the essay investigates Fortune’s “America’s Most Admired Companies” 
rating. If company expresses interest in reputation management and willing to improve it, it 
could be reflected in its ranking. Therefore this essay addressed the company performance as 
measured by reputation scores over a time period from 1985 to 2010. Reputation ranking is a 
popular method of reputation measurement. Fortune’s ranking is a widely accepted by 
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academics and practitioners. It has existed over three decades, and encompasses a broad 
range of industries, which makes as well-fitted sample for the analysis.  
The study included two empirical strategies dedicated to assess firm’s concerns over 
reputation management and assess reputation power over time: first the ordinary least square 
model was applied. The results indicated suggested firms’ concern over reputation 
management be related to its performance in the ranking. Reputation appeared to remain 
powerful over the period of four year. In the second empirical strategy the data was addressed 
as unbalance panel. Applied model accounted for firms’ fixed effects. Under this empirical 
approach it appeared, that reputation power reduces down to two years.  
This essay expanded a relatively narrow pool of studies, which overlook the timing 
aspect in the context of reputation (Shultz et al (2001); Roberts and Dowling (2002); Ang and 
Wight (2009)). Positive outcomes of the analysis indicate, that firm’s concerns over 
reputation management pay off. The power reputation appears to have strength over two 
years, which bring valuable implication for strategy planning.  
Further essays move to the sustainability topics. The second essay tackles the topics 
of fund survival. It adopted survival analysis, which evolved from medical literature, and 
previously had a major implication to study survival in the context of IPO, as demonstrated 
studies of Suret (2011), Espenlaub et al (2012) and Espenlaub et al (2016).  
The ex ante basis approach was applied to the data analysis. The dataset was based on 
the previous study of  Kreander et al. (2005). Authors matched pairs on the basis of age, size, 
origin and investment universe at the end and middle of the sample, which provided a cross-
section which allowed to study the survival.  
The survival rates among ethical funds appeared to be significantly stronger in 
comparison to non-ethical ones. Only 10 non-ethical funds out of the 30 examined by 
Kreander et al. (2005) survived after 2002, when the analysis terminated. In comparison, 18 
ethical funds remained in operation, which suggests an advantage of the ethical funds over 
conventional funds in a long-term perspective. Survival analysis revealed SRI funds to 
demonstrated stronger survival capabilities, which were attributed to the ethical specification 
of the fund.  
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The evaluation of ethical and non-ethical portfolio performance did not indicate 
significant abnormal performance. Both ethical and conventional funds demonstrated positive 
risk mitigation ability.  
The next essay challenges the subject of sell-side broker and ESG rating. This study 
combines two subjects that were previously poorly addressed in academic literature, due to 
the lack of interest from the sell-side brokers in the subject. However, as new regulations 
have been introduced - MiFID II, it is expected to significantly impact brokers operation 
model, to tighten competition, facilitates transparency, and change the fees structure. 
Therefore, as brokers seeking for opportunity to maintain competitiveness and find new 
opportunity to generate the value, ESG could open doors to previously unexplored territories. 
 The empirical chapter of the essay was based on the data, provided by sell-side 
broker. The company generated ESG recommendations, as an alternative to the services 
selection they offer. There is significant demand for ESG rankings and recommendations on 
the market (Fowler and Hope 2007; Richardson and Cragg, 2009; Chatterji et al., 2009), as 
well as no established regulations approach or standardized requirements for issuing ESG 
ranking. These factors create positive market opportunity for new entrants (Fowler and Hope 
2007; Richardson and Cragg, 2009), and, as brokerage houses have extensive access to data 
and research capabilities, these factors provides them with strong prerequisites to implement 
ESG and develop ESG ranking in-house. 
 The analysis focused on the two portfolios generated on the basis of the rating 
provided by the sell-side broker. The portfolios included European and French stocks (due to 
the origin of the sell-side broker). Based on the data an ASSET4 ESG-rating based portfolio 
was introduced. In addition, the portfolio performance was compared to the performance of 
the alternative SRI-fund based portfolios from France an Europe origin. 
 The results appeared to be strongly significant. The ESG ranking based portfolios did 
demonstrated significant alpha coefficient, however the results were not consistent, and were 
theme-specific. Recommendation-based portfolios generated negative alpha similar to the 
alternative SRI fund-based portfolio. When implementing long-short strategy, Oddo 
recommendations – based portfolio indicated abnormal return generation opportunity. These 
results suggest, that portfolio generated on the basis of Oddo and Cie recommendations could 
have competitive potential amongst other alternatives within the ESG unoverse. Overall, it 
suggests that broker ESG recommendations could provide feasible informaiotn to the market 
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with high demand for the ESG data, yet it could be further improved to be able to generate 
abnormal returns.  
 The final essay explore yet another area participants, where ESG implementation 
process occurs at a slower paste.  This study is an in-depth exploration of the growing 
stimulus that private equity industry firms now have to increase their level of ESG framework 
engagement; it also introduced first case study of the real world data. From industry reports it 
became evident that a lack of empirical results still creates a general level of scepticism 
among certain groups of investors. Poor reporting practices and lack of a standardized 
approach hamper further take up of the ESG concept. As reporting regulations are free for 
interpretation, the data issued by the industry participants have been characterized by a low 
compatibility level.  
 Despite the existing obstacles, practices of ESG implementation have become more 
common in the private equity sector. There are opportunities for ESG to evolve at every stage 
of the investment process, as the reports reveal. Screening and due diligence have been 
applied at the pre-investment stage, the evaluation of any ESG-related risks and opportunities 
during the study of the investment decision, and the negotiation of ESG-related topics at the 
stage of the investment agreement; the implementation of the ESG process at the ownership 
stage includes engagement, monitoring, and reporting activities; during exit a firm can re-
evaluate and assess its ESG techniques, as well as assessing pricing during the final stage.  
 The study has also revealed that measurement techniques are a challenging question 
for companies due to intangible nature of the ESG framework, making it complicated to 
assess the framework’s implementation contribution.   
 The data provided by an industry participant allowed us to create a unique dataset, 
which reflected the impact of ESG-related negative activities on the company, included in the 
portfolio of the industry players. The evaluation of the cross-section demonstrated the strong 
influence on portfolio performance caused by negative ESG-related events; an especially 
strong influence was perceived for large-cap companies.   
 Overall, this study has provided a first look at the relationship between ESG and the 
private equity industry, demonstrating the growing potential for the framework to develop. It 
also as presented the first elements of influence that ESG can have on portfolio performance.  
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C.2 Contributions 
 This first essay expands the literature dedicated to reputation management and 
the reputation persistence. It expands the pool of study, which focuses on Fortune’s AMAC 
ranking, such as Fombrun and Shanley, (1990), Black et al. (2000), Shultz and Ervorder 
(1998), Argenti and Forman (2000;), Deephouse (2000), Fombrun and Rindova (2000). The 
pool of academic literature dedicated to reputation management is notably focus on the 
financial benefits related to reputation (Brown and Perry, 1994; Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Ali 
et al., 2015; Weng and Chen, 2017). This study expands the methodology to seek the signs if 
reputation management could bring positive outcome. 
 This essay further broadens the studies dedicated to the reputation endurance.  
Previous studies indicated the longevity of reputation based on the evidence from the Danish 
reputation ranking (Shultz et al, 2001). Another evidence of reputation longevity evolved 
from the studies, which prioritised finical performance, as the study of Roberts and Dowling 
(2009), which revealed firms persistent financial performance to be linked with strong 
positive reputation.  Similarly, Ang and Wight (2009) supported indicated endurance in 
financial performance and longevity reputation effects. This study took the persistence as the 
prime focus, revealing the power of reputation to last over a prior of time. 
 The second essay provides two valuable contributions to the existing pool of 
research dedicated to SRI portfolio performance. The study addresses the survivorship bias, 
which was indicated in the studies of Bauer et al. (2005), Kempf and Osthoff (2008) and 
Renneboog et al. (2008). This study differentiates from previous studies, which mainly 
highlighted survival in descriptive statistics, and introduces a full-scale analysis. It explores 
the stronger financial characteristics of ethical fund survival, which was indicated, but not 
addressed in the research, through the implementation of survival analysis. This study 
provided evidence of stronger survival capabilities to be attribution of ethical specification. 
 It expands the boundaries of empirical implantation of survival analysis, as it was not 
applied to study SRI funds. The method is originated in the medical literature and was 
previously applied in assessment of survival in the area of IPO, as featured in the papers of 
Carpentier and Suret (2011), Espenlaub et al (2012) and Espenlaub et al (2016). 
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 The results make important contribution for the literature, which focuses on the fee 
structure of asset management companies. Previously of Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) studied the 
dependence of the size from the fund to be defined as SRI or conventional. This study 
suggests, that SRI funds could improve the longevity of the fees, as SRI funds are 
characterised by the higher survival rates.  
 Brokers gave very little research coverage to the involvement into ESG topics. The 
third essay bridges the literature dedicated to the sell-side broker and ESG.  
As this essay analyses the attempt to create an alternative service by a sell-side broker 
through development of an ESG ranking and recommendations, the practical and theoretical 
contributions come increasingly close. The study presented a detailed overview to identify 
the impact new regulation has on sell and buy-side brokers, as industry reports lack 
consistency (Bloomberg, 2017; KPMG, 2017). From a practical perspective, it overviews an 
example, which could be increasingly relevant for the companies, which are looking for the 
alternative value generation opportunities and consider entering the ESG space. 
From the theoretical perspective, this essay adds diversity to the literature dedicated to 
the ESG and ESG ranking. In Chatterji and Levine (2006), Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010), 
Delmas and Blass (2010) and Dorfleitner et al. (2015) the authors explore the development 
and application of various sustainability rankings. Escrig-Olmedo et al. (2010) highlighted 
the rising importance of sustainability rankings as an instrument to encourage investors to 
adopt sustainable investment approaches. Chatterji and Levine (2010) highlighted the 
diversity of ranking systems and the criteria applied, linking it to compatibility issues and 
investor confusion. Regardless, the rising trend for ESG implementation encourages investors 
to seek for a reliable ranking system. As sell-side brokers have compatible information 
resources, they could provide strongly competitive services in competition with similar 
products within ESG scope. 
 The forth essay develops a profound literature overview to explore the motivation and 
obstacles for ESG framework to penetrate private equity sector. It introduces complete an 
overview of existing reports, emphasizing the current stage of private equity industry’ and 
general partners engagement with the ESG framework, focusing on its potential and benefits, 
examining the existing implementation techniques, and highlighting the existing issues. As 
works of Teti et al (2012) Cornelli et al (2015) attempted to investigate ESG implication for 
private equity sector, this study implement empirically-improved primary evidence of the 
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potential influence of ESG-related factors on portfolio performance, providing a significant 
stimulus for further analysis, moving the research further  
 
C.3 Limitations 
 The scope of analysis presented in the four essays was subjected to a number of 
limitations. In the first essay, the analysis in the study is based on the data issued by the 
Fortune’s AMAC rating, the data provided by the rating defined the timeframe of the 
research. Data issued in the early years was not available for access, therefore the final 
timeline of the analysis is 1985–2010.  In 2005 the rating was issued in a shorter version, so it 
was excluded from the analysed cross-section. Methodology, implemented in the stud, 
relayed on the data from ProQuest database to create variable, which represents firm’s 
interest in reputation. The variable captured companies, which used Fortune’s AMAC 
mention in the reports. The search for a specific wording combination created an addition 
limits to the search 
Information availability similarly imposed limitations for the second essay. Cox 
(1974) Proportional Hazard model requires consistency of hazard rate over time. However it 
was not possible to gather information on the closing date on particular funds.  
Analysis in the third study was conducted using the information provided by the 
industry player. It was a unique opportunity to examine a brokerage company, which 
diversify the product range in response to changing regulation field empowered by 
implementation of new MiFID II regulations. However it imposed certain constrains to the 
analysis. The broker provided information on the ranking and recommendations construction, 
however the scale was not provided, therefore the focus was made on recommendations and 
ASSET4 ranking was implemented to create an ESG ranking-based portfolio. As the ESG 
implementation practice was implemented within the company relatively early, the size of the 
available dataset is limited to the 2007–2016 timeframe. In addition, due to the European 
origin of the company and its geographical coverage, the analysis focuses on European and 
French markets only.  
In addition, as market participants rarely reveal their methodology or make alternative 
ESG rankings publically available, the most efficient approach to compare the efficiency of a 
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product was to compare the performance to the SRI fund portfolios and the European-based 
benchmark portfolio. It was also discovered, that French financial market does not provide a 
home-based sustainable index.  
 The implementation of MiFID II was discussed in this study. However, as the 
Directive has not yet been implemented, the nature of the narrative carries a degree of 
uncertainty and the discussion is constrained by the available information, which could be 
subjected to potential change.  
 Data availability imposed even stronger limitations for the forth essay. Private equity 
is one of the most complex sectors to analyse due to data availability restrictions. This 
problem was widely discussed in the essay. The lack of regulations and standardized 
approaches to reporting affects the quality of the available data, which lacks both clarification 
and compatibility. In addition, private equity investors have not expressed a strong interest in 
the ESG framework, making the sector one of the slowest to adopt emerging practices. These 
factors have negatively impacted the dynamic of academic studies in the subject. Therefore 
no extensive empirical studies were dedicated to ESG within the private equity context, the 
analysis presented in the paper relied mainly on the publically available industry reports.   
 The exploratory presented in the paper was similarly impacted by data-related 
restrictions. The cross-section was constructed on the basis of the information provided by an 
industry participant. However the dataset provided was only partly complete, as some 
information was unavailable. Further information was not provided, which restricted 
opportunities for more in-depth analysis, and in addition the existing dataset covered only the 
period between 2007 and 2012. 
 
C.4 Implications 
The findings, demonstrated in four essays, brings positive implications for invstros, 
fund managers and other stakeholders.  Finding in the first essay would find relevance 
amongst strategic management. Effective reputation management practices provide 
opportunities and a competitive advantage for a company, making it among the firm’s top 
priorities. Detecting a link between reputation management and firm performance provides 
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encouraging evidence for companies, suggesting the positive results that could be fostered by 
reputation management.  
 The evidence of a long-term effect from reputation introduces a valuable insight that 
could impact reputation the management-related practices adopted by the company’s 
managers. It also provides additional encouragement to increase investment in reputation, as 
the lasting effect from reputation could hinder any potential for lasting investment pay-offs. 
Findings in the second essay bring a range of positive implications for asset managers. 
In order for Responsible investment practices to succeed among investors, it is important to 
provide strong positive evidence of a potential spectrum of possibilities that professionals 
could benefit from through the implementation of the ESG framework in the theory of 
investment strategy. This study demonstrated the long-term positive effect that SRI funds can 
benefit from, which could be a strong motivating factor for investors who seek long-term 
investment strategy and risk diversification opportunities.   
The study of the sell-side broker bring a range of positive implications for the industry 
players. The implementation of the ESG framework could be characterized as uneven among 
market participants. Sell-side brokers demonstrated an incredibly low interest toward the 
matter. However, the changing context of financial markets regulations reinforces 
transparency and imposes complications that could lead both to an increase in competition 
and profit reduction. In these turbulent conditions, it is important for sell-side brokers to 
adjust at a faster pace and consider alternative routes in order for their business model to 
prosper. The ESG framework is a complex and flexible one that encompasses various 
possibilities that market players can tailor to their needs. Therefore, it could be suggested that 
some ESG-related techniques could supply brokers with new techniques and mechanisms that 
could help them function more efficiently under the new conditions.  
   Another important topic highlighted in this study is ESG rating practices. In order to 
succeed in an investment strategy that would fall into an ethical category, it is important to 
have an accurate valuation mechanism as well as an assessment system. These requirements 
cannot be meet without the application of a reliable ranking system by investors. 
Communications and transparency are the key factors to develop a successful methodology; it 
is therefore important for both academic and market participants to provide more 
standardized and transparent techniques, in order to improve the efficiency of an approach 
that could provide significant benefits for the ESG framework.  
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In the fourth essay, the lack of empirically supported evidence of potential benefits 
related to the ESG framework was cited by numerous reports as a significant obstacle to 
further expansion and development of techniques. This study not only identifies the potential 
benefits and techniques that have been overlooked by investors; it also demonstrates the first 
empirically supported evidence of the potential influence of ESG-related factors on a 
portfolio. These results could influence investors’ attitudes towards the concept, and 
potentially encourage data-sharing practice as a further step to creating consistency in 
reporting practices.  
 
C.5 Further Research 
 This thesis revealed a number of further research opportunities in the topics of 
reputation management and responsible investment. The first essay tested whether corporate 
reputation works, through examining if firm’s interest in reputation impacts its performance 
as measured by AMAC ranking. The interest was translated into variable through the search 
of a specific wording in the ProQuest data availability. It is important to explore alternative 
stronger approach, which would provide robust data on company’s interest in reputation and 
would signalise its inclination to manage it. It could be achieved through testing for 
diversified search phrases. Further methodology development would allow to test the 
longevity of reputation power under different settings. In addition, it could be interesting to 
adjust the model test the impact of variable which captures the sustainable business approach 
to potentially improve the longevity of reputation. 
The second essay raised the question of fund survival capabilities. Number of studies 
tackled survivorship bias in the empirical research when evaluation performance of ethical 
and conventional funds (Gregory et al, 1997; Bauer et al. 2005; Gregory and Whittaker, 
2007). As numerous studies raised attention over stronger survival capabilities (Gregory and 
Whittaker (2007) revealed 17.43% higher survival rate of SRI funds, Kempf and Osthoff 
(2008) reported even lower survival rates of conventional funds at 19% lower comparing to 
ethical funds), this study further tested the connection, revealing SRI specification to improve 
survival of the funds. As the analysis tested the European universe, it is interesting to see 
whether the same results hold for the funds in North American region. In addition. It is 
important to extend the challenge through defining a longer timeframe for the analysis. As 
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SRY specification appeared to be the strongest factor to define survival, age and size were 
amongst the other tested factors. It would be interesting to test implications through 
introduction of a larger variety of factors. 
 Academic research on the subject of ESG and brokerage is visibly frugal, as this 
market participants addressed the framework relatively recently. It could be suggested, that 
more brokers could address the framework in search for alternative ways to generate fees and 
improve it competitiveness under introduction of MiFID II. Therefore, it opens a vast 
opportunity for academic community to evaluate ESG-related opportunities, which could be 
adopted by brokerage firms.  
 This study focused on the case of industry player, which developed and ESG ranking 
and recommendations, and offered it amongst its product range. It would be interesting to 
draw a comparative analysis to further test the efficiency of the recommendations and test the 
ranking creation opportunity on a larger scale. The UK market could offer a particular 
interest; given France and UK remain the leaders in the sustainability sector. It is also 
important to apply various themes for portfolio generation in order to identify stronger 
opportunity to generate abnormal positive portfolio return. This could make the product 
competitive not only within ESG ecosystem, but also with mainstream investors. 
 In addition, an access to more in-depth methodologies of ESG ranking providers 
would provide an opportunity to take a closer look at the methodology of ranking 
development. 
 The forth essay reported limited investigation due to data availability, however, it 
established a fruitful ground for further research as it revealed the evidence of negative 
relationship between the ESG-related incidents and private equity multiples. It would be 
interesting to fully evaluate the impact ESG factors have on private equity portfolio 
performance. Currently academic research lack strong empirical studies on the subject. In-
depth portfolio performance analysis would allow to search for evidence of positive ESG 
implications, which remain a subject of strong discussion. 
 Methodological outlook on the process of ESG implementation on various stages in 
requires further detailed investigation. It is important to understand at which stage 
implementation of ESG framework would bring most benefits. 
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 Finally, the study revealed a strong need for empirical analysis to test the implication 
ESG brings for risk mitigation in the private equity settings. 
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